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Internationalization   is an important issue   on the strategic agenda of firms.
When the home market is too small or competition is too strong for firms to
be profitable, firms are forced to seek new possibilities either of increasing
benefits or of decreasing the costs of production. A reduction in costs can,
for instance, be achieved by moving production facilities to low-wage coun-
tries, while sales can be increased by entering new geographical markets. In
the last few decades, opportunities for entering new markets have improved
considerably. Many countries have opened their markets to foreign investors,
new markets have emerged, customer preferences across the world have
converged, and the developments in information technology have facilitated
the  management of foreign affiliates.
However, each foreign entry remains difficult, mainly because of the many
factors that affect the success of the entry. Firms that want to invest in a
foreign country should assess the possible impact of these factors. Despite the
complexity of this decision-making process, it is important that firms make
the right decision within the right span of time. Generally, firms have only
one real chance to enter a foreign market (Hill, Hwang, and Kim, 1990;
Root, 1987; Terpstra and Sarathy, 1991; Wind and Perlmutter, 1977). If the
first attempt fails, other firms may profit from the opportunities, which
makes a second attempt futile. In addition, foreign entry usually requires
substantial investments, which will be worthless when the entry fails.
The purpose of the present study is to provide insight into the factors that are
decisive for the foreign entry mode choice. Rather than attempting to cover
the whole range of possible modes of entry, the focus will be on the question
whether a firm should enter a foreign market on its own, with a single
venture or a wholly owned subsidiary (WOS), or together with a partner firm
in a joint venture  (JV)  (see, e.g., Agarwal, 1994; Agarwal and Ramaswami,
1992a, 1992b; Benito, 1994; Erramilli, 1991; Erramilli and Rao, 1993;
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Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Hennart, 1991; Kim
and Hwang, 1992; Kogut and Singh, 1988b; Larimo, 1993; Padmanabhan
and Cho, 1994). In this study, a WOS is defined as a fully controlled
affiliate,  set  up from scratch.'  A  JV is defined  as a cooperative relationship
between at least two firms which contribute resources to a newly formed
joint subsidiary in exchange for shares in the control over and the equity of
the new entity.
The main reason for investigating only these two types is that the two modes
are comparable: both involve the development of new activities from scratch.
In a WOS, however, the investing firm can build upon its own skills and
experiences only, whereas a JV enables the combination and integration of
the partners' capabilities. Particularly if the partners' skills and experiences
are complementary, synergetic advantages may be gained in a JV. This
shared characteristic distinguishes WOSs and JVs from full and partial
acquisitions which can utilize existing facilities. A comparison between start-
ups and acquisitions would lead to a different research question. In that case,
the focus would be on the question whether to create an affiliate from scratch
or to build upon existing facilities. This choice was the topic of several
empirical studies  (see, e.g., Caves and Mehra,  1986;  Cho and Padmanabhan,
1992;   Hennart   and   Park, 1993; Kogut and Singh, 1988a; Wilson,    1980;
Zejan, 1990), but will not be considered in this study.
A second common feature of WOSs and JVs is that the relationship with the
new subsidiary is not only a contractual one, but also involves participation
in its equity. This distinguishes WOSs and JVs from non-equity modes of
foreign entry, such as exporting and licensing. Studies that examined, for
instance, the choice between WOSs and licensing arrangements concentrated
on the expanding firm's eagerness to own the foreign venture or not. A
number of studies investigated this decision   (see, e.g., Bilkey and Tesar,
1977; Contractor, 1984: Davidson and McFetridge, 1985; Killing, 1980;
Shane, 1994; Tallman, 1991).
' The abbreviation WOS is only used for wholly owned greenfield investments or wholly owned
start-ups. Acquisitions that lead to full control are not included in the term WOS.
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Several studies have explored the factors that influence the choice between
JVs and WOSs (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992a, 1992b; Benito, 1994;
Erramilli, 1991; Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988;
Gomes-Casseres, 1989, 1990; Hennart, 1991; Kim and Hwang, 1992;
Larimo, 1993). These studies revealed a large number of variables which
appear to be relevant predictors for the incidence of JVs or WOSs.
Some studies used transaction cost economics (see, e.g., Williamson, 1975,
1985)   as a framework for formulating hypotheses (e.g., Agarwal,    1994;
Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992b; Davidson and McFetridge, 1985;
Erramilli, 1991; Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988;
Hennart, 1991). This theoretical framework is oriented towards selecting the
most efficient governance structures. It is a useful framework for entry mode
choices, but, as is increasingly being acknowledged, this theory can provide
only a partial explanation of the complex, multi-faceted foreign entry mode
decision-making process. Therefore, researchers have attempted to incorpor-
ate concepts of other theories into the frameworks of their studies (Agarwal
and Ramaswami, 1992a; Bell, 1993a; Gomes-Casseres, 1989, 1990; Hennart
and Park, 1993; Hill, Hwang, and Kim, 1990; Madhok, 1994b). These
attempts show that a combination of more than one perspective can be
fruitful.   The most elaborate framework   is the eclectic theory   of the foreign
entry mode choice as introduced by Hill, Hwang, and Kim (1990). They
integrated aspects of three theories (transaction cost economics, internaliza-
tion  theory, and strategic behaviour approach)  into one eclectic model.2  This
eclectic framework, however, is not specified very precisely, and some
potentially relevant variables are ignored. The present study builds on this
eclectic theory. Several extensions and adjustments will be made based on a
critical review of the international business literature, strategic management
literature, and previous empirical studies on foreign entry mode choices.
Hence, this study will present a new eclectic, and more comprehensive,
conceptual framework for examining the selection of foreign entry modes.
2 The authors do not report explicitly that these three theoretical approaches are combined in their
eclectic framework. They only speak of strategic variables, environmental variables, and
transaction variables. However,   as   will be demonstrated   in the present study. the three groups  of
variables  are  closely  related  to the theories mentioned.
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Most previous empirical studies assumed that the relevant factors for the
foreign entry mode choice could be adequately captured with archival data.
In doing so, researchers disregard the crucial role of the perception of
decision makers. Irrespective of the actual circumstances, decision makers
take decisions that are based on their own judgment of the situation. Ignoring
the decisive influence of perception is a weakness in most entry mode
studies. Only recently, some researchers acknowledged the importance of
incorporating perceptions. They used surveys instead of publicly available
sources to collect data on foreign entry mode decisions (Agarwal and
Ramaswami, 19923. Erramilli, 1991; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Larimo, 1993;
Madhok, 1994a). The present study also recognizes the relevance of percep-
tions. Therefore, a survey was conducted to obtain data on foreign entry
mode decisions. These subjective data were complemented with archival data.
This combination of data adds to previous studies that only used either
subjective or objective data.
Closely related to this issue is the measurement of the explanatory variables.
Nearly all previous studies used one-item proxies for the variables, usually
gathered   at an aggregated level   (e.g., the industry level). However,   many
variables are complex constructs which cannot be assessed using one single
indicator. Hence, multiple proxies at the firm or venture level should be
employed to improve the measurement of such complex variables. In line
with Agarwal and Ramaswami (19928), Kim and Hwang (1992), and
Madhok (19948), the present study will combine multiple indicators (at the
level of the venture or the firm) to measure explanatory variables.
Finally, most studies are based on entries  of  US  MNEs (e.g., Agarwal   and
Ramaswami, 19922, 1992b; Brouthers  et  al., 1993; Caves and Mehra,   1986;
Contractor, 1984; Davidson and MeFetridge, 1985; Erramilli, 1991; Erramil-
li and Rao, 1993; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1989,
1990; Kim and Hwang, 1992). This bias concerning the national background
of the firms examined (i.e., country-of-origin effects)  may  have  had its reper-
cussions on the external validity of the results. The number of studies that
investigated foreign entry decisions of European firms is rather limited (see,
e.g., Barkema, Bell, and Pennings, 1996; Benito, 1994; Larimo, 1993). The
same  can be observed  for the number of Japanese entry studies  (see,  e.g.,
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In Chapter 3, the conceptual framework is developed. This eclectic frame-
work serves as the basis for the formulation of the hypotheses.
In Chapter 4, the methods of data collection and the measurement of the
variables are described. Furthermore, an outline is given of the statistical
techniques  that  are  used to process  the  data   in two successive steps: creating
the measurement model and testing the hypotheses.
In Chapter 5, the results of the two-step analysis are discussed. First, the
results of the estimations of the constructs are presented, and afterwards the
findings of the hypotheses testing.
Chapter 6 contains the conclusions of the present study and some managerial
implications. Finally, some suggestions for further research are provided.
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Cho and Padmanabhan, 1992; Hennart, 1991; Hennart and Park, 1993;
Hennart and Reddy, 1992; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1994). The present study
focuses on expansions of Dutch MNEs to find out whether the results of
studies on US-based firms are valid in other countries. In this regard, this
study, which is the first large-scale cross-sectional study on foreign entries of
Dutch MNEs, responds to the call for more research on foreign entries of
non-US firms (see Brouthers  et  al.,   1993).
In sum, the present study adds to previous studies in several respects. First, a
more comprehensive, eclectic framework will be developed. Second, this
framework will be tested using data from foreign entries of Dutch MNEs.
Third, these data include the perceptions of decision makers as well as
archival data. Fourth, the data involve data on the level of the firm and of
the foreign affiliate. Fifth, multiple indicators are utilized to measure  com-
plex explanatory constructs.
1.2 Problem formulation
The central issue of this study concerns the comparison between JVs and
WOSs as alternative modes of foreign entry. More specifically, an attempt
will be made to determine the variables that affect the choice between the
two entry modes. Formally, the main research question is:
What factors influence the choice between a joint venture (JV) and a
greenfield wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) as the mode of foreign entry?
1.3      Structure of the  book
In Chapter 2, the strategic relevance of foreign entry mode selections is
indicated, and the definitions of a number of possible modes of foreign entry
are given. Next, a critical overview of theories on international business is
provided. Finally, an overview is presented of previous empirical studies on
the choice between JV and WOS.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a review of the literature on entry mode choice.
However, before presenting the state of the art, the entry mode choice will
first be placed in a broader perspective. In section 2.2, the position of the
entry mode choice in the firm's strategy will be considered. Next, various
modes of entry will be described (section 2.3). Section 2.4 contains a critical
review of theories on international business. Finally, in section 2.5 an
overview of previous empirical research will be presented.
2.2 Corporate strategy and the choice of entry mode
Most firms have two levels of strategies: corporate strategy and business unit
(or competitive) strategy (Porter, 1987). Competitive strategy concerns   the
way in which each business unit should compete within its industry.   Only  by
creating a distinctive competitive advantage,3 each business unit may be able
to achieve the best competitive position. Possible strategies to enhance the
firm's competitive position are cost leadership, product differentiation, cost
focus, differentiation focus (Porter, 1980), shelter (Rugman and Verbeke,
1990), or cooperation (Moon, 1993). Corporate strategy, in contrast, con-
cerns the choice Of the businesses a firm wants to operate in, and the man-
agement of the different business units (Porter, 1987). Corporate strategy
should be the catalyst which generates synergies over and above the efforts of
the separate business units. This value added can be achieved by coordinating
and aligning the activities and requirements of the business units. Corporate
strategy, thus, entails the survival and the continuity of the firm. Stated
differently, corporate strategy deals with the question: 'How should a firm
manage its growth and development to maximize long-run profitability?' (Hill
3 More recently, new terms have been introduced with more or less the same meaning, such as
core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel,    1990)  and core capabilities (Stalk, Evans, and Shulman,
1992).
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and Jones, 1989). The answer to this question requires that the businesses
and the markets the firm wants to compete in are known. Corporate strategy
determines whether the firm will concentrate on a single business, will
integrate vertically into other stages of the value chain, or will diversify into
other businesses (Ansoff, 1965; Hill and Jones, 1989). These businesses may
be located either in the home country or in other countries.
In the last decades, many firms have established a presence in foreign
markets (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Levitt, 1983; Ohmae, 1985). In fact, a
shift from product-market expansion to geographic market expansion can be
observed (Dunning, 1993). Internationalization of activities is becoming a
prerequisite for the continuity of many firms, and should not be ignored in
the process of strategy formation.
The process of strategy formation involves many decisions. It includes the
selection of product-market combinations, the decision to enter a foreign
market  or  to stay within national borders  (see, e.g., Aharoni,   1966),   the
choice of target countries, and the determination of the firm's competitive
strategy in the various product-market combinations. All separate decisions in
this process of strategy formation interact with one another and are, thus,
very important. Together they determine the firm's competitiveness.
Consequently, a thorough ex-ante deliberation of the relationships between
the various decisions is required. All decisions must be geared to one
another. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to devote most attention to only
one decision in the entire process of strategy formation, thereby ignoring the
other decisions.
A good example of such a narrow focus on only one decision is Porter's
(1980) approach. In his book, Porter concentrated on the final decision of the
strategy process, i.e., competitive positioning. He argued that firms should
choose one of three generic strategies (cost leadership, differentiation, or
focus) to strengthen their competitive position. Porter suggested that this
selection from among the three generics is the most important decision to be
made. The determination of the precise criteria for selection takes place in
isolation from the other decisions. As a result, a possible interdependence of
this final decision in the process of strategy formation on previous decisions
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remains uncovered. Although the choice of competitive strategy is essential,
a 'correct' generic strategy will not lead to the best attainable competitive
position if earlier decisions are suboptimal. Porter's generic strategies  may  be
compared to the choices to be made in the last kilometre of a marathon,
while it may be more useful to investigate what choices are made in the first
41 kilometres (Rugman and Verbeke, 1993a, p. XI).
More recently, Porter (1986) acknowledged the relevance of other important
decisions in the process of strategy formation, such as the configuration and
coordination of foreign activities (see also Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). The
configuration of the firm's activities includes how many subsidiaries are
established, and where  (i.e., the location)  they are established. Coordination
involves the structuring of the relationship between headquarters and the
various separate entities (Porter, 1986). Although this distinction and inter-
pretation of the two concepts are susceptible to criticism, the relevance of the
configuration and coordination of foreign activities in the process of strategy
formation is generally accepted. Some of the criticism is put forward by
Rugman and Verbeke (1993b), who argued that both concepts are too broad
to be useful as criteria when choosing among alternatives. Further, they
claimed that the concepts of configuration and coordination are not mutually
exclusive (see also Moon,  1992).
One very important issue of international configuration, and consequently
also an essential element in the process of strategy formation, is the choice of
the mode of entry (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986. Hill, Hwang, and Kim,
1990; Kogut and Singh, 1988a; Root, 1987; Terpstra and Sarathy, 1991;
Wind and Perlmutter, 1977) or of the package of different entry modes
(Benito and Welch, 1994).4 After choosing in what product-market combina-
tions and where a firm wants to operate, the mode of entry must be deter-
mined. MNEs can choose among many entry modes when entering a new
product or geographical market. This choice has major consequences for
other decisions in the process of strategy formation and should, therefore, be
considered very carefully. A firm may gain significant advantages vis-a-vis
4 In Porter's work. the choice of entry mode is hardly mentioned, although he is convinced that
'...  it is an important decision of the global competitor, ...' (Porter,  1986, p.  10).
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competitors when the correct entry mode is selected. For example, if the
environment requires a fast entry to ensure a large market share, a WOS will
not be the most appropriate mode of entry. Then, other modes with a shorter
set-up time are to be preferred.
Furthermore, firms have to select the right mode of entry the first time.
Often, there are no possibilities for a second chance (Davidson, 1982; Root,
1987). Whenever a second-best entry mode is chosen, (potential) competitors
may already have taken the opportunities to serve the product-market combi-
nation. In addition to the market potential lost, many committed resources
(e.g.,  management time, money, and various facilities) may become obsolete.
These far-reaching consequences of an incorrect choice show that the mode
of foreign entry should be selected correctly the first time. There is no
general rule which states when a specific mode of entry is the most appro-
priate alternative, since all entry modes have unique characteristics. In the
following chapters, the contingencies for the optimal mode of entry will be
elaborated. In the next section, an overview will be given of the various
possible modes of foreign entry.
2.3 Possible modes of entry
There are many possible modes of entry. The modes which are relevant to
foreign market entry are discussed in this section. Since JVs and WOSs have
been  described in Chapter  1,  they  will  be  left  out  of the following overview.
The first mode of foreign entry that will be described is exporting. Exporting
can take place in different  ways. For instance, products  can  be  sold in other
countries via arm's-length contracts. This means that only one transaction
takes place without the intention of establishing a relationship.5 Another way
of exporting is using a local agent. A third option is to establish a sales
office, which sells the products of the exporting firm.
f Similar terms for this type of coordination are the 'buy' option (Richardson, 1972), 'spot market
transactions' (Williamson,   1975,1981),  and 'open market transactions'  (Root,   1987).
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Countertrade is a collection of entry modes which have in common that the
seller has a contractual obligation to purchase products back from the buyer
(Banks, 1983). Countertrade comprises no less than about 5 per cent of total
world trade (OECD, 1985). Many researchers have pointed to the increasing
relevance of countertrade as the number of firms and countries involved in
countertrade had been growing in the 1980s (Carter and Gagne, 1988; Chou-
dry, McGeady, and Stiff, 1989; Francis, 1987; Hennart, 1990). However, a
substantial part of the countertrade value consisted of trade with the former
centrally planned economies (Hennart, 1990). After Eastern European
countries opened up their markets to other modes of entry, countertrade lost
some  of its attractiveness.
Following Hennart (1990), six forms of countertrade can be distinguished,
which are divided into two groups. The common characteristic of the first
three types of countertrade (barter, clearing arrangements, and switch trad-
ing) is that cash payments are avoided.6 Barter is the most primitive form of
trade whereby products are exchanged, just like in ancient times. Clearing
arrangements are compilations of large numbers of barters in order to create
the possibility of credit. Surpluses or shortages are periodically settled in
cash or in kind (Halbach and Osterkamp, 1989). In the case of switch
trading, the positions which are kept in clearing arrangements can be traded,
thus enhancing the flexibility of the arrangements (Hennart, 1990).
The other three forms of countertrade (buy back, counterpurchase, and
offset) have in common that the parties involved enter into mutual obliga-
tions, laid down in parallel contracts (Halbach and Osterkamp, 1989;
Hennart, 1990). In a buy-back arrangement, technological know-how and
assistance are transferred to another country in exchange for money.    A
parallel agreement contains detailed arrangements about the amount of prod-
ucts which are made with the knowledge provided that will be bought by the
seller of the technology. Counterpurchases differ from buy backs in the sense
that there is no connection between the technologies sold and the products
h In many publications, barter and countertrade are entangled as it is believed that all forms of
countertrade are directed at avoiding cash payments (Choudhry, MeGeady, and Stiff,    1989,
McVey, 1980: Mirus and Yeung, 1986, 1987). That is why countertrade is usually considered to
be  harmful  for the present world trade (Halbach and Osterkamp, 1989; Lecraw,   1988,   1989)
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bought. The last form of countertrade is ojIset, which deals with the compen-
sation a host country gets for the payments it has made for the technologies
delivered. In an offset, the exporting firm does not only have to buy products
from the host country, but may also be obliged to outsource part(s) of its
production process to local firms or to transfer more technologies to the host
country. This type of countertrade is very common in the military defence
industry (Hennart, 1990).
A cartel is an entry mode which is subjected to stringent legislation. It is a
temporary form of horizontal cooperation in which economically independent
participants make verbal or written agreements to change the market condi-
tions in their favour, often by means of market control (Hoekman, 1984; De
Jong, 1985). Most cartels are prohibited by anti-cartel laws, as they cause
unfair competition. A well-known example of a cartel is the OPEC, which
attempts to make agreements on the quantity of the barrels of oil to be
produced  and  on its prices.
Licensing agreements are long-term contracts which cover the transfer of the
right to use specific know-how. Generally, the licensee pays the licensor a
royalty based on the quantity or the sales of the output which embodies the
know-how transferred. Sometimes, however, (packages of) patents are
exchanged for other patents making actual payment unnecessary.  This  type  of
agreement is labelled a cross-licensing arrangement. The knowledge trans-
ferred may concern one or more products, the production process, or the
R&D activities representing current technologies or current and future
technologies (Killing, 1980). In the latter case, new developments in a spec-
ified product range will be transferred to the licensee too. In order to make
the know-how transferable, it should be recorded in a blueprint, a drawing,
or a formula. When the know-how is of a tacit nature (Polanyi, 1967), it
cannot be transferred in the form of a written contract. Tacit knowledge can
only be acquired via learning-by-doing, which is usually not incorporated in
the licensing agreement. Sometimes, however, a minor part of the arrange-
ment involves the teaching of certain specific activities. For example, when a
brewery licenses its knowledge to brew beer to a foreign firm, it will also
provide training facilities to assure the quality of the beer and its brewing
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process. Although the precise process can be described in a formula or a
blueprint, a 'Fingerspitzengefiihl' or 'gut feeling' is required for the way to
react to unforeseeable events, and the finishing touch. This feeling can only
be obtained by experience.
Licenses are becoming more and more popular vehicles for the transfer of the
newest technologies to competitors. The main underlying argument for this
rather paradoxical tendency7 is that firms attempt to create a global standard
for technological innovations. Philips, for instance, has licensed its techno-
logical know-how of the production of compact discs and players to several
competitors, including Sony. Philips's intention was to prevent a debacle
similar to what happened with the introduction of the Video 2000 system
some years earlier. A global standard at an early stage of development
enables firms to be profitable without the threat of intensive competition.
Franchising is also called commercial licensing (Hoekman, 1984). It can be
described as a contractual form of commercial cooperation between indepen-
dent firms, where the franchisee pays for the right to use the franchiser's
brand name and, possibly, other distinctive means, such as the lay-out and
the design of the shop (Brickley and Dark, 1987). Both firms remain inde-
pendent. Popular examples of firms using franchising as a mode of foreign
entry are McDonalds, Burger King, and Pizza Hut.
Another contractual mode of entry is the consortium, which is frequently
confused with a JV. The main difference is that, in contrast with JVs, no
equity participation takes place. A consortium    is   a   sort of contractual   JV,
which is set up for the duration of a project. A number of firms establish a
relationship to share the expenses and the risk of a (large) project. Examples
of projects that typically require a consortium are the exploration of oilfields.
the construction of huge buildings, and the construction of the Channel
TunneL
7 This tendency is paradoxical because firms which have a leading position in the licensed
technology sell their comparative advantage to their competitors. As a result, these firms risk
losing their leading position.
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Another possible mode of entry is a strategic  alliance, an umbrella term used
for many forms of cooperation. A large variety of coalitions, such as JVs,
marketing agreements, supply agreements, licensing agreements and so forth,
are labelled strategic alliances  (see, e.g., Harrigan, 1988b; Porter and Fuller,
1986). Most definitions of strategic alliances are very broad, for instance:
partnerships among firms that work together to attain some strategic objective
(Berg, Duncan, and Friedman, 1982; Killing, 1983). A better definition of a
strategic alliance is the one formulated by Burgers, Hill, and Kim (1993),
who state that a strategic alliance is a long-term explicit contractual agree-
ment pertaining to an exchange and/or combination of some, but not all, of a
firm's resources with a competitor. This definition does not include JVs,
since no reference is made to equity participation, which is a distinctive
feature  of  JVs.
A minority participation involves the purchase of a small percentage of the
equity of an ongoing firm, usually a small high-tech firm (Harrigan, 1986).
Often, such an investment is focused on keeping up with and, eventually,
acquiring the specific skills or know-how of the target firm. One of the
characteristics of minority participations as opposed to JVs or acquisitions is
that the specific nature and identity of the target firm are preserved. It helps
to avoid that the innovative capabilities and the flexibility of the small firm
are influenced by the negative impact of a larger firm's bureaucratic, time-
consuming decision-making processes. Minority participations may be used
as a sort of venture capital to provide entrepreneurs with the capital required.
The last entry mode to be considered here is the acquisition. This is the most
far-reaching mode of entry, as all resources of a target firm are absorbed by
the buying firm. This feature typically distinguishes an acquisition from a JV,
where only a part of a firm's resources is exchanged: In the terms of
Williamson (1975, 1985), acquisitions are regarded as hierarchical govern-
ance structures as the buying firm obtains full ownership and, consequently,
full control of the target firm. The acquired firm must be integrated into the
' There are, however, JVs in which one firm contributes part of its resources, while the partner
firm brings in all of its resources. This particular type of JV can especially be found in relation-
ships between large and small firms Generally, smaller firms do not have enough managerial and
financial resources to set up a JV in addition to their regular business.
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buying firm to increase the likelihood that the acquisition will be successful
(Bueno and Bowditsch, 1989). This process of integration is often subject to
many problems and misunderstandings, which are usually due to differences
between the partners' corporate culture. If a foreign firm is acquired, the
combination and integration of the firms are much more complex than if a
firm is acquired with the same home base. In the former case, both national
and corporate cultural differences  have   to be overcome. Acquisitions  may   be
used to obtain market power by creating an oligopolistic or even a monopol-
istic market situation. Anti-trust legislation, however, attempts to prevent the
creation of market power and may, therefore, prohibit certain acquisitions.
In the next section, a selection of relevant theories on internationalization will
be discussed.
2.4   Theories on international business
The internationalization of firms is a topic which has been studied from many
different disciplines, like international finance, international trade, and
international business. The present study focuses on international business, in
which several explanations of the internationalization of firms can be distin-
guished. This suggests that there is a lack of consensus about the conceptual
domain of international business (Toyne, 1989). These approaches can be
divided into two broad groups: static and dynamic approaches.
Static approaches compare different states instead of processes, and try to
find  the best solution  (e.g.,  the best ownership structure)  for a certain state.
They provide explanations for the existence of MNEs, and not for the
process of internationalization (Melin, 1992). Most of these static approaches
have an economic background, which means that they evaluate firms' invol-
vements in foreign countries based on their costs and benefits. Examples of
static approaches are: Hymer's theory (Hymer, 1960, 1976), transaction cost
economics (Hennart, 1982; Teece, 1981, 1986. Williamson, 1975, 1985),
internalization theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Rugman, 1981),
Dunning's eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1981, 1988a, 1988b), the strategic
behaviour approach (Kogut, 1988). the resource-based approach (Wernerfelt,
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1984), and the eclectic theory of the choice of the international entry mode
(Hill, Hwang, and Kim, 1990).
Dynamic approaches, in contrast, consider internationalization to be a
sequential process. They attempt to explain and predict the firm's involve-
ment in the international environment over time. Examples of dynamic
models are: the product life-cycle model (Vernon, 1966, 1979), the innova-
tion-adoption-inspired internationalization models (Andersen, 1993; Bilkey
and Tesar, 1977; Cavusgil, 1980), and the Uppsala internationalization
process model (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990; Johanson and Wieders-
heim-Paul, 1975; Welch and Luostarinen, 1988).
Given    the    aim    of this study (see Chapter 1) , namely to investigate    what
factors underlie the choice for a JV or a WOS in foreign-entry decisions,
static approaches are more appropriate than dynamic ones. Hence, this study
will only concentrate on static approaches. It should be stressed, however,
that the focus will be on theories which provide microlevel (i.e., firm-level)
explanations for the existence of MNEs. More macroeconomic and financial
theories  on  the  MNE (e.g., Aliber, 1970; Kojima,   1978, 1982; Kojima  and
Ozawa, 1984; Lessard, 1976, 1982; Rugman, 1975, 1979) are disregarded in
this study.9
First, a description will be given of static theoretical concepts that provide an
answer to the question why firms become MNEs. Next, these theoretical
concepts will be evaluated in section 2.5. Finally, previous empirical studies
will be revipMed»e«on 2.6).
 .4.1   Hymer's  market  impe,fections  theory  of foreign direct  investment
C--
Hymer (1960) was the first to explain foreign direct investment (FDI) as an
international extension of industrial organization theory. He criticized    the
model of perfect competition of neoclassical economics, which asserts that
international trade is the only possible way to have international involvement
'   See, for instance, Calvet   ( 1981) and Dunning   (1993)   for   a good overview of these macro-
economic and financial theories.
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(Kindleberger, 1969). In his pioneering dissertation, Hymer (1960, 1976)
challenges the assumption of the model of perfect competition that informa-
tion is costless and freely available. According to Hymer, local firms are
better informed about the local economic situation than foreign firms. In
order to be able to provide an explanation for the existence of FDI, two
conditions must be fulfilled: (1) MNEs that own and control foreign subsidi-
aries must possess firm-specific advantages that outweigh the disadvantages
of being a foreign firm, and (2) the market for selling these advantages must
be imperfect (Hymer, 1960, 1976). These firm-specific advantages, which
Hymer called monopolistic advantages (based on market power), imply the
existence of structural market imperfections. Hymer relied on Bain (1956) in
rationalizing these imperfections, such as knowledge advantages, distribution
networks, economies of scale, and product differentiation. Hymer's view on
MNEs as monopolistic rent seekers formed the basis for Kindleberger's
(1969) 'market inlii,erfecii8 -i* Iiii;2>and for Caves's (1971) early work.d.-- -
Hymer's market imperfections theory of FDI postulates that WOSs are the
best alternative in the case of monopolistic advantages, while arm's-length
transactions are the best alternative in the absence of these advantages.
Hymer (1960, 1976) emphasized the role of monopoly power in explaining
MNEs, and paid no attention to efficiency based or Coasian (Coase, 1937)
considerations (Dunning, 1988a, 1988b: Dunning and Rugman, 1985;
Rugman, 1986; Teece, 1985, 1986). Obviously, Hymer was not aware of
Coase's work when completing his dissertation in 1960 (Horaguchi and
Toyne, 1990). However, in his later work (Hymer, 1968, 1970), he explicit-
ly referred to Coase and even combined Coase's view of markets and firms
with his own market imperfection theory of MNEs. For example, Hymer
(1968) concluded that the international activities of firms are determined by
both market power  and cost considerations.
2.4.2 Transaction cost economics
Oliver Williamson (1975, 1985) uses the concept of transaction cost market
imperfections in his analytical framework. He builds on Coase (1937), who
rationalized the existence of firms and specified the conditions of market
failure. Transaction cost economics elaborates Coase's views focusing on the
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most efficient governance structure for a given type Of transaction. Hence,
the level of analysis in transaction cost economics is the transaction. A
transaction is defined as 'the transfer of a good or service across a techno-
logically separable interface' (Williamson, 1975, 1985). A 'most efficient'
governance structure means that the total production and transaction costs
are, in the long run, less than those of any other governance structure. Pro-
duction costs include the direct and indirect costs of making the products,
such as the costs of labour, energy, raw materials, semi-manufactured
products, components, depreciation of the machinery, and maintenance.
Transaction costs are the costs connected with finding a contractual partner,
specifying a contract, and securing that the ex-ante defined goals will be met
ex post (Williamson, 1975, 1985). These transaction costs are determined by
three characteristics of transactions (asset specificity, uncertainty/complexity,
and frequency), given two assumptions about human behaviour (bounded
rationality and opportunism) (Williamson, 1975).
Different combinations of the three characteristics of transactions will lead to
different optimal governance structures. Firms prefer to internalize transac-
tions (i.e., creating  a  WOS  or, in Williamsonian language, a hierarchy)  in
cases of highly specific assets, high uncertainty, and recurrent transactions.
This governance structure is the best safeguard against opportunistic behavi-
our. In a hierarchy, authority and rules can be used to ensure that employees
will not behave in an opportunistic way (Williamson, 1975, 1985).
JVs, however, can only exist if the markets for intermediate inputs are inef-
ficient (Hennart, 1988). Then, JVs will be the most efficient governance
structure when transactions are characterized by a moderate level of asset
specificity, uncertainty, and frequency. Given these transaction cost market
imperfections, JVs are the best alternative for coordinating assets which can
be   shared  at  zero  or low marginal   cost (i.e., public goods), and cannot  be
separated from unwanted assets (i.e., firm-specific assets) (Hennart,    1988).
In order to remain the most efficient alternative, it is important that effective
safeguards exist against the risk of opportunistic behaviour of the partner(s).
Several researchers proposed solutions for ensuring effective safeguards. For
instance, Buckley and Casson (1988) introduced a theory of cooperation in
which the concepts of mutual forbearance, mutual commitment, and mutual
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trust (see also Beamish and Banks, 1987) are crucial. Mutual forbearance
means that all partners claim that they will refrain from cheating. Important
in this respect is that the commitment to the relationship is credible to all
partners. From this perspective, cooperation is efficient if a given amount of
mutual forbearance generates the largest possible amount of mutual trust. In a
similar vein, Kogut (1988) distinguished two critical issues, namely the rules
concerning the division of control and the sharing of gains and/or losses, and
the mutual commitment of resources. Brown, Rugman, and Verbeke (1989)
emphasized, in this regard, that the reward and control system should reflect
each partner's contribution  to  the JV correctly.
Initially, transaction cost economics focused on explaining why and when a
particular governance structure is chosen, neglecting the international
context. Williamson (1992) admits that his analysis of MNEs is brief and
incomplete. Notwithstanding this observation, it should be stressed that this
rather unexplored field was developed by others than Williamson (see
Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Buckley and Casson, 1985; Casson, 1982;
Caves, 1982; Hennart, 1982; Klein, Frazier, and Roth, 1990; Teece, 1981,
1986). For instance, Teece (1986) asserted that MNEs prefer to internalize
certain transactions to reduce the effects of opportunistic behaviour, which
can  be very great  in an international environment.
. .ftern«lization "'e«q '
Internalization theory was developed to provide an economic rationale for the
existence   of MNEs (Buckley and Casson, 1976; McManus, 1972).m  The
firm is the unit of analysis. This theory rests on two general axioms (Buck-
ley, 1988).(1) firms choose the least cost location for each activity they per-
form, and (2) firms grow by internalizing markets up to the point where the
benefits of further internalization are outweighed by the costs. The first
axiom did not always receive the attention it deserved. Rugman (1981), for
instance, minimized the relevance of location-specific variables   (e.g.,    low
labour costs, low transport costs, and a good infrastructure) in internalization
10 Rugman (1979,  1981,  1985) goes one step further by claiming that internalization theory is a
general theory of foreign direct investment
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theory by including spatial cost saving as a firm-specific variable. He argued
that the location-specific variables are exogenous and only have an explana-
tory value at the macrolevel, not at the level of the individual firm. Buckley
(1983) criticized this point of view by referring to the vital role the location
choice and the non-traded inputs play in the competitive positioning and
growth pauern of firrns.
Rugman and Verbeke (1992, 1993b) proposed a modified internalization
theory, which is based on concepts from authors who combined the field of
strategic management with international business (e.g., Bartlett and Ghoshal,
1989; Doz, 1986; Ghoshal, 1987). Rugman and Verbeke made an explicit
distinction between firm-specific advantages and country-specific advantages,
whereby the former can be either location bound or non-location bound.
Location-bound firm-specific advantages will only yield benefits in a particu-
lar environment. An exchange or diffusion of the location-bound advantages
to other locations is no option, as it will make the advantages worthless. The
non-location-bound advantages, however, keep their value when transferred
to and applied in additional locations. This distinction   of two types  of  firm-
specific advantages clearly shows the importance of locational differences.
In its most general sense, the second axiom can be interpreted as being tauto-
logical, or as Buckley (1983) formulated it eloquently: 'a concept in search
of   a theory'. However, additional assumptions about transaction costs   for
particular products and for trade between particular locations were specified
(Casson, 1982). For example, the market for know-how is imperfect, long-
term contracts are difficult to specify and to enforce, and tariffs and other
financial burdens cause internal transfer pricing. The firm is an alternative to
a market, as the internal market is used to produce and distribute goods and
services efficiently in cases of (external) market failures (Rugman, 1982).
MNEs arise when markets across national borders are internalized. Markets
that are often internalized are intermediate markets with imperfections, such
as markets for knowledge (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1982; Rug-
man, 1981). MNEs possess a comparative advantage when transactions are
uncertain and when transactions consist of long-term exchanges of complex
and heterogeneous products among a relatively small number of traders.
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According to the original internalization theory, MNEs always avoid JVs
since they are inferior to WOSs, which allow MNEs to maximize the returns
on ownership-specific advantages (Caves, 1982). JVs and other hybrid forms
of coordination are fraught with danger for the MNE, as they may negatively
affect the MNE's firm-specific advantage (Rugman, 1982). The benefits of
cooperation could never offset the strategic risks and transaction costs.
Referring to a study by Buckley and Davies (1981), Rugman (1982) claims
that hybrid forms of coordination (including JVs and licensing) are not very
important, and are unlikely to increase in number substantially in the future.
They are only expected to arise when the risk of dissipation of the MNE's
firm-specific advantage is low, which may be valid for only a few products
(Rugman, 1982). Internalization theory, thus, cannot explain JVs (Dunning,
1989; Parry, 1985). Beamish and Banks (1987), however, extended internal-
ization theory by providing an economic rationale for JVs. Using the trans-
action cost framework, Beamish and Banks (1987) argued that in situations
where a JV is established in a spirit of mutual trust and commitment to its
long-term success, problems regarding uncertainty, opportunism, and small
numbers   can be effectively dealt  with.   Then, the benefits   of  a  JV   will   more
than offset the costs.
2.4.4  Dunning's  eclectic  paradigm
The eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1981, 1988a, 1989, 1993) recognizes that
both structural and transaction cost market imperfections are important in
explaining MNEs. The unit of analysis is the (whole) population of firms
engaged in foreign value-adding activities. The eclectic paradigm of interna-
tional production states that firms will become MNEs if three conditions are
satisfied simultaneously: firms have ownership-specific advantages, which
can be more profitably exploited outside the firm's domestic markets (loca-
tion-specific advantage), and internalization of these advantages obtains the
highest value (Dunning, 1981; Teece, 1986)."
" Another name for this eclectic paradigm is OLI-paradigm. where OLI stands for ownership-
specific advantages, location-specific advantages. and internalization incentive advantages.
respectively (Dunning, 1988a, 1993)
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Dunning (1981) identified three types of ownership-specific advantages (0):
a. those that stem from the exclusive possession of, or access to, particular
income-generating assets;
b. those that are normally enjoyed by a branch plant compared to a de novo
firm;
c.   those   that   are a result of geographical diversification  or   multinationality
perse.
In his later work, Dunning (1988a, 1988b, 1993) made a distinction between
ownership-specific asset advantages (Oa) and ditto transaction advantages
(Ot).    Oa    corresponds    with    the    type of ownership-specific advantages    as
mentioned under a, and Ot with the other two ownership-specific advantages.
The Oa advantages involve the ownership of specific assets by MNEs which
other firms do not own. These assets may be either tangible, such as natural
endowments and (human) capital, or intangible, such as technological know-
how, managerial and marketing skills, and access to intermediate and final
goods markets (Dunning, 1988a, 1993). Given the notion (Dunning, 1988b)
that the differences between firms' assets can only occur in a situation of
structural market imperfections,12 the Oa advantages are similar to Hymer's
monopolistic advantages (Hymer, 1960, 1976). Although Dunning (1993)
asserts that the 0-advantages embrace Porter's competitive advantages (see,
e.g.,  Porter,  1980,  1985), he prefers his own nomenclature in calling these O
advantages monopolistic rather than competitive.
The Ot advantages include the ability of firms to capture the transactional
benefits from the common governance of multiple and geographically dis-
persed activities (Dunning, 1988b, 1993). Some examples of these Ot
advantages are the firm's experience, easy access to a variety of inputs
because of the relationship with the parent company, ability to learn from
cultural differences, and greater knowledge of international markets.
In addition to ownership-specific advantages, location-specific advantages (L)
are essential in determining which firms will engage in cross-border value-
I 2 See, for example, the classification proposed by Bain (1956): monopoly power, product differen-
tiation, absolute cost barriers, and government interventions.
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adding activities. Although the decision of where to set up production
facilities is treated separately from the other two advantages, it cannot be
seen as an independent decision. These location-specific advantages include,
for instance, low transport costs, the availability of resource endowments,
infrastructure, economic and political stability, and low input prices.
The last strand of the OLI paradigm comprises the internalization advantages
(I) that MNEs have in transferring assets within their organizations instead of
via the market, because of market failures. The greater the perceived costs  of
transactional market failure - and the greater the benefits of circumventing
market failure - the more likely it will be that MNEs exploit their ownership-
specific advantages within the firm. Some possible internalization incentive
advantages are high search and negotiating costs, high probability of moral
hazard and adverse selection, possible lock-in situations (Buckley and
Casson, 1988; Williamson, 1985), and high costs of (legal) enforcement.
2.4.5 Strategic behaviour approach
The strategic behaviour approach, or more generally the strategic manage-
ment approach, concentrates on the way in which strategic behaviour influ-
ences the firm's competitive position (Kogut, 1988) while retaining a suffi-
cient amount of strategic flexibility (Harrigan, 1985c). More specifically, this
approach is focused on the firm's ability to compete with both existing and
potential competitors (Porter, 1980). As a consequence, competitive advan-
tages are very important in the strategic behaviour approach. Competitive
advantages only last for a certain period of time (Porter, 1980), which is in
contrast with monopolistic advantages   that are assumed to exist eternally.
This time dimension is crucial in distinguishing competitive advantages from
monopolistic advantages. If a firm has a competitive advantage over other
firms, it must attempt to benefit maximally from this temporary relative
advantage, as competitors may catch up (Buckley, 1990).
The firm's competitive position, thus, is mainly determined by its temporary
competitive advantages. This explains the rather short-term orientation of the
strategic behaviour approach. Given a relative advantage, MNEs will try to
maximize short-term profits, even at the expense of long-term considerations,
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to prevent other firms from appropriating their competitive advantage
(Buckley, 1990). A WOS will be preferred over other alternative governance
structures, if this serves the MNE's relative competitive position best (Con-
tractor and Lorange, 1988b).
JVs can also function as an effective mechanism for the improvement of a
firm's relative competitive position. The reasons for setting up JVs are
numerous   (see, e.g., Contractor and Lorange, 1988a, 1988b; Harrigan,
1985a, 1988a). MNEs are expected to establish a JV only if this mode of
entry maximizes profits by improving the MNE's relative competitive
position. Then, the advantages minus the disadvantages of JVs relative to all
other alternative governance structures are highest (compare Contractor,
199Oa). Some of the (strategic) advantages of JVs are economies of scale,
learning effects, reduction of risk and competition, access to know-how,
skills and assets, and so on. Disadvantages are, for instance, the cost of
coordinating activities, the dissipation of know-how, and possible
opportunistic behaviour (Porter and Fuller, 1986).
2.4.6 Resource-based theory
The   resource-based   view   of   the firm emerged only recently    (see,    e.g.,
Barney, 1986; Collis, 1991; Conner, 1991; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992;
Peteraf, 1993; Tallman, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984), although its origin can be
found in the 1930s. The antecedents of the resource-based perspective
originate in four different, though related, streams: the theory of imperfect
competition (Chamberlin, 1933; Robinson, 1933), the theory of the growth of
the firm (Penrose, 1959; Rubin, 1973), the evolutionary, entrepreneurial
view of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Schum-
peter, 1934), and transaction cost economics (Coase, 1937; Williamson,
1975, 1985). The resource-based theory attempts to explain the success and
failure of individual firms by concentrating on the heterogeneous nature of
the firm-specific resources (Helleloid, 1992). A firm is considered to be a
unique collection of productive resources that are heterogeneous and fungible
(Penrose, 1959). The term heterogeneous means that the resources are
unique, whereas fungible implies that the resources can be applied for the
provision of several distinct services which yield different outputs.
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A well-accepted practice in the resource-based theory is to differentiate
between resources and capabilities (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Grant,
1991; Stalk, Evans and Shulman, 1992), also labelled tangible and intangible
resources (Hall, 1992), or assets and core competencies (Prahalad and
Hamel, 1990). This distinction acknowledges the difference between tangible
resources  (e.g., land, machines, and manufacturing facilities), which  can  be
traded relatively easily between firms. and tacit capabilities (e.g., techno-
logical know-how, managerial know-how, financial know-how, organizational
routines, and brand name capital), which are hardly transferable among
firms. The firm's capabilities form the firm's capacity to use and deploy
resources (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993), and infuse them with sustainable
value (Madhok, 1994b). Typical features of capabilities are that they are firm
specific, difficult to imitate, and have developed over time (Amit and Schoe-
maker, 1993; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). This implies that firms are able to
learn from previous experiences and, in addition, can exploit the knowledge
acquired in other circumstances. The accumulation of knowledge, or more
generally termed capabilities, is a dynamic process which leans heavily on
the history of the firm (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Current and future
behaviour of firms, thus, is substantially influenced by experiences in the
past. Since capabilities are the driving force behind the creation of (super-
normal) rents with the firm's resources, capabilities are of the utmost import-
ance in gaining competitive advantages. Particularly the improvement of the
ability to learn  (i.e., the firm's absorptive capacity; Cohen and Levinthal,
1990) by acquiring, processing, and diffusing information will result in
increased advantages relative to competing firms (Ghoshal, 1987).
Firms are expected to gain (temporary) super-normal profits when they
exploit their firm-specific resources efficiently and effectively to establish a
good fit between strategy, structure, and environment (Helleloid, 1992;
Tallman, 1991). In order to prevent the super-normal profits from being
captured by competitors, firms will create resource position barriers (Werner-
felt, 1984), which will hamper the attempts to imitate the firm-specific
resources. As an example, firms may decide to invest heavily in the develop-
ment of technological know-how, or in organizational learning.
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Like the other theoretical explanations in this section, the resource-based
approach is able to provide a rationale for FDI. According to this theory, it
is economically efficient for firms to become MNEs when the following
conditions apply simultaneously (Helleloid, 1992):
1.   The    firm has excess capacity    in a unique and valuable productive
resource.
2. There are imperfect markets for these resources.
3.   Exporting   from   the home country   is less efficient   than FDI because  of
governmental restrictions, lower factor costs, transportation costs, and the
perishability of the products.
4. Possession of unique and valuable resources gives the firm a specific
advantage in the host country, which offsets the cost disadvantages of
being a foreign firm.
5.   The    firm    has the excess capacity in managerial services required    to
manage foreign expansion.
6. The returns from foreign expansion exceed the returns from domestic
diversification.
7.   The bureaucratic costs of managing  one more subsidiary  do not offset  the
potential returns.
According to the resource-based approach, the selection of the mode of
foreign entry depends on the demands on the firm's capabilities and the
possible increase in these capabilities (Madhok, 1994b) Since the firm's
resources and capabilities are rather constant in the short run, they both guide
and restrict - in combination with the contextual requirements - the firm's
entry mode choice (Tallman,    1991). An increase   in the capabilities   (i.e.,
learning) is a time-consuming, gradual process. Therefore, firms may not be
able to learn the capabilities required in turbulent environments (Levitt and
March, 1988). In that case, a JV is the optimal mode of entry as JVs allevi-
ate the acquisition or development of the lacking capabilities. In addition to
this reactive way of dealing with JVs, firms may also behave pro-actively or
offensively by establishing JVs to increase and improve their stock of capa-
bilities beforehand. In this regard, firms may set up JVs mainly to become
experienced in managing and controlling JVs, so they can learn as much as
possible from their partner's capabilities. A WOS, in contrast, is the appro-
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priate mode of entry if the firm's current capability stock is sufficient to gain
the potential rents in a foreign country.
2.4.7 Eclectic theory of the foreign entry mode choice
Hill, Hwang, and Kim (1990) developed a framework to combine the differ-
ent and seemingly unrelated considerations and (partial) explanations discus-
sed in the existing literature. They contended that transaction cost economics
alone is not able to explain foreign entry mode choices. For example, stra-
tegic management issues, such as the role of global competition and global
strategy, are completely ignored in studies using transaction cost frameworks
(e.g.,   Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Hennart, 1991; Hennart   and   Park,
1993). Therefore, Hill, Hwang, and Kim (1990) stressed the need to incorpo-
rate strategic variables in an eclectic theory of the choice of international
entry modes.
They argued that the array of possible entry modes can be characterized by
three constructs: the level of control, resource commitment, and the risk of
dissemination. The level of control involves the amount of authority over
operational and strategic decision making. Certain modes of entry provide the
parent firms with more control than others. For example, in a WOS the
parent firm has more influence on the decision-making processes than in a
licensing arrangement. In a similar vein, it can be shown that WOSs entail
more commitment of resources than JVs and licensing agreements. Lastly,
the risk of dissemination refers to the risk that firm-specific advantages in
know-how will be appropriated by another firm (Hill and Kim, 1988).
Obviously, this risk will be much lower in the case of a WOS than in the
case  where  less than fully controlled modes of entry are involved.
Furthermore, Hill, Hwang, and Kim (1990) distinguished three broad groups
of variables that influence the entry mode decision: strategic variables, envi-
ronmental variables, and transaction-specific variables. Strategic variables,
being the type of strategy and the concentration in the global industry,
primarily affect the entry mode decision by the level of control they require.
The environmental variables (e.g., host-country risk, location familiarity,
demand conditions, and the volatility of local competition) are closely
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connected with the commitment of resources. The final group of variables
which consists of transaction-specific variables, such as the value of firm-
specific know-how and the tacitness of know-how, influences the choice of
the international entry mode through its impact on the risk of dissemination
and the level of control.
Hill, Hwang, and Kim (1990) acknowledged that not only the separate
variables are important for the choice of the foreign entry mode, but also the
interaction between strategic, environmental, and transaction-specific vari-
ables. The optimal decision for the MNE is to select that entry mode that
maximizes the long-term value of the firm, considering all relevant factors.
WOSs are assumed to be the preferred entry mode in the case of the pursuit
of a global strategy, the need for global strategic coordination, a large quasi-
rent stream generated by the MNE's specific know-how, or a large tacit
component of firm-specific know-how. JVs, in contrast, are expected to be
preferred in the case of a multi-domestic strategy, a high country risk, a
large perceived distance between the home and the host country, uncertain
demand, and volatile competition in the host market.
This overview of theoretical concepts on the existence of MNEs shows that
many explanations are possible. However, it appears that there is also some
overlap between the explanations. In the next section, these theories will be
evaluated to reveal the differences and the overlaps.
2.5    A comparative analysis of theories
In section 2.4, the following approaches were distinguished: Hymer's theory,
transaction cost economics, internalization theory, Dunning's eclectic para-
digm, the strategic behaviour approach, the resource-based approach, and the
eclectic theory of the choice of international entry mode by Hill, Hwang, and
Kim (1990). Below, these approaches will be evaluated with regard to their
usefulness in explaining the choice between a JV and a WOS as the mode of
foreign entry. This evaluation will be used as the basis for the construction of
the conceptual framework in Chapter  3.
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Hymer's market imperfections theory of FDI (Hymer, 1960, 1976) uses the
concept of market power in explaining the existence of MNEs. The market
power held by firms is believed to be based on monopolistic advantages of
these firms. Whenever firms possess monopolistic advantages, they will
invest outside their own country only by retaining full ownership (i.e., by
means of WOSs). Alternatively, an arm's-length contract will be selected.
This dichotomy, which Hymer proposed in his dissertation (Hymer, 1960,
1976), is a rather limited perspective as it ignores all kinds of intermediate or
hybrid forms of organization, such as JVs, franchising, and licensing arran-
gements. A comparable narrow focus was advocated in the initial publica-
tions on transaction cost economics (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975). In
more recent contributions, the existence of hybrid governance structures was
acknowledged (Hennart, 1988; Riordan and Williamson, 1985; Williamson,
1981, 1985, 199la, 1991b). A somewhat similar change can be observed in
Hymer's work. After completing his dissertation, Hymer (1968) recognized
that collusion may be an alternative to WOSs and arm's-length contracts.
This can be illustrated by the following statement: 'Une firme peut s'entendre
avec d'autres pour diviser le marcht en spheres d'influence (par exemple, les
Am6ricains se limitant A l'Amtrique Latine, les Europtens A l'Asie et A
l'Afrique et tous se faisant concurrence au Canada), ou bien elle peut nouer
des liens de coop6ration plus Btroits et partager avec d'autres les risques de
certains entreprises.......' (Hymer,     1968, p. 972).13 Although Hymer
acknowledged that other forms of organization are viable, he paid little
attention to them. The above - rather loose - statement comes just before the
end of the article, and Hymer did not elaborate on the subject in his later
work.
A second point of criticism on Hymer's work is the use of monopolistic
advantages, which 'automatically'   lead to revenues. 14 These monopolistic
advantages are firm-specific and remain valuable for a very long time without
'3 The fact that this article was written in French may be one of the reasons why it has been
overlooked   for  more   than two decades. Only recently, the concepts which   were put forward   by
Hymer  in this article are given the full credits they deserve (see, e.g., Dunning, 1993; Horaguchi
and  Toyne,   1990).
14 This 'automatic' way of generating revenues is in sharp contrast with the strategic behaviour
approach which states that obtaining revenues depends on the strategic choices firms make
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being appropriated by other firms. This conception of everlasting advantages
is beyond the contemporary reality of business. Nowadays, competition is so
severe that nearly every advantage a firm has over other firms will only be
valuable   for a short time. Competitors  will   try to acquire or imitate   such  an
advantage, making the comparative advantage worthless. Even if an advan-
tage   can be patented,    it   will not exist forever, because the patent system   is
not a perfect system (Hennart, 1982). Particularly in the international
context, the enforcement of patents is difficult and requires large investments
of time and money (mainly for legal support). Compare, for instance, the
problems firms encounter in their continuous fight against the multi-billion
market of illegal imitation of a great variety of products, such as watches,
compact discs, software, sportswear, and so on. Moreover, patents can fairly
easily be circumvented without punishment by making a product which
differs only slightly from the patented product. Hence, it can be concluded
that Hymer's assumption of eternal monopolistic advantages is not realistic.
In contrast, the strategic behaviour approach and the resource-based approach
explicitly acknowledge that firm-specific advantages    are only temporary.
Both approaches recognize that these firm-specific or competitive advantages
have to be protected against the appropriation or imitation by competitors.
The difference is that the resource-based approach proposes to employ
resource position barriers, while the strategic behaviour approach uses entry
barriers. Some examples of the former type of barriers are production experi-
ence, reputation, and relationships with clients and suppliers (Wernerfelt,
1984) or, more generally, the stock of intangible resources and skills
(Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Scale economies, investments in redundant
capacity, low prices, and specific non-recuperable investments (Porter, 1980)
are typical examples of entry barriers.
Transaction cost economics is complementary to these two approaches, since
its unit of analysis and its focus differ. Transaction cost economics evaluates
decisions at the level of the individual transaction, while the strategic behav-
iour approach and the resource-based approach, respectively, take the firm
and organizational units as the unit of analysis. Furthermore, transaction cost
economics uses the long-term or structural efficiency as the criterion for
choosing between alternative governance structures. The inclusion of struc-
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tural efficiency considerations adds to the decision criteria of the strategic
behaviour approach and, to some extent, of the resource-based approach.  rhe
strategic behaviour approach ignores the concept of structural efficiency
completely, whereas the resource-based approach makes an explicit distinc-
tion between strategic intent and structural e fficiency, which are integrated
into one model (Tallman, 1991). However, the attention this latter concept
receives in the resource-based view is much shallower than in transaction
cost economics.
In the last two decades, much criticism was addressed to transaction cost
economics   (see, e.g., Demsetz, 1988; Dietrich,   1994;   Dow, 1993; Groene-
wegen, 1995; Kay, 1992; Noorderhaven, 1994; Perrow, 1986; Robins, 1987;
Williamson, 1992, 1993). Some of the concepts which were criticized are the
assumption of opportunism, the subordinate role of trust, the implicit assump-
tion of hyperrationality given the explicit assumption of bounded rationality
(see Noorderhaven, 1994), and so on. The focus here will be on those
elements of criticism relevant for foreign entry mode choices.
Transaction cost economics only concentrates on structural efficiency at the
level   of the transaction, completely ignoring strategic considerations.   This   is
especially problematic, because transaction cost economics assumes a situ-
ation of imperfect competition (Robins, 1987) in which strategic behaviour is
important (see, e.g., Harrigan, 1985c; Hennart and Park, 1994; Kogut,
1988; Porter, 1980). Moreover, strategic considerations turn out to have a
decisive impact on ownership decisions (Contractor, 199Oa; Hennart and
Park, 1994; Hill, Hwang, and Kim, 1990; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Kogut,
1988). Firms may select a mode of entry which is not efficient for the
specific transaction in terms of transaction cost economics, but which is the
best   alternative   for   the   firm   as a whole,   e.g., for strategic considerations
(Kim and Hwang, 1992; Kogut, 1988; Osborn and Baughn, 1990).
A second shortcoming of transaction cost economics is that it focuses only on
the minimization of costs when comparing alternative governance structures,
and ignores possible benefits (Kogut, 1988). Such a one-sided approach
seems to assume that the benefits are similar for all possible governance
structures. However, it disregards the existence of benefits which may accrue
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from unique characteristics of the different modes of organization. One
example is the synergy between firms which can be achieved in JVs by
combining and exchanging relevant know-how. This synergy will result in
higher benefits than a firm would gain in a WOS (see also Contractor,
1990a; Contractor and Lorange, 1988b). Hence, it would be more correct to
consider both the benefits and the costs of governance structures when
contemplating a transaction. Rather than concentrating myopically on cost
minimization, a firm should attempt to maximize the difference between the
benefits  and the costs.
A final weakness of transaction cost economics which will be discussed here,
involves the implicit assumption of identical production functions across
firms (Conner, 1991; Demsetz, 1988; Dietrich, 1994; Madhok, 1994b;
Teece, 1985). This suggests that all managers of all firms have the same
management capabilities and routines, and use them in the same way. This
assumption is far from realistic, as it denies the existence of firm-specific
differences in this area. The study by Walker and Weber (1984) supports the
criticism on the above assumption, as they found that production cost differ-
entials are more important than differences in transaction costs in make-or-
buy decisions. Unlike transaction cost economics, the resource-based
approach assumes that all firms have a different stock of capabilities and re-
sources. More specifically, each firm is believed to form a unique, firm-
specific bundle of resources and capabilities (Penrose, 1959).
Internalization theory, which is perceived as a general theory for the exist-
ence of the MNE (Rugman, 1979, 1981, 1985),15 is frequently considered
to    be    analogous to transaction cost economics. Both transaction   cost   econ-
omics and internalization theory rest upon the early work by Coase (1937),
and were developed simultaneously in two continents. While Williamson was
working on his 'markets-and-hierarchies' dichotomy, Buckley and Casson at
the University of Reading (UK) formulated their internalization theory. The
fundamental ideas underlying  the two concepts are identical: firms use their
19 Parry (1985) disputes the contention that internalization theory is a general theory of FDL since
it cannot provide explanations   for the choice between exports, licensing   and    FDI,    or   for   the
existence of JVs.
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internal organization structure to overcome problems (expressed as costs)
which are caused by inefficiencies in factor markets. Both theories assume
that these inefficiencies can be dealt with more efficiently within the firm
than outside the firm. In this regard, Hennart (1986) stressed that organi-
zations may fail too. As a consequence, he proposed a 'theory of firm
failure', which shows that firms are not, by definition, more efficient than
markets where high transaction costs are concerned. Hennart emphasized  the
necessity for firms to reduce shirking and to control internal loss of informa-
tion. These are aspects which are more or less neglected by transaction cost
economics and internalization theory. 16
Nevertheless, there are some differences between these theories, which are
merely differences in emphasis (Rugman, 1986; Teece, 1986). Transaction
cost economics focuses on the level of the single transaction, whereas
internalization theory takes the firm as the unit of analysis. Another differ-
ence is that the second axiom of internalization theory requires some addi-
tional constraints to prevent it from being tautological (Boddewyn, 1985;
Buckley, 1983, 1988; Casson, 1982; Rugman, 1986). Only then, internal-
ization theory is able to determine what transactions need to be internalized
and what mode of entry should be selected. Transaction cost economics can
provide the framework required (Teece, 1986). A last difference is that
internalization theory explicitly takes location-specific advantages into
account, whereas transaction cost economics disregards these advantages.
Teece (1986), for example, asserts that the evaluation of location-specific
advantages is nothing more than comparing, on the one hand, the unit costs
of production at home and supplying the customers by exporting to, on the
other hand, the costs of local production and supply. According to Teece,
this is a rather straightforward conceptual exercise, which almost automati-
cally yields the appropriate solution.
The two eclectic approaches (Dunning's eclectic paradigm and Hill, Hwang,
and Kim's eclectic theory of the choice of international entry mode) also
'6 These topics are treated extensively  in the agency theory. which attempts to explain why organi-
zations are structured as they are (see, e g, Fama and Jensen, 1983) Central in this theory is the
problem of aligning the firm's objectives with those  of the agents  (e g., employees, managers,  or
foreign subsidiaries)  such  that sel f-interest-seeking behaviour is minimized.
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incorporate location-specific advantages. Dunning's eclectic paradigm
(Dunning, 1981, 1988, 1993), which has been criticized frequently (see,
e.g.,  Itaki, 1991; Rugman, 1986; Teece, 1986), distinguishes three kinds  of
advantages (OLI), which are believed to explain the foreign activities of the
whole population of firms. Two of these advantages (location and internal-
ization) are comparable with those of internalization theory, although the
precise interpretation of the advantages differs. For instance, internalization
theory combines ownership-specific advantages and internalization advantages
since the former advantages have to be internalized to be effective (Itaki,
1991; Rugman, 1986).
Two major differences between the two eclectic frameworks are: first, Hill,
Hwang, and Kim focused on the level of the individual firm, whereas
Dunning attempted to explain why the whole population of MNEs developed
cross-border activities. Second, Hill, Hwang, and Kim assumed that the
competitive advantages of firms are temporary advantages, while Dunning's
ownership-specific advantages are monopolistic advantages (compare Hymer,
1960, 1976).
A shortcoming of Hill, Hwang, and Kim's (1990) eclectic framework is that
no explicit attention is paid to the resources and capabilities of firms (com-
pare Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Hence, the resource-based theory is not
incorporated in their eclectic framework.
This section contains an evaluation of the theories. In the next chapter, the
usefulness of these theories for building the conceptual framework will be
examined. Before constructing that framework, a survey of previous empiri-
cal studies will be presented in the next section.
2.6 Empirical studies
Many empirical studies examined the incidence of foreign entry modes such
as licensing, JVs, acquisitions, greenfield investments, franchising, export-
ing, and countertrade (e.g., Bilkey and Tesar, 1977; Buckley and Davies,
1981; Caves and Mehra, 1986; Contractor, 1984; Czinkota, 1982; Davidson
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and McFetridge, 1985; Erramilli, 1991; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988;
Gomes-Casseres, 1989, 1990; Hennart, 1990, 1991; Hennart and Park, 1993;
Hennart and Reddy, 1992; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Kogut and Singh, 19882;
Stopford and Wells, 1972; Welch, 1990; Wilson, 1980; Zejan, 1990). These
studies tested hypotheses on a large number of variables expected to influ-
ence the choice of entry mode. Some examples are the familiarity with the
host country, the cultural (dis)similarities between the firm and the host coun-
try, the degree of specificity of the assets involved, and the firm's experience
with a particular entry   mode, host country or industry. However, the results
of these tests are mixed  (see, e.g., Benito, 1994; Caves and Mehra,   1986;
Contractor, 1984; Davidson and McFetridge, 1985; Gatignon and Anderson,
1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Hennart, 1990, 1991; Larimo, 1993; Mariti
and Smiley, 1983; Zejan, 1990). The hypotheses tested in these empirical
studies were usually based on a theoretical framework as described earlier,
sometimes even on more than one (Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Hennart and
Park, 1993, 1994; Madhok, 19942). The frameworks most frequently used
are the transaction cost framework (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992b;
Davidson and McFetridge, 1985; Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Gatignon and
Anderson, 1988; Hennart, 1991; Hennart and Reddy, 1992), the bargaining
power framework (Fagre and Wells, 1982; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Lecraw,
1984), and some eclectic frameworks (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 19922; Kim
and Hwang, 1992). Others did not use a particular framework, but elaborate
on previous empirical studies (Brouthers  et  al.,   1993;  Cho and Padmanabhan,
1992; Larimo, 1993; Zejan, 1990).
As the present study focuses on the choice between JVs and WOSs, only
empirical studies concerning this choice will be reviewed:7 Table 2.1 con-
tains an overview of the findings of these empirical studies. 18
I7 Some  of the studies presented investigated other modes of entry  (e.g.,   I icensing or acquisitions)
in addition to JVs and WOSs.
'*  The  studies by Stopford and Wells  ( 1972)  and  Kim and Hwang  ( 1992)  are not included in Table
21. The former study is excluded since no statistical  tests  were done. which makes it impossible
to make statements on the level of significance The latter study is left out because Kim and
Hwang did not make a direct comparison between JVs and WOSs
Table 2.1: Overview of the findings of the empirical studies which focused on the choice between JVs and WOSs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9           10          11           12          13          14          15           16
cultural distance                                +                                   +                          +       ns + + + - -
physical distance ns
uncertainty avoidance host country                                                                                                                  +
power distance host country                                                                                                                                     -
host-country risk                             +                                                 ns - ns +
level of welfare host country +             +                                                                             -                                              +              -             ns
growth of welfare host country                                                    +                                                     ns
host government restrictions                   +                +       +                                                                        +                                    +
perceived market potential
resource-intensive industry +    +          +               +
R&D-intensive industry +           ns          ns
marketing-intensive intensity ns       -       -
industry growth                                             ns                                      +
level of competition ns                            + ns ns
market complexity                                                                                                                +
desire for direct control
asset specificity                              - ns ns ns - ns ns       -
marketing intensity                           -                                         ns
capital intensity                                                                                                   +
firm size                                                                    -                           -                 +        -                                    -                 ns
size subsidiary ns                                           +                                                                                                                                                                                            ns
relative size                                             + ns ns
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8            9           10          11           12          13          14          15           16
international experience                                          -                                                           -/ +                            - ns ns - ns
host-country experience                                           -        -
JV experience                                                                                                                                                                   +
diversification ns/ + '           +                                 + ns ns ns
degree of diversification ns




resource obsolescence                                                                                                                                               +
contractual risk ns
performance ambiguity ns
service inseparability                                                                                       +
' Gomes-Casseres used two proxies for diversification: (1) the difference in the three-digit SIC code of the core activity of the subsidiary and the firm's activities, (2) the number of
foreign subsidiaries the firm had  in the subsidiary's three-digit SIC industry. Only the latter measure (i.e., product experience) was (positively) significant.
+  = increased probability of JVs; - = decreased probability of JVs; ns = not significant
1.  Gatignon and Anderson (1988) 5. Erramilli (1991) 9.  Larimo (1993) 13.  Agarwal (1994)
2. Kogut and Singh (1988b) 6. Hennart (1991) 10.  Erramilli and Rao (1993) 14. Benito (1994)
3.  Gomes-Casseres (1989) 7. Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992a) 11.  Brouthers et al. (1993) 15. Madhok (1994a)
4.  Gomes-Casseres (1990) 8. Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992b) 12. Shane (1993) 16. Padmanabhan and Cho (1994)
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Stopford and Wells (1972) were the first to investigate the entry mode choice
thoroughly. They analysed data on foreign entries of 155 US MNEs, and
found a higher propensity to establish WOSs when marketing, product
innovation, and product standardization were important. In contrast, JVs are
the  preferred  mode of entry in extractive industries  (e.g., coal mines,  oil,
and bauxite) and when the investment is a diversification.
Gatignon and Anderson (1988) tested eight hypotheses based on transaction
cost economics (see Anderson and Gatignon, 1986)„ regarding the level of
control in establishing a foreign mode of entry. They considered the entry
mode decision to be a two-stage decision. In the first stage, firms determine
whether they will cooperate or not, while in the second stage the level of
control (minority, 50/50, or majority) in the JV needs to be chosen. In order
to   test the hypotheses, Gatignon and Anderson   used the database   of  the
Harvard Multinational Enterprise Project (Curhan, Davidson and Suri, 1977).
This database contains firm-level data on more than 19,000 foreign subsidi-
aries  of  the 180 largest US firms  set  up  in the period 1900-1975. Gatignon
and Anderson concentrated on the (more than 9,000) foreign entries of
manufacturing firms in the period 1960-1975. However, the sample was
reduced  to 1,267 observations because of missing data. Their logit analyses
showed that most variables have a significant impact on the decision to coop-
erate or not (stage 1): (a) the propensity to set up WOSs increases with the
level of specific know-how, the MNE's experience, and the advertising inten-
sity, and (b) the likelihood of JVs grows in proportion with country risk,
legal restrictions, and, in certain cases, the sociocultural distance. Only three
variables appeared to be significant at stage 2: a larger scale of operations
leads to minority JVs; majority JVs are selected in advertising-intensive lines
of business; and in Latin European countries. This study demonstrated the
usefulness of a transaction cost framework for predicting the choice between
a WOS and a JV. However, the small number of significant variables at
stage 2 implies that this framework has insufficient predictive value for the
level of control once a JV is chosen.
" They, however, recognized that some of the variables included, such as cultural distance, are
'not  central to transaction cost economics'  (p.  311)
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Kogut and Singh (1988b) particularly focused on testing the strategic behav-
iour approach. They distinguished the following variables: type of industry
that is entered into (R&D intensive or advertising intensive), the growth of
the industry entered, the degree of concentration in that industry, and the
relative  size  of the foreign subsidiary. To investigate the impact of these  stra-
tegic variables, they used the same sample as in Kogut and Singh (1988a),
which was taken from a variety of publicly available sources. Their sample
consisted of 108 manufacturing entries into the United States, either WOSs or
JVs, made from 1981 to 1984. The results of their logit analyses partially
corroborate the predictions of the strategic behaviour approach. Only two
variables appear to have a significant effect on the foreign entry mode
selection: the R&D intensity of the industry entered and the relative size of
the investment have a positive impact on the propensity to form JVs.
Gomes-Casseres (1989) posited that the strategic motivation for cooperation,
transaction costs, and organizational costs jointly determine the costs and
benefits of ownership structures. In doing so, he relied explicitly on the work
by Hennart (1988) and by Stopford and Wells (1972).20 Gomes-Casseres
ascertained a two-stage decision process regarding the foreign market entry
mode choice, which differs from the one proposed by Anderson and Gatig-
non (1986). According to Gomes-Casseres, MNEs determine their own pref-
erences with respect to the entry mode in the first stage, while in the second
stage MNEs negotiate with the host government. He used the database of the
Harvard Multinational Enterprise Project (Curhan, Davidson and Suri, 1977),
but restricted the sample to subsidiaries which still existed in 1975. The total
sample of more than 5,000 affiliates was reduced to 1,532 complete obser-
vations. With regard to the first stage, the logit models revealed that MNEs
prefer JVs when they rely on local inputs of raw materials, when the host
country is restrictive, and when local firms contribute skills to a JV. WOSs
are preferred if MNEs have much experience in an industry or a country,
when intra-system sales of the subsidiary are high, and when the subsidiary is
in a marketing-intensive industry.
-" Stopford and Wells (1972) used a slightly different terminology. They referred to 'need for
resources' rather than 'motivation for cooperation'.  and  'need for control' rather than 'organizatio-
nal costs'
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In an additional paper, Gomes-Casseres (1990) investigated the ownership
structure of foreign entry modes in two stages: (1) What does the firm want?
and (2) What can the firm get? The latter question concerns the relative
bargaining power a firm has as opposed to the host government. Again,
Gomes-Casseres used the Harvard Multinational Enterprise Project database,
and he was able to analyse data on 1,877 foreign ventures. The results of the
logit analyses are comparable  with the results in Gomes-Casseres  (1989):   JVs
are more likely in the case of host-government restrictions, if a developed
country is entered, if the host country's welfare grows, in the case of a high
level of competition, if a resource-intensive industry is entered, in the case of
diversified expansion, and in case the subsidiary is large. In contrast, WOSs
are favoured if a marketing-intensive industry is entered, the investing firm is
large, there are substantial intrasystem sales, and if the investing firm has
much experience with operating in the host country. Further tests turned out
that the variables included influence the firm's preferences more than its
relative bargaining power. Several variables which had no significant impact
on the firm's relative bargaining power were significant in previous studies
(Fagre and Wells, 1982; Lecraw, 1984). In these studies, however, the two
stages (firm preferences and bargaining power) were not distinguished and
separated.
In a study on the foreign market entry modes of service firms, Erramilli
(1991) expected to find a U-shaped relationship between the firms' desire for
full control over foreign affiliates and their experience (both the length and
the scope). In order to verify this U-shaped relationship, Erramilli mailed a
survey to 463 US service firms involved in international operations, with a
response rate of 44 per cent. Using logit analysis, the hypothesized U-shaped
correlation between the level of control and the service firms' experience was
confirmed. The length of experience turned out to be a more significant
indicator of the entry mode selection than the scope of experience.
Based on transaction cost economics, Hennart (1991) examined whether
Japanese manufacturing MNEs choose a WOS or a JV when entering the
United States. He concentrated on costs and benefits of shared equity and
added two other variables, viz. the concentration ratio of the industry
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entered, and the age of the subsidiary. z ' Hennart took a sample from a
survey of Japanese affiliates in the US (Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1987). which
resulted in 158 observations. The empirical results of the log it models
indicate that JVs are the preferred entry mode if the subsidiary is in a
different industry than the Japanese MNE, the subsidiary is in a resource-
based industry, or the Japanese MNE is entering a high-growth industry.
Whenever the Japanese MNE's foreign experience increases or the subsidiary
is older, WOSs are more likely.
Kim and Hwang (1992) tested their eclectic theory of the choice of interna-
tional entry mode (Hill, Hwang, and Kim, 1990). They sent questionnaires to
senior-level management of US-based MNEs, of which 137 were returned (a
response rate of 22 per cent). The questions were used to calculate nine
constructs, which were included in various statistical analyses (MANOVA,
MDA, and multinominal logit analysis). In addition to JVs and WOSs,
license arrangements were included in the testing as the base of reference. As
a consequence, no direct comparisons were made between JVs and WOSs.
The results of their logit analyses show that there is a significant positive
relationship between the propensity to establish a WOS and all three strategic
variables (global concentration, global synergies, and global strategic motiv-
ations), and the tacit nature of know-how. There is a significant negative
relationship with country risk and location unfamiliarity. Moreover, their
study revealed that there is a significant positive relationship between the
preference for a JV and global synergies, global strategic motivations, and
the tacit nature of know-how. However, a significant negative relationship
was found with country risk and location unfamiliarity. This study largely
supports their eclectic theory of the choice of international entry mode (Hill,
Hwang, and Kim, 1990), and shows convincingly that besides variables from
transaction cost economics and internalization theory, strategic variables
should be included in the analysis of entry mode choices.
Agarwal and Ramaswami (19928) investigated the impact of the OLI-advan-
tages (Dunning, 1981, 1988) on the choice of the foreign-market servicing
'' This last variable was included since c,Ider JVs are more likely to he disxc,lved or acquired by
one of the partners (compare Harrigan, 19851, Killing. 1983)
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mode. Rather than including the extensive list of possible OLI advantages
(see Dunning, 1981, 1988, 1993), Agarwal and Ramaswami used a manage-
able number of variables. As ownership advantages were taken: firm size,
multinational experience, and the ability to develop differentiated products.
Market potential and investment risk were the location advantages, while
contractual risk was used as an internalization advantage. Besides testing the
separate effects of the individual variables, they also formulated hypotheses
on interactions between variables. In order to test the hypothesized effects,
Agarwal and Ramaswami distributed a pre-tested questionnaire to the presi-
dent or chief executive officer (CEO) of 536 American leasing firms, which
led to a response rate of 23 per cent. Only 97 questionnaires were usable,
each of which contained information on entries into three different countries:
the UK, Japan, and Brazil. Four different options were considered:    no
involvement, exporting, JV, and WOS. After an exploratory factor analysis,
a number of logit models were estimated. The results of the main effects
indicated a preference for WOSs when firms are larger and more internatio-
nalized, and when investments are contemplated in markets with a high
potential. The outcomes   of the analyses   of the interaction effects supported
the joint hypotheses rather well. Larger and more internationalized firms
prefer WOSs and JVs in low-potential countries, whereas smaller and less
internationalized firms opt for JVs in high-potential markets. Furthermore,
both JVs and WOSs are favoured over other modes of entry by firms with a
higher ability to develop differentiated products when they deliberate invest-
ments in markets with higher contractual risks.
In a distinct study, Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992b) explored the choice
between   WOSs    and   JVs    from a transaction cost perspective. Again,    they
tested separate and interaction effects. The main effects were the external and
internal uncertainty firms encounter. In this study, external uncertainty
concerned the host country's political and economic risk, while internal
uncertainty involved the cultural distance between the home country and the
host country. These main effects were also examined in interaction with firm
size, multinational experience, and technological intensity. To test their
hypotheses, Agarwal and Ramaswami collected data from publicly available
sources on 148 foreign entries initiated by US manufacturing firms in the
period 1985-1989. The logit analyses demonstrated an increased propensity
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towards   WOSs   in  the  case of higher external and lower internal uncertainty.
Moreover, WOSs are favoured more by firms with little multinational experi-
ence than by firms with much multinational experience in a situation of
external uncertainty. A similar conclusion is valid for the preference for JVs
in  the  case of internal uncertainty (i.e., sociocultural distance).
In a study on the entry modes of Finnish firms, Larimo (1993) distinguished
many possibly relevant variables. He conducted a survey of foreign entries
made by Finnish manufacturing firms in OECD countries in the period 1977-
1988. This approach resulted in 120 observations, which represents a
response rate of 30 per cent. The logit analyses revealed that the probability
of WOSs increases in proportion with the speed of internationalization, and
the host country's economic size. JVs are more likely for larger firms, and
for investments in resource-intensive industries.
Erramilli and Rao (1993) modified transaction cost economics to make it
more suitable for explaining the entry mode choice of service firms. The
authors claim that service firms always prefer maximum control when
establishing a foreign entry mode. They added some strategic behaviour
factors, such as global integration and market power, to transaction cost
factors. Using data from the same survey as Erramilli (1991), which had a
response  rate  of 44  per  cent, the final sample consisted  of 114 service firms
with information on 381 foreign market entry choices. The logit analyses
confirmed the expected pattern of influence only partially. JVs were found to
be more likely in the case of high capital intensity, inseparable services, and
a large cultural distance between  the home country  and  the host country.   In
contrast, the propensity to establish WOSs increased with the level of asset
specificity and the firm size.
Brouthers et al. (1993) placed a number of variables that were examined
previously by various researchers into two categories: the desire for direct
control and market complexity. They hypothesized that WOSs are more
likely than JVs and contractual relationships (e.g., licensing and franchising)
in  the  case  of a higher desire for direct control. The opposite was expected
for market complexity. To test these hypotheses, Brouthers and his col-
leagues collected data through a mail survey of 125 randomly selected
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American computer software firms. The response rate was 20 per cent.
However, since the respondents were asked to fill in the questions for more
entries, they received data on 72 observations. The ANOVA tests showed
that both hypotheses were confirmed by the data.
Shane (1993) hypothesized that countries with a low power distance (see
Hofstede, 1980) prefer JVs, while high power distant countries favour
WOSs. To test this expectation, Shane used the Benchmark Surveys of 1977
and 1982, which together contain data on approximately 40,000 American
foreign affiliates (see also Contractor, 199Ob; Contractor and Lorange,
1988b). Contrary    to the other empirical studies reviewed    in this section,
Shane used four different continuous dependent variables: the ratio of 50/50
and minority JVs to the total number of affiliates in 1977 and 1982, and the
ratio of the sales of those JVs to the total sales of all affiliates in 1977 and
1982. Multiple regression analyses revealed that JVs are less likely than
WOSs in countries which are characterized by a high power distance.
Moreover, JVs appeared to have a positive relationship with restrictive
policies of host governments, market size, and the level of uncertainty avoid-
ance  in  the host country.
The next study was by Agarwal (1994), who investigated the relationship
between cultural distance and the choice of JVs. He believed that a large
cultural distance improves the chance that a JV is the selected entry mode.
However, this effect is expected to be moderated by the multinational
experience of firms, their technological intensity, their size, the riskiness of
the host country, and the market potential. To test these hypotheses, Agarwal
used the same sample as Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992b). The maximum
likelihood estimations of the logit model confirmed the expected positive
relationship between cultural distance and the incidence of JVs, and a
negative relationship between the incidence of JVs and host-country risk and
market potential. Furthermore, the level of multinational experience turned
out to improve the likelihood that WOSs are initiated in countries with a
large cultural distance.
Benito (1994) formulated some hypotheses based on both transaction cost
economics and the behavioural approach (Cyert and March, 1963; Johanson
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and Vahlne, 1977; Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975). He expected that
WOSs are more likely if the firm's resource base is larger, specific assets are
important, and if a firm has much international experience. High country risk
and cultural distance increase the likelihood of JVs. The empirical data on
foreign investments of Norwegian manufacturing firms were obtained from
an existing survey conducted by the Norwegian Industrial Federation in 1984.
The original sample of 254 foreign entries established by 104 firms was
reduced to 174 observations, mainly because of missing data. The logit
analyses corroborated the hypotheses that WOSs are preferred by larger
firms, whereas JVs are favoured when host countries are judged as being
risky, or diverge substantially from the home country's culture. Benito came
to the conclusion that transaction cost economics appeared to be less relevant
than behaviour-oriented variables in selecting foreign entry modes.
Madhok (19942) based his analyses on two important streams in the foreign
entry literature: transaction cost economics and the organizational capability
approach, which is comparable to resource-based perspectives. Madhok
distributed a questionnaire to 750 senior executives of manufacturing MNEs
based in North America and Europe. Exploratory factor analysis was used to
create constructs for variables    that were measured by multiple items.    A
response rate of 23 per cent was achieved. The number of observations was
reduced to 130 observations because of missing data. Logit analyses showed
that WOSs were favoured when firms are highly experienced in operating in
international settings,   and, in contrast  with many other studies (e.g., Gatig-
non and Anderson, 1988; Kogut and Singh, 19888), when the host and home
countries have different cultures. Furthermore, the likelihood of JVs had a
positive relationship with the experience with previous JVs, and the develop-
ment of resources that may soon become obsolete in volatile environments.
The main conclusion of this study was that transaction cost economics lost
much of its relevance in the current dynamic environment which requires
(global) strategic considerations and strategic behaviour (see Benito, 1994).
The last empirical study was by Padmanabhan and Cho (1994), who used
data on 839 foreign subsidiaries of Japanese firms (Toyo Keizai Shinposha,
1992). The results of the logit analyses indicated that only four variables
have a significant impact on Japanese foreign entry mode selection. Host-
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country experience, R&D intensity of the investing firms, and the cultural
distance turned out to increase the odds that a WOS is set up. JVs were more
likely when the host government follows a restrictive policy.
2.7 Conclusions
This chapter demonstrated that the selection of the appropriate mode of entry
is a complex exercise, which is influenced by a great many factors. Never-
theless, firms should choose the right mode of entry, since they usually have
only one real chance to become successful in the host country. Although
there are many different possible modes of entry (see section 2.2), the focus
of this study is on JVs and WOSs.
The comparison of relevant theoretical explanations of MNEs revealed that
some theories, such as transaction cost economics, the strategic behaviour
approach, resource-based theory, internalization theory, and the eclectic
theory of Hill, Hwang, and Kim (1990) provide interesting viewpoints on the
choice between  JVs   and WOSs. Elements   of these theories are supported  by
empirical studies. The overview of relevant empirical studies on the choice
between JVs and WOSs shows that the statistical tests in these studies
(usually logit analysis) produced mixed results. Many variables turn out to
have a significant impact on this choice. The overview clearly reveals that
elements of the following theories are corroborated by empirical data:
*  transaction cost economics   (see, e.g., Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992b;
Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Hennart, 1991);
*  the strategic behaviour approach  (see, e.g., Gomes-Casseres,   1989;   Kim
and Hwang, 1992, Madhok, 19948);
* internalization theory  (see, e.g., Agarwal and Ramaswami, 19923; Gomes-
Casseres, 1990; Shane, 1993);
*  the resource-based theory  (see, e.g., Madhok, 1994a);
* Hill, Hwang, and Kim's eclectic theory (see Kim and Hwang, 1992).
The possible application of these theories in the conceptual framework of this
study will be considered in the next chapter. That framework will serve as
the basis for the formulation of hypotheses.
CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPO-
THESES
3.1 Introduction
This chapter contains the conceptual framework that will be used for analy-
sing the choice between a JV and a WOS. Following previous eclectic studies
(Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992a; Hennart and Park, 1993; Hill, Hwang,
and Kim, 1990; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Madhok, 1994a), several theories
will be combined to create a comprehensive framework. Based on this
conceptual framework, a set of hypotheses will be formulated (section 3.3).
3.2 Conceptual framework
As  stated in Chapter   1, the starting-point for building the conceptual frame-
work of this study is the eclectic theory on the choice of foreign entry modes
developed by Hill, Hwang, and Kim (1990). Using an eclectic framework is
in line with real-world practice. The firm's business environment is affected
by a great many different developments. The real world is so complex that it
cannot be described adequately by one discipline alone. One-sided views are
inappropriate for selecting the foreign entry mode, as this important strategic
decision is influenced by many factors. Looking at this topic only with, for
example, 'transaction cost eyes' may or will lead to neglecting other import-
ant (e.g., strategic) influences. Hence, a multidisciplinary or eclectic
approach is required to obtain the most realistic descriptions.
Hill, Hwang, and Kim (1990) combined elements of the strategic behaviour
approach, transaction cost economics, and internalization theory. 22 Each of
these approaches is concerned with different issues which are only part of the
story. The incorporation of these three theories is a good attribute of this
eclectic model, for the following two reasons. First, as was demonstrated in
22 They, however, did not explicitly report that they wanted to combine the insights of these three
approaches.
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section 2.5, the three approaches complement one another. The strategic
behaviour approach concentrates on the competitive position of the firm as a
whole, including both benefits and costs in the analysis. Transaction cost
economics focuses on the transactional variables which determine the most
efficient structure (in terms of costs) for governing individual transactions.
Internalization theory uses the firm as the level of analysis, and adds the rel-
evance of locational variables (compare Rugman and Verbeke, 1992, 1993b).
These three complementary approaches together cover a broad range of
topics which are important in foreign entry mode decisions. For instance, the
peculiarities of the host country, the transaction, and the investing firm's
strategy are explicitly taken into account. Firms which contemplate foreign
expansion are definitely confronted with the constraints these topics pose on
foreign investment. That is why they should be incorporated in a framework
on foreign entry mode choices.
The second reason is that all three theories are empirically supported (see
section  2.6). More specifically, the characteristics of individual transactions
appear to affect the choice of foreign entry  mode  (see, e.g., Agarwal  and
Ramaswami, 1992b; Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988;
Hennart, 1991; Kim and Hwang, 1992). In a similar vein, the specific
circumstances   in the potential host country  (see, e.g., Agarwal and Ramas-
wami, 19928; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Kim and Hwang, 1992) and the
strategy of firms (Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Madhok,
19943)  turn  out  to  have a -decisive impact  on the likelihood  of  a  JV  or  a
WOS.
An important shortcoming of Hill, Hwang, and Kim's eclectic theory is that
it   ignored the resource-based theory. This theory is focused on ownership-
specific advantages like the utilization and enlargement of the firm's stock of
resources and capabilities. Hence, it is oriented at internal organization.
Given its focus and level of analysis   (i.e., the organizational   unit),   this
approach is complementary to the strategic behaviour approach, internali-
zation theory, and transaction cost economics. For example, the complemen-
tarity of the resource-based theory and the strategic behaviour approach can
be illustrated as follows: a firm's strategic flexibility is not only restricted by
the firm's irreversible investments (i.e., strategic behaviour approach),   but
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also by its stock of capabilities (Tallman, 1991; Teece, 1985). Another
example is the development of a well-considered mixture of capabilities as a
safeguard against contextual fluctuations, which enables the firm to improve
its competitive position (Madhok, 1994b). As a consequence, the resource-
based theory provides valuable insights into foreign entry mode choices, and,
therefore, deserves to be included in a framework on this topic. Moreover,
empirical research corroborates the relevance of the resource-based theory
for the choice between a JV and a WOS (see Madhok, 1994a).
In the present study, the relevance of the resource-based theory is acknowl-
edged. As a consequence, this theory will be incorporated in Hill, Hwang,
and Kim's framework, which serves as the basis for the conceptual frame-
work of this study. Before elaborating this framework, it will be explained
why the other approaches that were distinguished in Chapter 2 (Hymer's
theory and Dunning's eclectic paradigm) are not included in the framework.
Hymer's market imperfections theory uses monopolistic advantages in
explaining the existence of MNEs. However, in the present turbulent busi-
ness environment, monopolistic advantages are no longer realistic sources of
profit. Furthermore, this theory merely accepts cooperative forms of organ-
ization (such as JVs), without attempting to give clear reasons for their
existence. These two attributes make that Hymer's theory is not suitable for
inclusion in a framework for the choice between a JV and a WOS.
Although Dunning (1981, 1988, 1993) postulated some very interesting ideas
on  internationalization   (e.g., the distinction between three groups of advan-
tages: ownership, location, and internalization), his approach is not appli-
cable in this study either. The focus of his eclectic paradigm is on explaining
why the whole population of MNEs has developed cross-border activities.
This focus deviates substantially from the goal of the present study, which is
to determine and, if possible, predict the factors that actually influence an
individual firm's foreign entry mode choice. Moreover, Dunning's eclectic
paradigm leans quite heavily on monopolistic advantages, which was the
main  reason to exclude Hymer's theory.
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Thus, four complementary approaches remain regarding the choice between a
JV and a WOS: the strategic behaviour approach, internalization theory,
transaction cost economics, and the resource-based theory. These approaches
are combined into a unifying framework. The relevant approaches differ from
one another with regard to, for example, the underlying assumptions, the
units of analysis, and the respective viewpoints. This makes a full integration
of the four approaches unfeasible. Therefore, an eclectic framework will be
created, which, by definition, links only those parts of theories that are












HHK= Hill, Hwang and Kim's eclectic
theory of foreign entry mode
choices
OLI- Dunning's eclectic paradigm
Figure 3.1: Schematic presentation of the ability of theoretical approa-
ches to provide explanations for foreign entry mode choice
(JVs versus WOSs)
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The results of the discussion in this section and in section 2.5 are summar-
ized in Figure   3.1. This figure shows   that four theoretical approaches   (the
strategic behaviour approach, transaction cost economics, internalization
theory, and the resource-based theory) can provide (partial) explanations for
the foreign entry mode choice. In contrast, Hymer's market imperfections
theory cannot explain which foreign entry mode will be chosen. Hill, Hwang,
and Kim's eclectic theory combines elements of three of these relevant
theories: the strategic behaviour approach, transaction cost economics, and
internalization theory. As such, it is able to link three partial explanations.
Dunning's OLI paradigm includes parts of Hymer's theory, transaction cost
economics, and internalization theory. This paradigm cannot adequately
predict the mode of foreign entry, as it is partially based on Hymer's theory,
which is irrelevant for foreign entry mode choices. An additional reason is
that it is focused on the level of all MNEs rather than on the level of the
individual firm.
In the present study, a more comprehensive framework will be used: all four
theories that produce partial explanations for the foreign entry mode choice
are integrated. Thus, the strategic behaviour approach, transaction cost
economics, internalization theory, and the resource-based theory are incor-
porated in the conceptual framework. Following Hill, Hwang, and Kim
(1990), three groups of variables are distinguished that influence the foreign
entry mode choice: strategic variables, transactional variables, and locational
variables. These groups of variables are closely related to the strategic
behaviour approach, to transaction cost economics, and to internalization
theory, respectively. However, the present study added the resource-based
theory to Hill, Hwang, and Kim's eclectic theory, which implies that a fourth
group of variables (ownership-specific variables) needs to be distinguished.
This group of variables, which contains the firm-specific capabilities and
resources, has a direct link with the resource-based theory. Figure 3.2
presents the conceptual framework. This framework is the basis for the
formulation of the hypotheses in the next section.














Figure 3.2: The conceptual  framework of the comprehensive eclectic
theory of the foreign entry mode choice
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3.3         Hypotheses
Below, hypotheses will be formulated for each group of variables.
3.3.1    Strategic   variables
MNEs may pursue a multi-domestic strategy or a global strategy CHOut,
Porter, and Rudden, 1982). A multi-domestic strategy is based on the notion
that national markets differ with regard to, for instance, local habits, prefer-
ences of customers, and political and social structures. In order to increase
the probability of success, firms have to adjust, among other things, their
products, their marketing policy, their management style. and their way of
influencing the relevant stakeholders to the local circumstances. To establish
a perfect fit between the local conditions and the firms' strategy and behav-
iour, local subsidiaries should receive as much control as required to operate
autonomously. Attempts by MNE's headquarters to determine the particular
decisions local subsidiaries should make, will inevitably lead to an insuffi-
cient or even an incorrect level of local responsiveness (Bartlett and Ghoshal,
1989). Generally, headquarters are not informed well enough to fully
understand the peculiarities of local regions where the MNE is actively
involved. That is why a decentralized approach is preferred. Decentralization
and delegation of authority and responsibilities imply that the MNE has only
limited control over the local affiliates. It should be stressed that becoming
acquainted with the specific local culture and environment is a time-consum-
ing process. The knowledge needed is of a tacit nature, which necessitates
the  relationship with a local  firm  (e.g.,  a JV).
A global strategy is more or less the opposite of a multi-domestic strategy, in
the sense that equality of preferences and markets is expected to exist. A
global strategy implies that an MNE attempts to gain economies of scale by
concentrating production in one country (or a limited number of countries)
and by exporting its products worldwide (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989;
Ghoshal, 1987). These global economies of scale form the firm's non-
location-bound firm-specific advantages (Rugman and Verbeke, 1993b). A
certain degree of centralized coordination is required to take maximum
advantage of the economies of scale (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Hout, Por-
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ter, and Rudden, 1982). Only then, MNEs are able to avoid that subsidiaries
maximize their own performance at the expense of the performance of other
subsidiaries. Suboptimization may harm the MNE's competitive position and
overall performance. Hence, full control is required in the case of a global
strategy to minimize the risk of cannibalism and suboptimization (Hill,
Hwang, and Kim, 1990).
So far, only one study (Kim and Hwang, 1992) investigated the effect of
strategy on the foreign entry mode choice. Kim and Hwang found that, in the
case of a global strategy, firms prefer setting up either WOSs or JVs to
licensing. Unfortunately, they did not differentiate between WOSs and JVs.
The above discussion leads to the first hypothesis of this study:
H 1:     A global strategy decreases the likelihood  of JVs.
A second strategic variable that is believed to influence the foreign entry
mode selection process is the level of competition   in the industry entered.
When competition is intensive, a WOS is not a suitable mode of entry as it
creates additional capacity. The incumbent firms   will not accept an intruder
in their industry without any resistance. Strategic reactions, such as price
reduction, the creation of idle capacity, and collusion can be expected as
expressions of retaliation (Hennart and Park, 1994). In this regard, it is
important that the entering firm's strategic flexibility is guaranteed (Harrigan,
1985b, 1985c). Only then, a quick and immediate response to the counter-
actions  of the incumbent firms is possible  (e.g.,  a  fast exit). Therefore, firms
should not commit many resources  as this restricts their flexibility.
In contrast, a JV with an incumbent firm usually creates hardly any addi-
tional capacity if the existing capacity of that firm is to be utilized. This
relative advantage of JVs increases the propensity to establish JVs in highly
competitive industries (see Hill, Hwang, and Kim, 1990). Several studies
tested this hypothesis, but failed to find a significant effect (Hennart, 1991;
Kim and Hwang, 1992; Kogut and Singh, 1988b). Only Gomes-Casseres
(1990) was able to confirm that the level of competition has a positive influ-
ence on the probability of JVs being set up.
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H2: Strong competition in the industry entered increases the likelihood
of JVs.
The last strategic variable investigated in this study is the growth of the
industry.    If a subsidiary's industry is growing rapidly, MNEs may use an
incumbent partner to gain a better competitive position faster (Kogut and
Singh, 19881)). The creation  of  a  WOS  may  be  too time consuming to benefit
from the increased market opportunities. Alternatively, JVs with incumbent
firms can be set up much more rapidly, because, at least, part of the produc-
tion capacity is already available. Therefore, JVs offer better prospects than
WOSs in fast-growing industries. However, this statement is only valid if the
disadvantage of sharing profits with the JV partner is smaller than the time
disadvantage of setting up a WOS. Hennart (1991) investigated the effect of
industry growth on the choice of entry mode. He found that JVs are more
likely to be set up than WOSs in case a subsidiary's industry is growing
rapidly.
H3: High growth in the industry entered increases the likelihood of JVs.
3.3.2 Ownership-specific variables
Below, four different types of experience (i.e., firm-specific capabilities)  and
one  resource  (i.e., the relative  size)  will be considered.
When firms cross their national borders for the first time, they do not know
how to deal with all kinds of uncertainties and foreign peculiarities. They
are, for instance, not familiar with foreign norms and values, foreign legisla-
tion, other foreign requirements, the preferences of foreign customers, and
the   best   way to bargain with foreign governments.   This   lack of knowledge
may be neutralized by forming a JV with a firm that possesses the knowledge
required.
Over time, firms learn how to deal with unknown situations. They gain
experience in managing external and internal uncertainty, and learn how to
reduce risks to proper proportions (compare, Barkema, Bell, and Pennings,
1996; Cyert and March, 1963; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Johanson and
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Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975). Empirical research revealed that international
experience  has a positive effect  on the likelihood  of  FDI  (see, e.g., Terpstra
and Yu, 1988; Yu, 1990). Firms with much international experience know
how to operate in various contexts and, thus, do not need a partner firm.
This finding is confirmed in several empirical studies (Agarwal and Rama-
swami, 19928,1992b; Benito, 1994; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Madhok,
19948). The results of some other studies, however, turned out to be insig-
nificant (Larimo, 1993, Padmanabhan and Cho, 1994).
Erramilli (1991) investigated the foreign entry mode choices of service firms,
and discovered a curve-linear (U-shaped) relationship between the firm's
multinational experience and its preference for WOSs. This outcome indicates
that both unexperienced and highly experienced firms favour WOSs to JVs.
Erramilli supposed that less experienced firms are eager to fully control their
activities because of an ethnocentric orientation,23 or to prevent problems
with transaction partners. There   is some additional evidence that firms   with
little international experience prefer to have a high level of control over their
foreign ventures (Davidson and McFetridge, 1985; Shetty, 1979; Stopford
and Wells, 1972). Notwithstanding these findings, most evidence points to a
generally positive relationship between the foreign experience of firms and
their tendency to opt for WOSs. Hence, the following hypothesis is formu-
lated:
H4: Much international experience decreases the likelihood of JVs.
A similar argument applies to the host country experience of firms (Gomes-
Casseres, 1989, 1990; Hennart, 1991; Kim and Hwang, 1992). Firms that
are very experienced in operating in a particular country are familiar with the
local peculiarities, which increases the chance of new FDIs (Davidson, 1980;
Yu, 1990). They know, for instance, how to deal with the indigenous
population, the local authorities, the cultural differences, the employees, the
clients, and so on. As a result, such firms do not need the specific knowledge
21 An ethnocentric orientation means that a firm prefers to have its own people or people from its
home country in the most important positions with a foreign venture. Japanese firms generally
have such an ethnocentric orientation.
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about local conditions that local firms usually possess. Less experienced
firms lack country-specific information which cannot be obtained easily in a
limited period of time, unless a partnership with a local firm is established.
Various studies confirm that firms which are experienced in operating in the
host country will expand more likely by means of a WOS than via a JV
(Gomes-Casseres, 1989, 1990; Hennart, 1991; Padmanabhan and Cho,
1994). In Larimo's study (1993), the outcome of this proposed effect did not
satisfy the requirements of statistical significance.
HS:    Much host country experience decreases the likelihood of JVs.
A third firm-specific capability which may have a bearing on the foreign
entry mode choice, is the firm's mode   experience, or, more precisely, the
experience  a  firm  has with previous  JVs  or  WOSs.   The idea behind incorpor-
ating this variable is that learning from earlier mode experiences may affect a
next entry mode decision. Negative experiences with a specific mode of entry
reduce the probability that the same mode will be selected again in the
future, whereas in the case of positive experiences the opposite may apply.
JVs are more complex to manage than WOSs because the interests of at least
two firms are involved (Bell, 1993b; Harrigan, 1985a; Killing, 1983;
Lorange and Roos, 1991). At the same time, different corporate cultures,
which have to be matched to prevent misunderstandings and unnecessary
problems, come together in one new entity. The international context may
aggravate the effects of intercultural differences (Buckley and Casson, 1988).
Frequently, the partners' interests conflict with each other, which may cause
frictions. Especially 50/50 JVs are susceptible to all kinds of problems, since
the partners are involved in the decision-making process on an equal basis.
Such problems range from a delay to a block in decision making, and may
even lead to a termination of the venture (Killing, 1983). However, firms
which previously established JVs will have learned how to deal with alien
corporate cultures, negotiations with potential partners, the transfer of knowl-
edge, and the complexities of managing JVs (Lyles, 1988; Mody, 1993;
Shetty, 1979; Tallman and Shenkar, 1994; Westney, 1988). Such firms are
expected to have a preference for JVs when a new entry decision is made.
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A similar argument can be presented for previous experiences in managing
WOSs. Madhok (19948) investigated the effects of mode experience on the
entry mode choice. His study confirmed that the propensity to set up JVs
increases with the firms' experience with JVs. Experience with WOSs turned
out to have no significant impact on the incidence of WOSs. Although only
the first relationship is supported by previous empirical research, a hypo-
thesis will be formulated for both effects.
H6a:  Much JV experience increases the likelihood of JVs.
H6b: Much WOS experience increases the likelihood of WOSs.
The last capability considered in this study is product experience. This
variable concerns the experience a firm has with the foreign subsidiary's core
products. When firms engage in product markets outside their core business,
they often lack the specific knowledge of the activities to become successful.
Frequently, firms have no access to distribution channels for products outside
their core business. The impact of these deficiencies is stronger when diver-
sification takes place outside the home country. Then, firms will have to
make use of the skills and knowledge of one or more other firms, since the
skills, knowledge, and access required cannot be learned or acquired easily.
In  this  case,  a JV  will  be  the most efficient mode to obtain these assets  (e.g.,
through learning by doing) (Hennart, 1991).24 In contrast, when new activ-
ities are more comparable with or even similar to the current core activities,
firms do not need the inputs from other firms. Then, firms will prefer full
control to shared control (Gomes-Casseres, 1985; Hennart, 1991).
The relationship between product or activity inexperience and the propensity
to  set  up  JVs is confirmed by several empirical studies (e.g., Gomes-Casse-
res, 1985; Hennart, 1991; Hennart and Reddy, 1992; Stopford and Wells,
1972; Zejan, 1988). Other studies, however, found an insignificant effect
24 Another argument which fits more within the strategic behaviour approach is that firms are often
not willing to invest large sums of money in activities that lie outside their core business. Possible
reasons are the lack of in-depth knowledge of the peculiarities of the products involved, the
inability to assess the risk in different contexts, and the observation that non-core activities usually
receive less attention than core activities.
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(Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Larimo, 1993; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1994). A
somewhat different analysis was made by Madhok (19948). He did not
investigate the separate impact of the activity experience, but only the
interaction of that variable with the volatility of the environment. The
underlying reason for this interaction is that Madhok, following March
(1991), believes that learning effects become less useful in turbulent contexts.
Thus, over time the relevance of experience with products will become less
in volatile environments. Although his argument seems valid, his approach
will not be incorporated in this study, since this would imply that all hypoth-
eses regarding some kind of experience should include the volatility of the
environment. Given the substantial amount of confirmation, the following
hypothesis will be formulated:
H7: Much product experience decreases the likelihood of JVs.
In  addition to these capabilities, one ownership-specific resource  will   be
examined: the relative size of the foreign affiliate.
If the subsidiary is large compared to the MNE, the MNE presumably lacks
financial and managerial resources to run the subsidiary on its own (Con-
tractor and Lorange, 1988b; Harrigan, 19852). In that case, a partner firm is
needed to achieve the goals intended. The partner may provide the money,
time, and personnel to ensure the necessary fit between needs and resources.
Without that correspondence, the goals of the foreign affiliate and the
intentions of the investing firm will not be realized. If no suitable partner
firm can be found, the investing firm will have to refrain from its plans to
invest abroad. Alternatively, the subsidiary will not receive the attention and
the  funding it needs to become successful.
Some empirical studies examined the impact of the relative size of the foreign
subsidiary on the foreign entry mode choice. Only one study (Kogut and
Singh, 1988b) corroborates the relationship between the relative size and the
propensity to establish a JV. Two other studies failed to find significant
effects (Hennart, 1991; Larimo, 1993).
H8: Relatively large investments increase the likelihood of JVs.
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3.3.3  Transactional variables
When a firm transfers specific assets to \ts subsidiaries   (e.g.,   proprietary
technological or marketing know-how, or specific skills regarding quality
control), that firm will be inclined to prevent a decrease in the value of those
specific assets. An essential feature of these transaction-specific assets is that
they cannot be utilized, or only at very high costs, in different transactions.
Consequently, there is a real danger of becoming locked in in the
transactional relationship (Williamson, 1975, 1985). Therefore, firms will be
anxious to internalize transactions which are characterized by specific
investments. This preference will be stronger if the risk of opportunistic
behaviour of other firms is high. WOSs provide better safeguards against the
risk of the dissemination of know-how than JVs, as in the latter case there
are always at least two parties involved, with possibly deviating interests
(Buckley and Casson, 1976; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Hennart, 1988).
In WOSs, top management can use authority and rules to prevent or mini-
mize opportunistic behaviour (Williamson, 1975, 1985). However, these
mechanisms  do  not work perfectly. Even within the hierarchical governance
structure, transaction costs exist because of potential opportunistic behaviour
(Hennart, 1982). Thus, firms will prefer full control over their affiliates if
the risk of opportunistic behaviour regarding the transferred assets is high.
In contrast, if the risk of opportunistic behaviour is low or even negligible
(e.g.,   in situations characterized by mutual trust, mutual forbearance,   and
mutual commitment) highly specific assets could also be transferred by means
of a JV (Beamish and Banks, 1987; Buckley and Casson, 1988).
Many empirical studies examined the specificity of the transferred assets,
although the measurement of this variable varies. Frequently, the research
and development (R&D) intensity of the investing firm was used as a proxy.
Gatignon and Anderson (1988) and Padmanabhan and Cho (1994) found a
significant positive effect of the R&D intensity on the preference for a WOS.
In some other studies insignificant results were obtained (Agarwal, 1994;
Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992b; Benito, 1994; Davidson and McFetridge,
1985; Fagre and Wells, 1982; Hennart, 1991; Larimo, 1993; Stopford and
Wells, 1972). Whenever the R&D intensity of the subsidiary was used as
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measure for asset specificity, it appeared that the incidence of JVs increased
as opposed to WOSs (Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Kogut and Singh, 1988a,
19881,). Two studies attempted to measure the asset specificity  with a survey
(Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Madhok, 1994a). Only the former found a positive
and significant impact of asset specificity  on the propensity  to  set  up  WOSs.
In sum, most of the evidence points to the relationship hypothesized by H9:
H9: The transfer of highly specific assets decreases the likelihood of
3Vs.
The repumtion of the expanding firm may also affect the choice of the
foreign mode of entry. Firms must invest heavily in advertising and their
brand name to obtain a good reputation. This process of reputation building
is time consuming and uncertain. High investments in reputation do not
automatically lead to a good reputation. Each minor deviation from the
behaviour that the firm prescribes may have a disastrous impact on the firm's
reputation. Therefore, firms that invest heavily in brand-name capital will try
to avoid free riding by other firms (Brickley and Dark, 1987; Caves, 1982).
Free riding means that a firm takes advantage of the reputation of another
firm without bearing any costs (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). The former
firm may earn high short-term profits by making low-quality products, and
sell them under the brand name of the latter firm. As a result, the firm's
reputation will deteriorate. High-control entry modes are considered to be the
most efficient governance structures in situations where the risk of free riding
is high (Brickley and Dark, 1987; Caves, 1982; Williamson, 1985).
This expected relation was explored in several empirical studies. Gatignon
and Anderson (1988) and Stopford and Wells (1972) found a positive,
significant impact of the investing firm's advertising intensity on the propen-
sity to establish WOSs. The results of Hennart's study (1991) revealed an
insignificant relationship. In some other studies, the marketing intensity of
the subsidiary was taken as a measure for the firm's reputation. Gomes-
Casseres (1989, 1990) found evidence for the proposed effect, whereas Kogut
and Singh (19883, 1988b) only obtained insignificant results.
H10:  A good reputation decreases the likelihood of JVs.
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3.3.4 Locational variables
Four locational variables are distinguished: the difference between the home
country's culture and the host country's culture, the riskiness of the host
country, the host government's policy towards FDI, and the level of welfare
in the host country. For all variables a hypothesis will be formulated.
The cultural dijIerence between the home country and the host country may
entail many difficulties for firms that contemplate foreign entry. The larger
the cultural difference is, the larger the problems are. MNEs are unfamiliar
with local norms, values, and traditions, when an investment is made in
culturally dissimilar countries. In such cases, MNEs will probably encounter
many situations of miscomprehension, because of their lack of knowledge
about the precise cultural backgrounds. For example, an MNE may
unintendedly offend local authorities or clients by acting and behaving in a
way different from what is expected. This may cause frustration and irritation
on the side of the local parties, which may eventually lead to an overt
opposition to entry and the MNE's presence in the local market. As a
consequence, the MNE may fail to achieve its goals, and may have to
consider premature withdrawal from the market.
In order to prevent or, at least, minimize the repercussions of cultural
divergence, firms will have to become acquainted with the relevant aspects of
the host country's culture. Since the knowledge required is tacit, it cannot be
acquired easily. Setting up a WOS from scratch to become acquainted with
local culture is a time-consuming path paved with many obstacles. A much
faster way of getting acquainted with the norms, values, expected behaviour,
and habits of the host country is to establish a JV with a local firm (Gatignon
and Anderson, 1988; Kogut and Singh, 1988a). Then, the local partner can
explain the underlying concepts, and train the foreign MNE in this area.
Hence, a positive relationship between national cultural dissimilarity and the
propensity to form JVs is expected.
In addition to this expectation, a similar hypothesis with regard to cultural
similarity will be introduced. In many publications on JVs, it was argued that
partners have to understand each other, and must have a comparable cultural
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background (Bell, 1993b; Brown, Rugman, and Verbeke, 1989; Buckley and
Casson, 1988; Harrigan, 1985, 1986; Hennart, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Lorange
and Roos, 1991, 1992). This suggests that JVs are the appropriate mode of
entry in countries with a national culture that is comparable to the home
country's culture.
To capture both expectations, a curve-linear (U-shaped) relationship between
the likelihood to set up a JV and the cultural distance will be hypothesized.
This implies that in the case of a moderate cultural distance WOSs will be
preferred over JVs.
Empirical research supports the use of JVs in culturally distant countries
(Agarwal, 1994; Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992b; Benito, 1994; Davidson,
1982; Erramilli, 1991; Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Gatignon and Anderson,
1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1985; Kogut and Singh, 1988a).25 Larimo (1993)
did not report a significant support for this relationship. Some studies,
however, found that WOSs are more likely when cultural distance increases
(Madhok, 1994a; Padmanabhan  and  Cho,   1994).
Hll: Both a small and a great cultural distance between the home
country and the host country increases the likelihood of JVs.
The riskiness of the host country is believed to be a significant determinant of
the foreign entry mode choice. When a country's political, legal, cultural,
and economic environment is uncertain and unpredictable, MNEs should not
commit themselves too much as they may loose their strategic flexibility
(Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Harrigan, 19858, 1985c; Kim and Hwang,
1992). This contextual  risk  (Root,   1988) is usually beyond the control  of
firms. Even if a WOS is established, firms will not be able to really control
the uncertainties and to minimize the inherent negative consequences, such as
opportunistic behaviour. Moreover, in risky countries the host government
may  nationalize the properties owned by foreign firms. Hence, the amount  of
loss possible should be kept as low as possible. A proper means for this is to
25 Firms with much international experience, however, prefer WOSs over JVs in the case of more
cultural distance (Agarwal,   1994;  Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992b)
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form a JV with a local firm, since the risk of nationalization and possible
xenophobic reactions will be lower when a local firm is involved in the
business operation.
Mixed results were obtained in empirical studies. A number of studies
confirmed that high-control entry modes are not very likely in the case of
risky host countries  (see, e.g., Benito, 1994; Gatignon and Anderson,   1988;
Kim and Hwang, 1992), whereas in other studies the opposite was found
(Agarwal, 1994; Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992b) Research by Erramilli
and Rao (1993) revealed that WOSs are preferred over JVs as modes of entry
in risky host countries, if the assets to be transferred to the foreign subsidiary
are characterized by a high level of specificity. This study expects that coun-
try risk has a positive effect on the incidence of JVs.
H12: Host country risk increases the likelihood of JVs.
Another factor that may have a substantial impact on the foreign entry mode
choice is the host government policy on 'EDI. Certain governments put
restrictions    on the ownership of local activities by foreign    MNEs;     for
instance, 100 per cent foreign ownership of local subsidiaries is not allowed.
In that case, foreign ownership is only possible if a local firm owns part of
the shared equity. WOSs are, thus, no longer a viable mode of entry, which
obviously increases the propensity to form (minority) JVs with local firms
(compare Franko, 1989).
However, in spite of the restricting rules, some MNEs are able to establish
WOSs because they have a good bargaining position as compared to the
foreign government. A firm's bargaining position depends, among other
things, on the type of technology that will be transferred to the host country
and the number of potential rival firms that can provide the same assets
(Fagre and Wells, 1982; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Lecraw, 1984). When a
firm's products are new and innovative, the firm's bargaining position is
better than when products become more mature (Bivens and Lovell, 1966;
Davidson, 1982). This effect is called the 'obsolescing bargain' (Vernon,
1977). Since only a few MNEs may be able to build up enough bargaining
power to circumvent the requirements of the host government, most firms
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have to adjust to the rules imposed. Therefore, it is postulated that JVs are
the preferred entry mode when host governments restrict foreign ownership.
Previous research strongly corroborated this relationship (Gatignon and
Anderson, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1989, 1990; Padmanabhan and Cho,
1994; Shane, 1993).
Here, it should be stressed that governments are recognizing more and more
that restricting foreign ownership is not always the best solution for their
countries. Therefore, nearly all restrictive governments (such as India, Indo-
nesia, Mexico, China, Japan, France) relinquished their restrictive policies
towards foreign investments in the last decade (Contractor, 199Ob).
H13:  A restrictive host government policy increases the likelihood of JVs.
The last hypothesis of this study concerns the level Of wegare in the host
country. This variable is meant to indicate the attractiveness   of a country   to
serve as a potential market for selling products. A high level of welfare
Suggests that the country is well developed. Obviously, this has a substantial
impact on, for instance, the level of education of the indigenous population,
the buying power of people, and the capabilities of local firms. Therefore, it
can be expected that setting up a JV with a local firm would be beneficial for
MNEs, since these firms have something to offer, such as good craftsman-
ship, technological know-how, marketing know-how, and so on. An addi-
tional advantage is that, because of the high level of education, enough
qualified employees can be hired.
However, an opposite effect is also plausible. If the level of welfare is
considered as a measure of market size (Shane, 1993), it can be expected that
firms will attempt to establish a WOS. Large markets are attractive to enter
alone, because then the (high) profits do not have to be shared with another
firm. Usually, attractive markets with a high level of welfare are not very
difficult to enter alone since the specific characteristics of the country are
well known, and no restrictions on ownership are imposed.
Some studies confirmed the greater likelihood of JVs in the case of a high
level of welfare (Gomes-Casseres, 1989, 1990; Kobrin, 1987; Larimo, 1993;
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Shane, 1993), whereas others supported the opposite relationship (Agarwal,
1994; Agarwal and Ramaswami, 19928, 1992b; Terpstra and Yu, 1988).
Given the mixed support, no specific effect will be hypothesized for the
relationship between the entry mode choice and the host country's level of
welfare.




















Figure 3.3:  The four groups of variables that influence the foreign entry
mode choice
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3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, a comprehensive, eclectic conceptual framework was built
that will be used in the present study. The framework is mainly based on
four theoretical approaches: the strategic behaviour approach, the resource-
based theory, transaction cost economics, and internalization theory.    Four
relevant groups of variables were distinguished: strategic variables, owner-
ship-specific variables, transactional variables, and locational variables    (see
Figure  3.3).   For each variable a hypothesis was formulated (see Table  3.1).
In the next chapter, the methodology of the empirical part of this study will
be presented.
Table 3.1: Overview of the hypothesized effects of the variables on the




investing firm's strategy                                 -
level of competition                                                   +
industry growth                                            +
international experience                                 -
host country experience                                     -
JV experience                                           +
WOS experience                                           -
product experience                                           -
relative size of foreign affiliate                               +
level of asset specificity                                           -
investing firm's reputation                             -
cultural difference -'+
host country risk                                             +
restrictive host government policy                            +




The conceptual framework that was built in the previous chapter led to a
number of hypotheses  that  will be tested empirically. This chapter describes
the   methodology   that   is   used   to test these hypotheses. The process   of  data
collection is explained in section 4.2, and the operationalization of the
variables in section 4.3. A description of the sample is given in section 4.4,
and the statistical techniques used in section 4.5. The last section contains
some concluding remarks.
4.2 Data collection
Most previous empirical studies on foreign entry mode choices used existing
(i.e.,   secondary)  data for testing hypotheses. A prominent source  is  the  Har-
vard Multinational Enterprise database, which contains data on more than
19,000 foreign subsidiaries  of 180 large  US  MNEs  from   1900  to   1975   (see
Curhan, Davidson, and Suri, 1977). Several researchers were allowed to use
this enormous database for statistical analyses (e.g., Chowdhury,    1992;
Davidson, 1980; Davidson and McFetridge, 1985; Gatignon and Anderson,
1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1987, 1989, 1990). Other researchers built their own
databases using  data from governmental and/or commercial institutions  (e.g.,
Agarwal, 1994; Cho and Padmanabhan, 1992; Hennart, 1991; Hennart and
Park, 1993, 1994; Kogut and Singh, 1988a, 1988b; Padmanabhan and Cho,
1994; Shane, 1994). Although using existing data is fairly popular, it has
recently been acknowledged that survey data are a promising alternative (see
Agarwal and Ramaswami, 19923; Benito, 1994; Erramilli, 1991; Kim and
Hwang, 1992; Larimo, 1993). The reason is that archival data do not contain
direct information on underlying motives. Surveys offer the opportunity to
gain insight into the perceptions of decision makers and the factors that influ-
ence the mode selection.
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The present study recognizes the importance of measuring perceptions in
(strategic) decision making (compare Noorderhaven, 1995). Decision makers
base their decisions not only on objective data, but also on their subjective
judgments. Suppose, for example, that a country is considered to be a risky
country according to objective criteria. Then, a JV is the more likely mode
of entry than a WOS. However, when the decision maker perceives a country
as not risky at all, he or she will probably select a WOS to be the entry
mode. Hence, it is crucial to know how decision makers perceive their
internal and external environments.
Several techniques can be used for collecting subjective or perceptual data,
e.g., surveys, interviews, and observations (see Mintzberg,     1973;    Yin,
1989). Surveys are especially appropriate for large-scale studies, interviewing
and observing being too time consuming and, consequently, too expensive to
be  employed  in such studies. As indicated in Chapter  1, this study is directed
at gaining insight into the factors that influence the choice between a JV and
a WOS. A cross-sectional approach was followed to obtain data on poten-
tially influencing factors. To increase the external validity of the results, it
was attempted to obtain many observations. Since surveys are appropriate
methods of collecting perceptual data on a large scale, a survey was con-
ducted in the present study.
Although surveys appear to be easy to use, there are many caveats. Some of
the potential problems are: questions can be interpreted in multiple ways,
terms used may be misunderstood by respondents, the response rate may be
(too) low, and respondents may be guided towards outcomes ex-ante pre-
ferred by the researcher (see, e.g., Babbie, 1990; Churchill,  1991).
In contrast with most previous studies, data were collected both at the level
of   the   firm   and   at the level    of the individual entry.    Such   data   are   more
informative about the exact internal and external situations at the time of
entry than data at the level of the industry only, which were used by previous
researchers (e.g., Caves and Mehra. 1986: Davidson and McFetridge,   1985;
Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Kogut and Singh,
19882).
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The questionnaire contained questions about the firm and questions about
foreign JVs and WOSs. The only difference between the questions concern-
ing JVs and the questions about WOSs was that, in the former case, some
questions about the division of equity and control were included. Many
questions required the respondent to score on a 7-point Likert-type scale. In
some cases, the extremes ranged from 'very good' to 'very bad', and in other
cases from 'very large' to 'very small', depending on the questions. In
addition, a number of questions  with two categories (e.g., yes/no)  and  some
open-ended questions were included. The main reasons for the focus on
questions with limited response categories rather than on open-ended ques-
tions   were the greater uniformity of responses   and,   thus, the relative   ease   of
data processing (Babbie, 1990). The questionnaire is given in Appendix A.
Most variables are measured psychometrically: the proxies are based on
multiple items instead of on only one (Nunnally, 1978). In this way, it is
more  likely  that the variables are really covered  by the questions  (see,  e.g.,
Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992a; Kim and Hwang, 1992). Besides survey
data, archival data were collected on, for example, host country risk, cultural
distance, the level of welfare, and the level of education of the host country's
inhabitants. The reason is that the combination of these two types of data
allows a better measurement of variables.
4.3 Variables
The dependent variable is the mode of entry: either a JV or a WOS. Three
types of JVs are distinguished: minority, 50/50, and majority JVs. In
general, researchers take the division of equity as proxy for the distribution
of power within a JV, mainly because this information can be acquired rather
easily from public sources  (see,  e.g.,  Bell and Jagersma, 1996; Gatignon  and
Anderson, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1989). A better and more precise measure
of  the  type  of JV would  be the division of control. Control is defined  as  the
ability to influence systems, methods, decisions, and the behaviour of other
parties (compare Ouchi, 1977) in order to accomplish a prespecified result.
This concept is more accurate than the equity division, as partners with a 50
per cent, or even a minority, equity stake may largely control the JV
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(Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Schaan, 1988). In the present study, both
division criteria were included. The division of equity was measured by
means of a question on the percentage of equity each partner has in the JV.
The control division was captured by a question on the actual influence a
firm can have in the JV.
In Chapter 3, four groups of variables were found to be important in entry
mode decisions: strategic variables, ownership-specific variables,
transactional variables, and locational variables. In addition to these  vari-
ables, three variables are distinguished to control for possible disturbing
effects: the size of the investing firm, the type of industry, and tile activities
of the value chain performed by the foreign subsidiary. Below, the operatio-
nalization of all these variables will be explained.
4.3.1   Strategic  variables
Global strategy: Two indicators are used to measure this variable: (1) a
dummy variable which indicates whether all products of the foreign subsidi-
ary are sold in the host country; (2) a dummy variable with the value 1 if
less than 10 per cent of the sales of the foreign subsidiary is sold to the
parent firm. The first indicator is included because global firms sell their
products in many countries, while firms with a multi-domestic (or national
responsiveness) strategy mainly sell their products locally (see Bartlett and
Ghoshal, 1989; Hout, Porter, and Rudden, 1982). The second indicator
provides insight into the level of intrasystem sales. Following Gomes-Casse-
res (1989), it is believed that if these intrasystem sales are more than 10 per
cent of the foreign affiliate's total sales, an important vertical relationship
exists between the entry mode and the firm. Since firms with a global strat-
egy attempt to economize on their value-chain activities by gaining economies
of scale and scope, many intrafirm deliveries will take place.
Level of competition: This variable is measured by means of two indicators:
(1) the respondent's perception of the intensity of the competition in the
industry at the time of entry; and (2) the perceived number of (potential)
competitors in the industry at the time of entry. Both indicators have a
7-point Likert scale.
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Industry growth: This variable is operationalized by: (1) the respondent's
perception of the present growth of the sales of the industry entered; and (2)
his or her expectation of the prospects of that growth in the near future. Both
indicators have a 7-point Likert-type scale. These questions are comparable
with the questions used by Kim and Hwang (1992). Hennart (1991) and
Kogut and Singh (1988b) took the annual rate of the growth of the shipments
in the industry as the proxy for industry growth.
4.3.2 Ownership-specific variables
International experience: This variable is measured by: (1) the perceived
multinational experience of the firm scored on a 7-point scale (compare
Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992a); (2) the number of foreign JVs and WOSs
of the firm (the respondent had to select one out of five possible categories)
(see, e.g., Benito, 1994; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Larimo,   1993);  and
(3) the year in which the firm established its first foreign JV or WOS (four
periods were given as answering categories) (compare Erramilli, 1991;
Padmanabhan and Cho, 1994). As has been demonstrated frequently, the
experience curve and the learning curve are characterized by the fact that the
marginal increase in experience and learning becomes smaller and smaller
(see, e.g., Johnson and Scholes, 1989; Porter, 1980). Therefore, the natural
logarithm of this variable was used since a logarithmic curve reflects decreas-
ing marginal effects (compare Barkema, Bell, and Pennings, 1996).
Host country experience: In line with Kim and Hwang (1992), host experi-
ence is measured by (1) the perceived familiarity of the firm with the host
country (e.g., customers' preferences, market structure, national culture);
and (2) the perceived experience of the firm in operating in that country.
Both indicators were scored on a 7-point scale. Again, the natural logarithm
was taken.
Mode experience: This variable is measured by asking the respondent
whether the firm had established at least one JV or WOS previously (com-
pare Madhok, 19948). To capture the separate effects of JV experience and
WOS experience, two dummies were created.
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Product experience: Product experience is assessed by taking the difference
between the core business of the subsidiary and the firm as perceived by the
respondent. This difference was indicated on a 7-point scale. Product experi-
ence is closely related to the direction of expansion. In case a firm had no
previous experience with a product, the expansion was labelled an unrelated
diversification, and much product experience was called a horizontal expan-
sion.
In addition to this indicator, it was attempted to determine the direction of
expansion by comparing the classification codes of the core activities of both
the MNE and the subsidiary (see Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Hennart, 1990;
Pennings, Barkema, and Douma, 1994). The comparison resulted in only
three related diversifications and no unrelated diversifications. This means
that virtually all expansions fell within the core business of the investing
firm. As a consequence, this classification is inappropriate for inclusion in
the analyses.
Relative size: A 7-point scale was used to gain insight into the respondent's
judgment of the size (measured by invested capital) of the entry mode
relative to the firm (compare Hennart, 1991; Kogut and Singh, 1988b;
Larimo, 1993).
4.3.3 Transactional variables
Asset specificity: This variable is measured by four indicators with a 7-point
Likert scale: (1) the perceived degree of specific technological know-how the
firm contributed to the new venture; (2) the estimated degree of proprietary
skills that the firm transferred to the entry mode. These two proxies cover
the level of specificity of the assets contributed. These proxies are compar-
able to the questions included in other empirical studies that employ survey
data (see Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992a; Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Kim
and Hwang, 1992; Madhok, 19942). Studies solely based on archival data
usually take the ratio of the firm's R&D expenditures and sales, or the ratio
of the average R&D expenditures of the industry and the average sales of the
industry,   as the indicator for asset specificity   (see, e.g., Caves and Mehra,
1986; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Hennart, 1991).
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Besides these two indicators of the level of asset specificity, two questions
were included on the perceived risk that other firms might exploit or even
abuse the proprietary know-how and/or skills: (3) the perceived risk of
opportunistic behaviour regarding the specific know-how; and (4) the per-
ceived risk of opportunistic behaviour regarding the specific skills. These
indicators were added to operationalize the crucial assumption of transaction
cost economics that asset specificity and opportunism must occur simulta-
neously to make a WOS the most efficient governance structure (Williamson,
1975, 1985). In the absence of opportunistic behaviour, transactions charac-
terized by asset specificity can also be governed efficiently with a partially
controlled structure, such as a JV or a long-term contract.
In order to capture this combination of asset specificity and opportunism, a
dummy variable was created with the value 1 if both asset specificity and the
likelihood of opportunism   are   high (i.e., above the mean).26   In all other
possible situations, the dummy has the value 0.
Reputation: The investing firm's reputation is assessed by four indicators:
(1) the respondent's perception of the firm's reputation in the host country
before the decision on entry mode; (2) the respondent's perception of the
firm's reputation in the industry entered in the host country; (3) the respon-
dent's judgment of customers' assessment of the firm in comparison with
competitors; and (4) the perceived investments in the firm's image relative to
competitors. All four indicators were scored on a 7-point scale. The first
three indicators are similar to Kim and Hwang's (1992) indicators. This
method of using the respondent's perception measures a firm's reputation
more directly than by using the marketing intensity of the firm or the
industry as a proxy for reputation, as was done in earlier studies (compare
Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Hennart, 1991).
26 The mean value of these two constructs, 'asset specificity' and 'chance of opportunism',   was
calculated by taking the average of the multiplication of the respondents' scores on the indicators
by the so-called 'factor score regressions' (see section 4.5.1).
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4.3.4   Locational  variables
Cultural difference: Most previous empirical studies measured the cultural
differences between the home country and the host country with either the
country clusters created by Ronen and Shenkar  (1985)   (see, e.g., Gatignon
and Anderson, 1988) or the Kogut and Singh index (see, for instance,
Agarwal, 1994; Benito and Gripsrud, 1992; Cho and Padmanabhan, 1992;
Erramilli, 1991, Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Kogut and Singh, 1988a; Larimo,
1993;   Padmanabhan  and  Cho,   1994)  or both (Barkema,  Bell, and Pennings,
1996).   Brouthers   et   al.   (1993)   and   Kim and Hwang   (1992) used question-
naires to measure perceived cultural differences. The Ronen and Shenkar
(1985) clustering is based on eight cross-cultural studies, among which the
frequently cited large-scale study by Hofstede (1980). The Kogut and Singh
index is based on Hofstede's four dimensions of national culture: uncertainty
avoidance, individualism, power distance, and masculinity. Kogut and Singh
(1988a) calculated their index by subtracting the scores of the home country
on each of the four dimensions from those of the host country. The square of
this difference was divided by the variance of the scores on each dimension.
For each host country, the resulting scores on each dimension were added up
and divided by four.
In the present study, cultural difference is measured by two indicators: (1)
the Kogut and Singh index; and (2) the respondent's perception (on a 7-point
scale) of the cultural differences between the Netherlands and the host
country. The reason for combining these indicators  is  that  both may capture
different aspects of the 'true' cultural distance.
For some of the host countries in this study, there were no scores on the
cultural dimensions available (see Hofstede, 1980, 1991). These countries are
China, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Romania, Malta,
Namibia, Syria, and the Netherlands Antilles. These scores were obtained
from personal communication with Hofstede:
- The scores of Hong Kong were used for China, since, nowadays, China is
comparable to Hong Kong. Capitalistic principles are officially denied in
China, but they flourish in practice.
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- The scores for Hungary were taken from a study by Varga (1986).
The scores for Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania are estimates by
Hofstede based on the characteristics of the countries. Romania, for
instance, has a Byzantine background which heavily influenced its scores
on the four cultural dimensions.
The scores for Finland were used for Estonia, since the countries are
comparable. One exception, however, is the dimension of individualism,
for which Hofstede suggested a lower score.
Namibia can be considered to be a West African country. Therefore, the
scores for West Africa were also used for Namibia.
- Syria can be considered to be a Arab country. Therefore, the scores for the
Arab region were used for Syria.
There are no data on the Netherlands Antilles, therefore the scores for
Surinam  were  used. The reason  is  that this country, mainly because  of  its
close relationship with the Netherlands, appears to be similar to the Neth-
erlands Antilles. The scores for Surinam were taken   from the study   by
Nanhekhan (1990).
Hofstede  was   not  able to provide the scores for Malta. He referred  to   M.
Hoppe, who replicated Hofstede's study for nineteen countries including
Malta (see Hoppe, 1990). In a personal communication with Hoppe, these
missing scores were obtained. According to Hoppe, Malta is comparable to
the Latin European countries.
As was shown in Chapter 3, cultural distance is hypothesized to have a
curve-linear, U-shaped effect on the incidence of JVs. In order to test this
relationship, the square of the variable cultural distance was also included in
the model.
Host country risk: In previous studies, host country risk was frequently
captured by the classification made by Goodnow and Hanz (1972) (see
Benito, 1994; Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988). A
disadvantage of this classification is that it gives an impression of the risk of
countries in the late 1960s. This classification may no longer hold, especially
because the riskiness of countries varies over time. For example, countries
such as India, Thailand, and Turkey, which were high-risk countries accord-
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ing to Goodnow and Hanz, are less risky nowadays. Agarwal (1994) and
Agarwal and Ramaswami (19928, 1992b) took more recent data from the an-
nually published International Country Risk Guide. Instead of using these
'objective' measures of country risk, Kim and Hwang (1992) based country
risk on the respondents' perceptions.
In this study, the two methods are combined: the perceptions of respondents
are complemented with publicly available data on country risk. This combi-
nation was done for reasons similar to those in the case of cultural differ-
ences (see above). The riskiness of the host country was measured by: (1) the
perceived political stability in the host country; (2) the perceived economic
situation of the host country; (3) the perceived risks of the host country other
than  political and economic risks  (e.g., the risks of natural disasters);  and  (4)
the country risk score in the year of entry as calculated by Euromoney. The
first three indicators are the respondents' judgments (on a 7-point scale)
about the riskiness of the host country in the period of the establishment of
the foreign subsidiary. The fourth indicator was taken from the rankings of
country risk published annually by Euromoney.
Once a year, and since recently twice a year, Euromoney publishes a list of
the riskiness of all countries in the world. This country risk score consists of
three broad categories: (a) analytical indicators (political risk, economic risk,
and economic indicators); (b) credit indicators (payment record and ease of
rescheduling); and (c) market indicators (access to short-term and long-term
finance). Each category has a different weighting factor, with economic risk
and political risk having the greatest weight. Euromoney uses data from
several sources, such as the World Bank World Debt Tables, the Euromoney
global economic projections, and expert polls to calculate the host country
risk. Experts from all over the world (risk analysts, risk insurance brokers,
and bank credit officers) are polled to obtain estimates of the political risks.
Host government policy: Several previous studies included this variable in
their analyses. For instance, Gatignon and Anderson (1988) used the classifi-
cation by Stopford and Wells (1972), who distinguished six restrictive
countries. Gomes-Casseres (1989, 1990) created a dummy variable with the
value 1 for countries which had restricted foreign ownership or had encou-
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raged JVs in 1975. Gomes-Casseres used data from the US Department of
Commerce. A shortcoming of these measures is that they disregard the tact
that countries may change their attitudes and their policies towards foreign
investments. Illustrative   in this regard   is the strong relaxation of restrictive
policies which has taken place  in the 1980s  (see, e.g., Contractor, 199Ob).  A
better approach is to look at government policy at the moment (or year) of
entry (compare Padmanabhan and Cho, 1994); in that case, the influence of
the host government on the entry mode choice can be adequately assessed. A
different method was employed by Kim and Hwang (1992). They asked ma-
nagers how they perceived the likelihood that the host government would put
constraints on foreign operations.
In the present study, the perceptions of the respondents are combined with a
more 'objective' measure of the government policy in the year of entry. The
reason is that restrictions may affect investing firms differently, since some
firms may have enough bargaining power to minimize the impact of govern-
mental restrictions.27 Hence, the (perceived) impact on the individual firms
should not be ignored. Therefore, the following indicators were used to
determine the policies of host governments: (1) the managers' perception (on
a 7-point scale) of the restrictiveness of the host government with regard to
the firm's investment; (2) the respondents' perception (on a 7-point scale) of
the extent to which the host government stimulated cooperation with local
firms; and (3) data on the restrictiveness of host governments in the year of
entry which were gathered from publications by the Dutch Ministry of
Economic Affairs, the IMF, the OECD, the UNCTC, and the Worldbank. A
dummy variable captured whether  a host country was restrictive (value   1)  or
not (value 0) in the year of entry.
More   specifically, the following countries were classified as restrictive:
China, Indonesia, India, Japan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Thailand, and Turkey. This list of countries is comparable to the results
which Contractor (199Ob) found using the Benchmark Surveys. Some coun-
27 A firm's bargaining power depends on a variety of aspects including the state of technological
know-how that may be transferred to the new subsidiary and the availability of substitutes (see
Fagre and Wells, 1982. Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Kobrin, 1987, Lecraw, 1984).
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tries use more restrictions than others. Indonesia, India, and Romania, for
instance, heavily restricted foreign ownership for all industries, whereas
other countries (e.g., Japan) only limited foreign ownership in specific indus-
tries.
Level of welfare: In earlier studies, the level of welfare in the host country
was assessed by taking the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of countries
(Gomes-Casseres, 1989, 1990; Larimo, 1993; Shane, 1993) or the Gross Net
Product (GNP) per capita (Agarwal, 1994; Benito, 1994). In the present
study, the latter indicator is preferred since it provides more insight into the
welfare of individual customers. A heavily populated country with a high
GDP may still have a low level of welfare.
In addition to (1), the GNP per capita (in US dollars), the level of welfare is
measured by four other proxies: (2) the secondary school enrolment ratio; (3)
the third school enrolment ratio   (i.e., the number of students per 100,000
inhabitants); (4) the percentage of illiterates; and (5) the respondent's per-
ception (on a 7-point scale) of the attractiveness of the local firms' level of
knowledge and level of education. If available, data on the four 'objective'
indicators were collected for the year of entry. Alternatively, the nearest year
was taken, which was never more than three years removed from the year of
entry. The GNP per capita was taken from the World Tables 1992 (World
Bank, 1993). Data on the secondary school enrolment ratio were also
collected from the same World Tables, and the third school enrolment ratio
was taken from the Unesco Statistical Yearbooks. The illiteracy rates were
also obtained from these Statistical Yearbooks and from the Compendium of
Statistics on Illiteracy (Unesco, 1990).
4.3.5 Control variables
Three variables are included as control variables: the size of the investing
firm, the type of industry it is involved in, and the type of activity of the
foreign affiliate.
Firm size: The size of the expanding firm may affect the entry mode choice.
Larger firms have more resources than smaller firms. Therefore, they are
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less inclined to set up JVs than smaller firms for reasons of managerial and
financial constraints.    In    line with previous studies (e.g., Agarwal    and
Ramaswami, 1992a; Benito, 1994; Larimo, 1993), the sales of the investing
firm is used as a proxy for the size of the investing firm. Respondents were
asked to give information about sales over 1992 of their firm, division or
business unit, depending on their position. If no information was provided on
firm sales, annual reports were consulted to try to obtain these data. A logar-
ithmic function of the 1992 sales was used (compare Barkema, Bell, and
Pennings, 1996; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1994).
Type of industry: Previous studies found that in certain industries firms
prefer full ownership over shared ownership,   e.g., in advertising-intensive
industries, and know-how-intensive industries (Franko, 1989; Gomes-Casse-
res, 1989). Alternatively, firms prefer JVs over WOSs in resource-intensive
industries (Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Harrigan, 1985a; Hennart, 1991; Larimo,
1993). To determine whether an industry is advertising intensive or know-
how intensive usually the average marketing-to-sales ratio and the R&D-to-
sales ratio  of the industry, respectively,  are  used  (see, e.g., Gomes-Casseres,
1989; Kogut and Singh, 1988b). Industries are called resource intensive if
their main products involve food and beverages, tobacco, textile mills, wood
(except furniture), pulp and paper, petroleum, rubber, and primary metals
(see Gomes-Casseres, 1989).
In the present study, the respondents were asked to indicate the core product
of the new subsidiary. This information was used to ascertain which industry
was entered. The determination of resource-intensive industries was done
with the help of Gomes-Casseres's classification. In the Netherlands, no data
are available on the marketing-to-sales and R&D-to-sales ratios. Furthermore,
no classifications of more know-how-intensive and marketing-intensive
industries exist. As a consequence, own classifications were made. Industries
were classified as know-how intensive or marketing intensive if in the par-
ticular industry, many financial resources were expected to be devoted to
R&D or to marketing. In addition, it was checked which industries have
earlier been labelled as know-how intensive or marketing intensive in the
literature (see, e.g., Brickley and Dark, 1987; Cohen and Levin, 1989;
Franko, 1989, Harrigan, 1985a; Schmalensee, 1989; Stopford and Wells,
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1972). Some of the industries which have been labelled as know-how
intensive are: electronics, coatings, optical instruments, and fibres. Adver-
tising-intensive industries are consumer food, tobacco refining, clothing,
pharmaceuticals, and so on.
Type of activity: The foreign subsidiary's type of activities may be crucial
for the decision concerning the appropriate entry mode (see Bell and Jagers-
ma, 1996). If the affiliate's main activity involves marketing and sales, it is
to be expected that a firm wants to control this vital link of the value chain
alone (Porter, 1986; Porter and Fuller, 1986). Full control enables the firm
to ensure a good quality of the sales trajectory and a high commitment of the
sales people. Furthermore, it prevents a deterioration of the firm's brand
name and image   (see, e.g., Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Brickley   and
Dark, 1987).
Similarly, firms may prefer to control the production of goods, for instance,
to prevent deterioration of the quality of the production process and of the
final products. This preference will be especially strong if the production
process is complex and requires much tacit knowledge to proceed smoothly
(Teece, 1976; Williamson, 1979). Rather simple production processes and
mature products do not necessitate high control, because the requisite
knowledge is widely available and relatively easy to manage (Anderson and
Gatignon, 1986; Teece, 1976).
Finally, JVs may be advantageous in situations of (technological) know-how
development, since the knowledge base of more firms can be combined and
exchanged to achieve positive synergies (see, e.g., Contractor, 1990a;
Contractor and Lorange, 1988b; Harrigan, 1985a). However, it can be
argued that such new, advanced know-how should not be shared with other
firms to prevent the other firm from taking away the know-how and from
using it exclusively for its own benefits (Hamel, 1991; Hamel, Doz, and
Prahalad, 1989; Reich and Mankin, 1986). The choice between a JV and a
WOS depends on the relationship with a partner firm and the possibilities of
preventing opportunistic behaviour.
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The foreign subsidiary's type of activity is assessed in the survey by one
question that distinguishes among three possible activities: R&D, production,
and marketing and sales. The respondents were asked to indicate which
activity, or combination of activities, was executed  in  the new subsidiary.
Most variables were assessed by composite measures, which has far-reaching
consequences for which statistical techniques can be applied (see section 4.5).
Before examining these techniques, the sample will be described.
4.4 Sample
Important steps in the process of data collection are selecting the respondents
and ensuring their participation in the survey. A description of these steps
will be given below.
Unfortunately, there are no listings or databases available which contain all
Dutch firms that are actively involved in foreign countries with a JV or a
WOS, and are able to decide upon foreign entries. Firms which do not have
the decision-making power to make foreign entries, such as daughter firms of
foreign companies, should not enter the dataset. The entry mode choice of
these firms is probably not based on the four groups of variables, but on
headquarters' preferences. Fortunately, a database containing some basic data
(e.g., name, address, telephone number)  of the largest firms   in the Nether-
lands could be used. This database, however, was built for a different
purpose. Hence, it is unlikely that all the firms included have a foreign JV or
WOS, and have the authority to establish foreign entries. The database was
constructed by including firms that appeared at least once in any of the fol-
lowing rankings:
* the FEM top 100 of 1990 and 1991 based on net value added;28
* the FD top 50 of 1992 based on net profits;
* the FD top 50 of 1992 based on cash flows;
a    PEM    stands    for    Financieel    Economisch    Magazine    (Financial    Economic    Magazine),    which
publishes a list of the 100 biggest Dutch firms every year
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*   the  FD  top  50  of 1992 based on total assets;
* the FD top 50 of 1992 based on shareholders' value;
*  the  FD  top  50  of 1992 based  on the number of employees;
*  the FD top  100 of 1992 based on sales.29
This procedure led to a database of exactly 250 large Dutch firms. Also,
several divisions and business units of these firms were added to the data-
base. The reason is that exploratory interviews revealed that in many large
firms not only headquarters decide upon foreign entries and mode choices,
but also the divisions, and even (large) business units.30 Hence, the 1992
annual reports of these 250 firms were examined to discover possible interna-
tional involvement of divisions and business units. In all cases where the list
of participations - which is included in Dutch annual reports - contained one
or more foreign affiliates, the particular division or business unit was
incorporated in the database. This method resulted in 139 extra observations.
Furthermore, it was attempted to find other internationalized firms, which
were   not   among   the   250   biggest   Dutch   firms.   For   this   purpose, het Finan-
cieel Economisch Lexicon (Financial Economic Lexicon) of 1992 was
checked, which contains an overview of Dutch firms and their subsidiaries
and participations. This examination revealed 69 additional firms which are
actively involved in foreign countries.
The three trajectories combined resulted in a database of 458 firms. There is
no evidence that all Dutch firms with a foreign JV or WOS are incorporated
in this database, or that all included firms actually have a foreign JV or
WOS. Moreover, it is not clear whether all firms, divisions, and business
units can decide upon the entry mode when they enter a foreign country. The
firms were phoned to establish whether they possessed foreign JVs or WOSs,
and to establish their autonomy in foreign entry mode decisions.
  FD is the abbreviation of Het Financieele Dagblad (77,e Financial Daily), the Dutch equivalent
of 7he Finanaal Times and 77:e Wall Street Journal. Each year a special volume is published
which contains rankings of Dutch firms ordered on the basis of various criteria.
3() In case two or more questionnaires were received from one firm, it was checked whether the
ventures differed. In all cases, the ventures were, indeed, different.
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In an attempt to ensure a high level of participation and a high response rate,
the following actions were taken:
1. The Secretary of the Executive Board 1 of each firm was called to ask
for the name and telephone number of the most appropriate respondent for
this study. This should be a person who was closely involved in one or
more recent foreign entries, for example, a member of the Executive
Board, the CEO, a strategic planner, the director geographic development,
or the head of the international division. At the level of the division and
the business unit, the head or the strategic planner are the most appropri-
ate respondents. In most cases, the secretaries were able to refer to the
right persons. Occasionally, they proposed to address the questionnaire to
them so that they could see to it that the questionnaire would be filled in
by the appropriate person.
2. The potential respondents were approached by telephone to find out
whether they would be willing to participate in the survey. In this way,
further information could be provided orally. An additional advantage is
that respondents tend to remember the phonecall when they receive the
questionnaire, which may have a positive effect on his or her willingness
to fill it in.
3.   As an extra stimulus to complete the questionnaire, the potential respon-
dents were promised a report with the results of the study. Furthermore,
they received an invitation to a (free) workshop about the results of the
study.
4. The questionnaire itself was set up in such a way that it could be filled in
easily within a limited amount of time. Moreover, much attention was
paid to making a well-structured layout (see Appendix A). Of course, it
was stressed that the data would be dealt with confidentially, and that
3l In the Netherlands, firms are managed by an Executive Board, which consists of the Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) and some other top managers. in general, each top manager is respon-
sible for a functional area, such as marketing, production, finance, or a geographical area, such as
Western Europe, North America, the Far East. in contrast with most Anglo-Saxon firms, decisions
are taken by the Executive Board rather than by the CEO
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anonymity was assured. With regard to the contents of the questionnaire,
two distinct tests were carried out. First, during the construction  of  the
survey, a number   of experts   (both in international management   and    in
survey methodology) checked both the translation of theoretical concepts
into specific questions, and the formulation of the questions. Second, two
potential respondents scrutinized the questionnaire. They were asked to
think aloud while interpreting and answering the questions. This testing
stage provided some insight into the interpretation of the questions. On the
whole, the questions were understood in the way that they were meant,
but a few adjustments in the formulation of questions proved to be neces-
sary.
5.   After some weeks, a reminder   was   sent   to the firms   that   had   not   yet
returned the questionnaire.
In order to obtain the information required for the empirical analyses, it is a
prerequisite that the respondents are well informed about the decision process
preceding the choice of the mode of foreign entry. The respondents were
asked to remember a recently established foreign JV and/or WOS in which
they themselves were involved. Subsequently, they had to answer the
questions. If a respondent had been involved in both types of entry, he/she
was asked to fill in the questions for both.
All but 28 of the total group of 458 firms were phoned to find out whether
the firm would participate in the survey. The reasons for not contacting the
28 firms were, for example, the inability to trace address or telephone
number and the reluctance to call firms whose survival was at stake at that
time. Of the remaining 430 firms, 127 firms did not participate for several
reasons: 80 firms indicated that they had no foreign JV or WOS; 19 firms
were fully owned by foreign firms and had no decision power regarding
foreign entry mode choices; and 28 firms stated that they did not want to
cooperate in the survey, because of a shortage of time and the confidentiality
of the information.
As a result, 303 questionnaires were distributed by mail. Of the 303 ques-
tionnaires, 164 were returned, which is a response rate of 54 per cent. This
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response rate is much higher than in previous entry mode studies, where a
response rate of 20-25 per cent is normal (see Agarwal and Ramaswami,
1992a; Brouthers et al., 1993; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Madhok, 1994a).
Only   in some studies, a higher response  rate was obtained (Erramilli,   1991:
44 per cent; Larimo, 1993: 30 per cent).
Of the 164 questionnaires returned, 46 were not filled in because the firms
did not have a foreign JV or WOS (18) or the firms did not want to partici-
pate (28). Careful examination of the returned questionnaires revealed that
four more could   not  be used, which resulted   in   114 usable questionnaires.
The respondents were asked to fill in the questions for either a JV or a WOS
or for both. A number of them completed the questionnaire for both a JV and
a WOS, which finally resulted in 168 usable observations (75 JVs and 93
WOSs). A list of the host countries entered is included in Appendix B.
This section described the sample. In the next section, the statistical tech-
niques that were used to test the hypotheses will be explained.
4.5 Statistical techniques
As indicated in section 4.3, most independent variables are proxied by more
than one indicator. To find out whether these items measure the same under-
lying variable, confirmatory factor analysis was used (compare Frambach,
1993; Long, 19833). This technique tests whether a number of observed
indicators together measure an unobservable underlying variable (see subsec-
tion   4.5.1). The relationships among those underlying variables cannot   be
tested with confirmatory factor analysis.   In the present study, these relation-
ships were tested with logit models.
By separating the measurement model and the testing model, a so-called two-
step approach was followed (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). An alternative
wbuld be a structural equation model in which both distinct steps are taken
simultaneously   (see, e.g., Bollen, 1989; Byrne,    1989; Lim, Sharkey,   and
Kim, 1991; Long, 1983b). This one-step approach, however, has a number
of   shortcomings    (see, e.g., Anderson and Gerbing,    1988, 1992). First,
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incorrect specifications influence all estimates (Johnston, 1984). Second, it is
almost inevitable that interpretational confounding will take place.
Interpretational confounding means that an unobserved variable is given a
different empirical meaning than would have been given by an individual
before estimating unknown parameters (Burt, 1973). This effect is reflected
by the substantial changes in the parameter estimates when different struc-
tural models are tested. It is caused by the fact that the covariances of
indicators, which  are not related according  to the theoretical specification),
affect the estimations and the fit of the model. A two-step approach prevents
these problems with incorrect specification and interpretational confounding.
The two-step approach has drawbacks   as   well   (see, e.g., Fornell   and   Yi,
1992). One limitation is that the two steps are not completely independent, as
is suggested by the label 'two-step approach': modifications in the first stage
affect the second stage. In a reaction to this criticism, Anderson and Gerbing
(1992) argued that the specification and its modifications in the first stage are
based on theory, which implies that possible effects on the second stage are
not arbitrary but driven by theory.
The    second    step, i.e., testing the relationships among the independent
variables and between the independent variables and the dependent variable,
was  done with logit analysis. Normal' (multiple) regression techniques32  6
(e.g., OLS) cannot  be   used,   as the dependent variable   is   not a continuous
variable. Hence, qualitative response models (Amemiya, 1981), which
acknowledge the discrete nature of the dependent variable, should be used.
Three different models will be described. First, if the dependent variable is
dichotomous (JV versus WOS), an appropriate statistical technique is a
binomial logit model (DeMaris, 1992). This type of model will be discussed
in subsection 4.5.2. Second, if the dependent variable can take more than
two discrete values (minority JV, 50/50 JV, majority JV, and WOS), a
multinomial logit model (see subsection 4.5.3) is appropriate (DeMaris,
U In general, probit models produce results similar to logit models (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984,
Liao, 1994) The models differ with regard to the assumed distribution of the disturbance term.
Logit analysis assumes a logistic distribution function, while probit analysis assumes a normal
distribution. In line with most previous studies on foreign entry modes, this study will use logit
analysis.
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1992: Liao, 1994, Menard, 1995). Third, if the values of the dependent
variable are ordered,  as is suggested in foreign entry mode literature  (e.g.,
Chu and Anderson, 1992; Contractor and Lorange, 1988b; Hagedoorn,   1993;
Root, 1987), an ordered logit model is suitable (DeMaris, 1992; Ishii-Kuntz,
1994).  Subsection 4.5.4 contains a description  of the ordered logit model.
4.5.1    Confirmatory  factor  analysis
Confirmatory factor analysis is used for measuring the effects of indicators
on latent or underlying variables. Indicators which are believed to operatio-
nalize  the same construct are combined  into one model.   Then, the analysis  is
directed at examining whether the empirical data can confirm the theoretical
model specified ex ante.
The confirmatory factor analytic model  can be written  as  (see, e.g., Bollen,
1989; Byrne, 1989; Long, 1983a):
x = 45 + 6 [4.1]
where x is a (qxl) vector of indicators or observed variables; 4 is a (qxs)
matrix of factor loadings relating  the  x's  to the latent  E's;  E  is  an (sxl) vector
of constructs or latent variables; and 6 is a (qxl) vector of the unique factors
or measurement errors.
Figure  4.1  contains an example  of a schematic presentation  of a confirmatory
factor analytic model.   In this figure,   it is shown that latent variables   (Ej's)
may be correlated. Although not depicted in this figure, the measurement
errors (61's) can be related too.
Confirmatory factor analysis needs a correlation matrix or a covariance
matrix    of the observed variables as input matrix. The covariance matrix
should be used as the input matrix if all variables are continuous variables,
because it prevents a loss of valuable information on the dispersion of
variables (JOreskog and SOrbom, 1988). However, if at least some variables
have a discrete nature (either ordinal or nominal), the correlation matrix will
be the most appropriate input matrix. In that case, the variances of the
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variables cannot be calculated since the central tendency is unknown
(Churchill, 1991). Contingent on the measurement scale of the observed
variables (nominal, ordinal, interval, or ratio), a different type of correlation
coefficient is applicable. A polychorical correlation coefficient is calculated
in case there are two ordinal variables. In the case of one ordinal variable
and one continuous variable, a polyserial correlation coefficient is computed.
Finally, a Pearson correlation matrix is calculated if both variables are
continuous (JOreskog and Surbom, 1988).
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Figure 4.1: Confirmatory factor analytic model
In the present study, the measurement scale of the observed variables ranges
from ordinal to ratio. As a result, a covariance matrix cannot be used as the
input matrix. PRELIS was used to calculate the correlation matrices, as it has
an option with which the cut-off rate can be specified when a variable is
interpreted as an ordinal variable or as an interval variable (J6reskog and
Stjrbom, 1988). The confirmatory factor analyses were carried out using
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LISREL's maximum likelihood procedure (JOreskog and Sorbom, 1989),
which is common practice for this purpose (Bollen, 1989). This technique
produces the best estimations if the variables have a normal distribution.
Based on the rule of thumb that the kurtosis and skewness should not exceed
1    (Churchill,  1991). it turned out that most independent variables are more
or less normally distributed. Nevertheless, the outcomes should be interpreted
with care. If not all variables have a normal distribution, maximum likeli-
hood may estimate the standard errors and the X2 goodness-of-fit measures
incorrectly (Cudeck, 1989). In the present study, these limitations are
mitigated by requiring that the t-values must exceed the value 2 before they
are interpreted as significant (see Boomsma, 1983). Moreover, X2 will not be
used to examine the goodness-of-fit of the theoretical matrix and the empiri-
cal  matrix.
Other measures for the model fit, such as the adjusted goodness-of-fit index
(AGFI) and the root mean squared residual (RMR), are more appropriate in
the present context (Joreskog and SOrbom, 1989). The AGFI indicates how
much of the covariance is explained by the model parameters, taking into
account the number of degrees of freedom. The value  of the  AGFI can range
from  0  to 1, where a higher value means   that  the   fit is better.   The   RMR
measures the average of the variance of the residuals that cannot be explained
by the model.  The  RMR  has  the same range  as  the  AGFI,  but  here a value
closer to 0 implies a better fit.
In addition to these measures of the overall fit of the models, it is also
possible to evaluate the estimates of the individual indicators. Four important
measures will be used: validity, reliability, the coefficient of determination,
and the largest fitted residual. First, validity involves the question whether a
variable measures what it is supposed to measure (Churchill, 1991; Cook and
Campbell, 1979). In confirmatory factor analytic models, the (convergent)
validity   of an indicator   is   the   kij.    i.e.,   the   size   of the direct relationship
between one latent variable and one indicator (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988;
Bollen, 1989). Whether indicator xi measures what it is supposed to do, is
signalled by the significance of ku· As mentioned above, the threshold for
significance employed in this study is that the t-value must be at least 2. The
validity  of a construct can be calculated as follows: EAD(Ex,2 + Ea,).
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Second, reliability means that the same results will be obtained when the
same procedures or tests will be done again with the same data (Yin, 1989).
In LISREL, the reliability of an indicator is defined as the direct relationship
between all latent variables and indicator xi (Bollen, 1989). The larger this
direct relationship, the larger the reliability of x,. The reliability is measured
with  Rl  (i.e.. the squared multiple correlation coefficient  of xi), which  can
range from 0 to 1. Since,  in this study, each indicator is influenced by only
one latent variable, the Rl is equal to X2. The reliability of a latent variable
can be computed with the formula: (Exi)2/((EX,)2 + Eai)·
Third, the coefficient of determination indicates how well the indicators
jointly measure the latent variable (Jtlreskog and SOrbom, 1989). A higher
value (i.e.. closer  to 1) means  that the model is better. The fourth measure
examines the residuals, which consist of the difference between the theoreti-
cal and the empirical correlation matrices. A model is called a good model if
the  value   of  the largest fitted residual is smaller  than  0.1   (Backhaus  et  al.,
1987).
So far, only the relationships between the latent variable and the individual
indicators were discussed. LISREL provides so-called 'factor score
regressions', which are regression coefficients between the indicators  and  all
latent variables. These 'factor score regressions' were multiplied by the res-
pondents' scores on the various indicators, resulting in the respondents'
scores on the latent variables. 33
In this section, the main elements of the first step of the two-step model were
discussed. Below, the second   step,    i.e., the testing   of the relationships
between, on the one hand, the choice of entry mode, and, on the other hand,
the various latent variables will be discussed (subsections 4.5.2 to 4.5.4).
" These multiplications were executed with 386-MATLAB Missing values in the indicator scores
were substituted by the mean value ot- the scores of the remaining respondents on that particular
indicator. This method. called 'mean imputation'. adds noise to the model, making significant
relationships less likely (Little and Rubin, 1987).
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4.5.2   Binomial  logit  analysis
Binomial logit models have been used frequently in foreign entry mode
studies   (see  e.g.,   Cho and Padmanabhan, 1992; Davidson and McFetridge,
1985; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Hennart, 1991;
Larimo, 1993). Binomial logit analysis is oriented to estimating the prob-
ability that an event occurs rather than another. In the present study, it would
mean that instead of a JV a WOS is chosen as the foreign entry mode. The
binomial logit model can be formalized as follows (NoruAis, 1990):
 (n -   e z-1+ez
[4.2]
with Z being a linear combination of the independent variables:
Z=1 0+1 1%1+P2%2+···+1 nX. [4.3]
where Y is the selection of a JV as the mode of foreign entry; the Bk's are
the regression coefficients, with k = 0,11,..., n; the Xi's are the independent
variables,   with  i   =1,2,   . . . ,n. The choice   for   a  WOS is represented  by
(1-Y). A positive sign for a regression coefficient means that the particular
variable increases the likelihood of a JV as the selected entry mode.
If the model is written in terms of the log odds (= the logit), the direct
impact of the B 's can be shown.
log PCA =4O+ 1Xl+ 32X2+···+ nx"
1-P(k) 14.41
Logit models were estimated  with  SPSS 5.0 using maximum likelihood.  This
technique selects those Bk's that make the observed results most likely (see
Cramer, 1991). Several measures exist to evaluate how well an estimated
model fits the data. First, a classification table can be calculated to compare
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the predicted JVs and WOSs to the observed ones. A model is said to clas-
sify well if the total percentage of correct predictions is substantially higher
than the percentage that would have been obtained by chance. The classifica-
tion rate of a random model is 02 + (1-Ot)2, where a is the proportion of JVs
in the sample (see Morrison, 1969). The classification table also displays the
sensitivity rate and the specificity rate of the model. The sensitivity rate indi-
cates the ability of a model to correctly classify the dependent variable with a
value of 1 (JVs), whereas the specificity rate indicates the opposite.
A second way of assessing goodness of fit is to investigate the likelihood of
the sample outcomes, given the estimates of the parameters. A common
measure is the -2 times the log likelihood (-2LL), which has a small value if
the fit is well. This measure can be used to test whether the predicted model
is comparable to the perfect model. An insignificant result indicates that the
null hypothesis - that the models resemble each other - cannot be rejected.
A third way to determine goodness of fit is the model-X2, which tests the null
hypothesis that all #1''s are zero, except Bo. Whenever the model-X2 is
significant, this null hypothesis can be rejected.
The binomial logit model is only applicable if the dependent variable is a
dichotomous variable. Sometimes, the dependent variable may take more than
two values. In this study, three different types of JVs were distinguished:
majority, 50/50, and minority JVs. Firms entering a foreign market may opt
for either a WOS or one of the three types of JVs; a choice out of four
possible entry modes. Then, multinomial rather than binomial logit analysis
can be used to estimate the effects of the independent variables on the entry
mode choice. This technique will be discussed in the next subsection.
4.5.3 Multinomial logit analysis
Multinomial logit analysis can be applied if the dependent variable has at
least three categories that need not be ordered. Many empirical studies on
foreign entry mode choices used multinomial logit analysis  (see,  e.g.,  Agar-
waI and Ramaswami, 1992a: Contractor, 1984; Erramilli, 1991; Gatignon
and Anderson, 1988; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Kogut and Singh, 1988a).
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Multinomial logit analysis is directed at estimating the effects of independent
variables on the probability that a certain state of an event occurs. Formally
(Liao, 1994):
W





with W being a linear combination of the independent variables
W=D 10+ 11Xl+  iA+··+ inXn 14.61
where j represents the categories of the dependent variable, with j - 1,2,
. . . .   J-1 ;   the  Bk's   are the regression coefficients,   with  k -0,1 ..., n;  the
Xi's  are  the  independent  variables,  with  i   =   1,2,...,   n.   Response  category
J, P(Y=J), is the reference category, which is used as the basis for compari-
son. The probability that a certain response category j will be selected is the
probability compared to reference category J. Obviously, this model equals
the binomial logit model  if J =2.
An essential condition for a correct interpretation of the outcomes of multino-
mial logit analysis   is   that  the   probability   of a response category   (e.g.,   a
minority JV) for an individual observation is not systematically influenced by
other response categories (Liao, 1994; Menard, 1995). Only if response
categories are mutually exclusive and independent from one another, the pre-
cise effect of an independent variable on the incidence of a certain response
category can be determined.
The goodness of fit of the multinomial logit models will be assessed in
several ways (see DeMaris, 1992). First, the loglikelihood ratio test will be
used. This test is an Xz-based, global test for the significance of the total
model, which is calculated as the ratio of -2LL of the model with only the
intercept and the -2LL of the full model. The null hypothesis is that all A's
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are  equal   to   zero.   If the ratio is significant, this hypothesis is rejected.   The
second  test is almost identical   to the first  one.   The main difference  is  that  the
test is not meant for al| Bk's, but only for a specific Bk which indicates the
influence of a specific independent variable on the dependent variable. The
third  test  92)  is a measure  of the overall  fit  of the model, which is similar  to
R  in regression analysis (see Chu and Anderson, 1992). This measure is
calculated as: p2 -1. LF/Lo, where LF is the loglikelihood of the full model
and Lo is the loglikelihood of a model with all parameters restricted to zero.
The multinomial logit analyses were carried out with the CATMOD pro-
cedure in SAS using maximum likelihood.
4.5.4   Ordered  logit  analysis
Unlike multinomial logit analysis, ordered response logit analysis assumes
that the answer categories are of an ordinal nature. In the present study, this
means that the four possible modes of foreign entry are ordered. This is a
realistic assumption since the four entry modes range from low to high with
regard to both the level of control and the level of equity. For example, in
case of a minority JV, the investing firm has the least equity and (usually)
the least control.34 In spite of the intuitive appeal of the ordering of the
dependent variable, virtually no empirical study on foreign entry mode
choices has acknowledged it. One exception is the study by Chu and
Anderson (1992). This is a replication of Gatignon and Anderson (1988),
who used binomial and multinomial logit analysis. Chu and Anderson came
to the conclusion that ordered logit analysis is an attractive technique for
entry mode research, because it offers more parsimony and has less computa-
tional restrictions than multinomial logit analysis.






14 A minority stake in the equity of a JV does not necessarily imply that the firm has a low level of
control (Schaan, 1988). Even as a minority partner, a firm can exert a substantial amount of
control.
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where the B1's are unknown threshold parameters that separate the contiguous
categories that have to be estimated with the Bk's (Liao, 1994). All other
parameters have the same meaning as before.
One goodness-of-fit measure is added to those applied in multinomial logit
analysis (see Chu and Anderson, 1992; DeMaris, 1992): the invariance to the
cutpoint. This measure assumes that the estimated effects for each value of
the independent variables are similar for all categories of the dependent
variable (Menard, 1995). Whenever the test is insignificant, this assumption
is   accepted. The ordered logit analyses were carried  out  with the LOGISTIC
command in SAS using maximum likelihood.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter described the methodology used to test the hypotheses of the
present study. In several respects, the methodology differs from the method-
ology employed in previous studies. The first difference is that latent vari-
ables are used which were measured by a number of indicators. Most other
studies only took one proxy for each variable. Second, data about these
indicators at the level of the firm or the venture were gathered by means of a
survey, complemented with archival data. In this way, it was possible to
include information on the perceptions of decision makers. Many previous
studies only used archival data, usually, at industry level. Third, the sample
consists of Dutch MNEs entering foreign countries, which adds to the
general focus on US or Japanese MNEs. A last difference is that not only
binomial or multinomial logit analyses were carried out, but also ordered
logit analysis. This last technique was applied only once in foreign entry
mode studies (see Chu and Anderson, 1992).
Chapter 5 contains the results of the statistical analyses that were carried out




The previous chapter focused on the methodology used to test the hypotheses
as     formulated in Chapter     3. The results    of both steps     of the two-step
approach are presented in this chapter. Tile first step involves the estimation
of the measurement model by means of confirmatory factor analysis. The
results of this step are provided in section 5.3. The second step consists of
testing the model. The results of the binomial, multinomial, and ordered logit
analyses are discussed in sections 5.4 to 5.6, respectively. However, before
these results are presented, attention will be paid to potential biases with
regard to the responding firms (section 5.2).
5.2 Non-response analysis
To trace non-response bias, it was investigated whether the results obtained
from the analyses are driven by differences between the group of respondents
and the group of non-respondents. Non-response bias may cause inaccurate
conclusions, and, consequently, reduce the external validity of a study.
Several firm-related factors (e.g., firm size, the type of activity it is involved
in, the type of industry) can be used to check for non-response bias. Here,
the sales of the firms participating in the survey were compared to the sales
of the non-responding firms. Unfortunately, it was impossible to obtain the
sales of all firms, divisions, and business units included in the sample. The
1992  sales  of a total  of 206 non-responding  and 112 responding firms could
be collected.35
Two tests were conducted to find out whether the average firm size of the
responding firms differed significantly from that of the non-responding firms.
35 These 206 non-responding firms represent approximately  77 %  of all firms  thX were phoned  and
did not respond (i e., 266 firms), whereas the  1 12 responding firms constitute 68%  of all  164
responding firms
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First, a T-test was done to explore whether the group means differ from each
other. The null hypothesis that the group means are equal could not be
rejected: the T-test is highly insignificant  (p =0.94).   The  mean  of  the   1992
sales of the responding firms is 2,458,386 and the non-responding firms'
average sales are 2,382,726. As a second test, a binomial logit model was
estimated to test the effect of the firms' sales in 1992 on the decision to
participate in the survey or not. The results of this logit model show that the
1992 sales have no effect at all on the firms' participation in the survey
(B= 9.04E-10; p =0.9435). The improvement   of the model   with the sales
relative to the base model with only the intercept is highly insignificant
(p =0.9437). This indicates that sales  are  not a significant predictor of survey
participation. The conclusion on the basis of both tests is that the two groups
of firms do not differ in size.
5.3 Confirmatory factor analysis
This section contains a discussion of the results of the first step of the two-
step approach: the estimation of the measurement model. The control
variables and three explanatory variables (i.e., relative size, mode experi-
ence, and product experience) are each measured by one single indicator.
These variables do not have to be estimated by way of confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA), but can directly be inserted in the logit analyses. All other
explanatory variables are latent variables, captured by at least two indicators.
The estimation results  at the indicator level are presented in subsections  5.3.1
to  5.3.4,  and the results  at the level  of the constructs in subsection  5.3.5.
5.3.1  Strategic variables
Global strategy is measured by two indicators: local sales and intrasystem
sales. The operationalization of a construct by two indicators would lead to a
negative number of degrees of freedom.36 This problem can be solved by
* The number of degrees of freedom  left is determined as follows:  ((X  *  (X + 1))/2) - n, where X
is the number of indicators and n stands for the number of parameters to be estimated  In the case
of two indicators, the number of degrees of freedom  is:  ((2*3)/2) -  (2+2)  =  -1.
Chapter 5: Results 101
decreasing the number of parameters to be estimated, for instance, by assign-
ing  a fixed value  to  one  or more parameters  (e.g.,   Xi = 1),  or by assuming
that some parameters are equal   (e.g.,    At -12) (see Bollen, 1989). Another
solution   is to estimate two constructs simultaneously.   In this study, the latter
route is followed. The rule used for combining constructs is the expectation
that the constructs hardly influence one another. For all models with two
constructs, additional tests were done with different combinations of con-
structs. These tests led to similar outcomes. Hence, the results of the confir-
matory factor analyses are not influenced by the selection of the constructs
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Figure 5.1:  CFA maximum likelihood estimates of global strategy and
level of competition
The construct global strategy was estimated together with latent variable level
of competition (see Figure 5.1), with the covariances of the disturbance terms
between these two constructs being fixed  at zero. Figure  5.1  should be inter-
preted in the same way as Figure 4.1. The values in parentheses are t-values,
and the reliability  of each indicator is added under the heading   'R2'.   The
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results of the analysis indicate that the (convergent) validity of the indicators
C -Ai's) is rather well: 0.602 and 0.845 for global strategy, and 0.732 and
0.533 for the level of competition. The t-values of all Xi's exceed the value
2, which implies that these estimations are significant (see subsection  4.4.1).
The reliability of the indicators ranges from 0.362 to 0.713 for global
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Figure 5.2: CFA maximum likelihood estimates of industry growth and
cultural difference
The latent variable industry growth is measured by two indicators. Analogous
to the construct global strategy, this construct was estimated simultaneously
with another construct, viz. cultural difference (see   Figure   5.2).   Again,   no
covariance is assumed between the error terms  of the constructs. Below,   the
results of industry growth are discussed: the results of cultural diference are
postponed to subsection 5.3.4, where the locational variables are considered.
The indicators of the construct industry growth differ somewhat from one
another with regard to validity and reliability. One indicator (chance of con-
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tinuation of industry growth)  is very reliable  (0.885)  and  has a validity  (= A)
of -0.941 with a t-value larger than 2. The other indicator (perceived present
industry growth) has a lower reliability (0.343) and validity (0.586). Again,
A is significant.
5.3.2 Ownership-specific variables
Two ownership-specific variables are latent variables, viz. international
experience   and   host   country   experience.   The   construct  international   experi-
ence is operationalized through three indicators (see Figure 5.3). This model
has zero degrees of freedom. All three individual indicators have a highly
significant X. with a value that ranges from 0.733 to 0.910. The reliability of




















Figure 5.3: CFA maximum likelihood estimates of international experien-
ce
The second ownership-specific latent variable, host     country     experience,     is
measured by two indicators: the perceived familiarity with host country
characteristics and the experience in the host country. To enable the esti-
mation  of  this  latent  variable,  the construct reputation was included in the
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confirmatory factor analysis (see Figure 5.4). There, covariance between the
disturbance terms of these constructs is assumed to be zero. The results of
the latent variable reputation will  be  presented  in  subsection  5.3.3,   where  the
transactional variables will be dealt with.
The two indicators of the construct host country experience have a rather
high A: 0.732 and 0.826, with t-values that are much higher than the thresh-
old value of 2. The R2 of each indicator is relatively high: 0.535 and 0.682.
5.3.3 Transactional variables
The first transactional construct reputation was estimated simultaneously with
the construct host country experience. The results of the model estimation are
shown in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.4:  CFA maximum  likelihood estimates of host country expe-
rience and reputation
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Three indicators have a very significant A: 0.771, 0.786, and 0.440. The
fourth indicator 'perceived investments in image' has a rather low validity
(A-0.245). although the t-value of the A is still above the threshold value.
The reliability of this indicator is very low (0.060). Therefore, this indicator
is left out of the further analyses. This confirmatory factor analytic model
was estimated again with the three remaining indicators as an operationaliza-
tion of the construct reputation.    The   R2s of these indicators (0.594, 0.617,
and  0.193) are satisfactory.
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Figure 5.5:  CFA maximum likelihood estimates of specific assets and
risk of opportunism
The second transactional variable, asset specificity, is a dummy variable with
the value 1 if the respondent's scores on the two latent variables speciftc
assets and risk Of Opportunism are above the average scores on these vari-
ables (see subsection 4.3.3). These two latent variables are operationalized
by, in total, four indicators (see Figure 5.5). The covariance between the
error terms of the indicators 'perceived specific know-how' and 'perceived
risk of opportunism know-how' is not fixed to zero, but also estimated in the
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model. In this way, a possible relationship between these indicators can be
captured. The reason for letting this covariance 'free' is that there may exist
a relationship between asset specificity and the risk of opportunism. By
including this covariance in the estimation model no degrees of freedom are
left. Hence, the AGFI cannot be calculated, while the RMR and the largest
fitted residual are equal to zero. All indicators have a highly significant A,
which ranges from 0.653 to 0.854. The indicators have a rather high reliabil-
ity: 0.425, 0.498, 0.617, and 0.729.
5.3.4  Locational  variables
Four locational variables are latent variables: cultural difference, host country
risk, host government policy, and level of welfare. The construct cultural
dijIerence was measured by two indicators. This construct was estimated
together with the construct industry growth in the confirmatory factor
analysis (see Figure  5.2). The first indicator, 'perceived cultural differences',
has a significant A (0.747) and a rather high reliability (R2=0.557). The
second indicator, the 'Kogut and Singh index', or cultural distance according
to Hofstede (1980, 1991), has a somewhat lower validity (A=0.465) and
reliability (0.216). Yet, the t-value of A is larger than 2. The observation that
the second indicator has a lower validity and reliability than the first indica-
tor, 'perceived cultural differences', is important, because most empirical
studies have used the Kogut and Singh index as the only indicator of cultural
differences between  a  home  and  a host country   (see, e.g., Agarwal,   1994;
Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992b; Benito and Gripsrud, 1992; Cho and
Padmanabhan, 1992; Kogut and Singh, 1988a; Shane, 1994). Apparently,
decision makers' perceptions of cultural differences deviate in a non-trivial
way from the cultural distance based on the four dimensions of national
culture as proposed by Hofstede (1980, 1991)!37
The second locational construct, host   country   risk, is measured by four
indicators (see Figure  5.6).   The  A  of each indicator is highly significant.  The
R2s of all indicators are satisfactory, except the reliability of 'perceived
political stability', which has a very high value: 0.831.
37 The correlation between these two indicators is only 0.347.
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Figure 5.7:  CFA  maximum  likelihood  estimates of host government
policy
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The latent variable host government policy is proxied by three indicators,
which resulted  in a model without any degrees of freedom left. Figure   5.7
shows that each indicator has a highly significant A. The reliability of each
indicator is fairly high: 0.438, 0.499, and 0.698.
The   last   latent variable, level   of  welfare. is measured by five indicators (see
Figure 5.8). Four out of five indicators have a highly significant X, and a
high R2. The fifth indicator 'perceived level of knowledge of local firms' has
a rather moderate validity (A=O.297; t-value=3.793), but a very low
reliability  (R'=0.088).   As a result, this indicator  will be excluded  from  the
estimation of the construct level   Of welfare. This construct was re-estimated
with the remaining four indicators, and the results were taken as the input for
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Figure 5.8:  CFA maximum likelihood estimates of level of weUare
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5.3.5   Construct  and  model  evaluation
Table  5.1   summarizes the reliability  and  validity  of all latent variables,  and
the four criteria for the evaluation of the model as a whole which were
distinguished in subsection  4.5.1.  From this table  it  can be concluded  that  all
constructs have a fairly high reliability and a somewhat lower - but still very
satisfactory - validity. The validity is satisfactory but not very high, because
of the relatively small number of indicators per construct. An increase in the
number of relevant indicators generally leads to a higher validity of the
constructs.
Furthermore, Table 5.1 clearly shows that all models have a very good fit:
1.   Nearly all covariance  of the models is explained  by the model parameters
(all AGFI's approach the maximum value 1).
2.  The  average  of the variance  of the residuals that cannot be explained  by
the models is negligible (all RMRs approach 0).
3.   All indicators together appear  to  be  very good measuring instruments   for
the latent variables (all coefficients of determination are close to 1).
4. The values of the fitted residuals that are not explained by the models are
far  below the critical  value  of 0.1.
This section presented the results of the confirmatory factor analyses. Two
indicators, each of which was expected to affect an underlying variable,
turned out to be an unreliable measure of these constructs. Therefore, these
indicators were omitted from the confirmatory factor analyses. The re-
estimated models (i.e., without these two indicators) turned  out to produce
valid and reliable indicators. The results of these re-estimated models were
used as input for the subsequent analyses (see sections 5.4 to 5.6).
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Table 5.1: Overview of the reliability and validity of the constructs,
and of the evaluation criteria of the CFA models
Latent variables Relia- Vali- AGFI RMR Coeff. of Largest
bility dity determ. fitted res.
Global strategy 0.694 0.538 0.934 0.022 0.901 0 028
Level of competition 0.575 0.410 0.934 0.022 0.901 0.028
Industry growth 0.751 0.614 0.975 0.015 0.956 0.016
International experience 0.860 0.672 ---1 0.000 0.887 0.000
Host country experience 0.756 0.608 0.890 0.038 0.967 0.055
Reputation 0.682 0.458 0.890 0 038 0.967 0.055
Specific assets 0.715 0.557 --- 0.000 0.939 0.000
Risk of opportunism 0.729 0 577 --- 0.000 0.939 0.000
Cultural difference 0.545 0.387 0.975 0.015 0.956 0.016
Host country risk 0.752 0.446 0.974 0.021 0.864 0.028
Host government policy 0.780 0.545 --- 0.000 0.803 0.000
Level of welfare 0.734 0.698 0 986 0.004 0.915 0.009
' If no degrees of freedom are left, LISREL cannot calculate the AGFI, while the RMR and the largest fitted
residual are zero as in perfect models (Jikeskog and Sdrbom, 1989). The coefficient of determination,
however, can still be calculated for models without any degrees  of freedom  left.
5.4 Binomial logit analysis
This section presents the results of the binomial logit analysis. In the next
sections, the results of two additional logit analyses (multinomial logit and
ordered logit) will be presented. Together, these three analyses form the
second   step   of the two-step approach: the testing   of the hypotheses. First,
however, the correlation matrix of all variables that are included in the logit
analyses is given in Table  5.2.
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Table 5.2 Means, standard deviations, and the correlation matrix of
the dependent variable and the independent variables
Mun SD 1 23 45 6 7 8 9
1  Entry mode .4464 .4986   1.0000
2 Glob. strat. .2006 .9055 -.1586 1.0000
3  Lev. comp. 4.0732 1.3248 -.1389 -.1749 1.0000
4  Ind. growth -1.1135 1.0797 .1448 -.0438 -.1826 1.0000
5  Intern. exp. 1.0366 .4009 -.1612 .0980 .0853 .0218    1.0000
6  Host exp. .7809 .6632 .1855 .0431 -.1240 .0273 -.0029 1.0000
7 JV exp. .3214 .4684 .7664- -.0323 -.1400 .0965 -.2791" .1214 1.0000
8  WOS exp. .4405 .4979 -.7968- .0846 .1317 .1426  -.0291  -.2350' -.6107- 1.0000
9  Prod. exp. 6.2381 1.4528 .0177 -.0059 -.0294 -.1264 .0194 .0304 -.0251 .0114     1.0000
10 Rel. size 2.1488 1.5958  -.1592 -.1302 .0422 .1645 .0042 -.1195 -.1765 .1431 .0466
11 Asset spec. .3452 .4769 -.2234' .1075 -.0105 .0175 .1455 -.0337 -.2378' .0758 .0052
12 Reputation 2.6282 1.5998 -.1692 .4143- .0415 -.0342 .2201' .0964 -.1349 .0789 -.1029
13 Cult. diff. 2.2419 .9761 .1666 -.0586 -.1186 .0985 -.2837" .2453' .1734 -.0825 .0587
14 Host risk 5.0071 3.4189 .1429 -.0530 -.1061 -.0743 -.3871- .2573- .2099' -.0646 .0548
15 Host pol. .8930 1.7612 .1162 .3670" -.1043 -.0400 -.1363 .0951 .0941 -.0889 .0076
16 Lev. of welf. 2.1479 1.5281 -.0754 .0513 .1882 -.0716 .3442" -.2467' -.1394 .0348 -.0653
17 Firm size 5.4488 2.9758 0529 .0328 -.0309 -.0529    -. 1170 -.0465 .0277 -.0459 -.0181
18 Advert. ind. .2500 .4343 -.0760 .1764 .0629 .0297 .1395 .0030 -.1913 .0138 .0190
19 Knowl. ind. .2738 .4472 .0662 -.0754 -.0138 .1585 -.1099 -.0851 .0633 -.0339 .0189
20 Res. ind. .1905 .3939 -.1002 .0506 -.1094 -.0721 -.1009 -.1120 -.0417 .1803 .0249
21 Type of act. 4.1488 1.8463 .0770 .0533 -.0321 .1520 .0308 -.0437 .0482 -.0326 .0738
10     11     12      13     14     15     16     17     18     19     20    21
10  Rel. size 1.0000
11 Asset spec. -.1502     1.0000
12 Reputation ..1429 mil.0000
13 Cult. diff. ..1423 -.1013 -,1591 1.0000
14 Host risk -.2613  -.0814 -.1824 .4951- 1.0000
15 Host pol. -.1390 -.1806 .1494 .1681 .2021' 1.0000
16 Lev. of welf. .1513 .0415 .1768  -.3572- -.7205" -.2000' 1.0000
17 Firm size -.1652 .0563 -.0332 .0857 -.0320 .1396 .0021 1.0000
18 Advert. ind. -.0022 .0304 .0841 -.0823 -.1163 .0579 .1865 .1138  1.0000
19 Knowl. ind. -.0071 -.0633 -.0488 .1397 .0084 .0205 -.0897 .0359 -.1696 1.0000
20 Res. ind. .0594 -.0048 -.1060 .0944 .1318 .0968 -.0982 .0474 . 1400 -.1959 1.0000





In this correlation matrix, correlations are significant at the 0.01 (0.001)
level if they have a value of at least 0.20 (0.25). A careful investigation of
the correlation matrix learns that only four correlations are larger than
0.501, while correlations above   10.60 I are considered  to be rather  high
(see, e.g., Churchill, 1991). Two of these correlations are between the
dependent variable and an independent variable (JV experience and WOS
experience). The high value of these correlations with the dependent variable
(0.7664 and -0.7968) may cause multicollinearity. To find out whether
multicollinearity problems would occur, three logit models were estimated
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including JV experience,  WOS  experience, and both, respectively. The results
of all three binomial logit analyses revealed multicollinearity problems.
Because of the multicollinearity effects, these variables (JV experience and
WOS experience) will be left out of the logit analyses. Consequently, Hypo-
thesis 6 on mode experience cannot be tested.
An additional effect of the elimination of these variables is that one of the
other high correlations disappears. This particular correlation (-0.6107) was
between JV experience   and   WOS experience. Hence,   one rather high
correlation remains, viz. between level of welfare and host country risk
(-0.7205). Two separate logit models were conducted: one without level of
we(fare and one without host country risk. The results of these models are
comparable   to  the   results  of  the   whole   model.   However,   the  effect of host
country risk is no longer significant when the level of welfare is omitted from
the   model. This suggests   that the level of welfare needs   to be controlled
when measuring the impact of country risk, and vice versa. All other correla-
tions are fairly low, making further exclusions of variables unnecessary.
Table 5.3 contains the logit estimates of B and its standard error (presented in
parentheses) for each explanatory variable and control variable. Furthermore,
the level of significance is provided for each variable.38 Below, the results
are discussed for all explanatory variables. Positive values of a regression
coefficient means that the particular variable increases the probability of a JV
compared to a WOS. A negative coefficient means that a WOS is more likely
than  a  JV.
The first hypothesis that firms with a global strategy prefer a WOS to a JV
when entering a foreign market is not corroborated. As expected, the effect
of global strategy   on the likelihood   of  JVs is negative (8= -0.2328).   How-
ever, it is insignificant. This result suggests that a high-control entry mode (a
WOS)  is not required  if  the firm follows a global strategy. This insignificant
effect is not in line with Kim and Hwang (1992), who found that more
38 One-tailed significance levels are used since the hypotheses contain explicit predictions of the
effect of the explanatory variables. One exception, however. is Hypothesis 14, in which the effect
of the level of welfare is not specified  In this case, a two-tailed significance level is employed
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control is (significantly) preferred over less control in case global synergies
can be achieved. They, however, did not compare JVs and WOSs directly.
Hence, there is no evidence of a significant effect of a global strategy on the
choice between JVs and WOSs.
Contrary to the expectation, a higher level of competition in the industry
entered   has a negative (-0.3463) and significant   (p < 0.05) effect   on   the
propensity to set up a JV. This implies a preference for a WOS in the case of
high-competition industries. WOSs create extra capacities in an industry,
which will most likely incite incumbent firms to react fiercely. Perhaps
Dutch MNEs possess (or perceive that they possess) strong competitive
advantages that may overcome the problems that arise from entering a highly
competitive industry on their own (compare Hennart and Park, 1994; Yip,
1982). In general, MNEs have such distinctive advantages (see Hennart and
Park, 1994; Teece, 1981) which may lead them to decide to enter a highly
competitive industry on their own. To test this proposition, an additional logit
model was calculated that included the interaction between international expe-
rience and the level of competition. International experience was taken as a
proxy for the distinctive competitive advantages of MNEs. The logit analysis
revealed that the negative coefficient of the level of competition remained
negative,   but the effect  is no longer significant. The interaction effect  also
turned  out  to  have an insignificant, negative effect  on the incidence  of  JVs.   A
first preliminary conclusion based on these findings is that international
experience appears to be not the only distinctive competitive advantage of
Dutch MNEs, since the interaction effect was insignificant. Unfortunately, no
other advantages of MNEs are included in the survey, which makes it impos-
sible to test which competitive advantages (including international experience)
increase the tendency to enter a highly competitive industry with a WOS.
The present study's finding that WOSs are preferred over JVs when a highly
competitive industry is entered, conflicts with Gomes-Casseres's (1990) find-
ing. He found a significant effect of the intensity of competition in the
industry entered on the likelihood of JVs. So far, his study is the only study
that found a significant impact of competition intensity on foreign entry mode
choice. All other studies  led to insignificant results  in this respect (Hennart,
1991; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Kogut and Singh, 1988b; Larimo, 1993).
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Host country risk 0.1941
(0.1059)
Host government policy -0.0637
(0.1446)










Type of activity (1) (R&D) -0.0760
(1.7242)
Type of activity (2) (production) 0.2218
(0.7839)
Type of activity (3) (marketing and sales) -1.5788'-
(0.6633)
Type of activity (4) (R&D + production) -2.7182'
(1.6108)
Type of activity (5) (R&D + marketing and sales) -7.9058
(20.3777)




Degrees of freedam                                                                        24
p<0.1; '- p<0.05; ' - ' p<0.01 (one-tailed). Values in parentheses are standard errors.
' A positive coefficient means an increased likelihood of JVs.
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In line with Hypothesis 3, firms rather set up a JV than a WOS when
entering a fast-growing industry (B =0.4034;  p < 0.05). This finding suggests
that JVs are better vehicles for capturing the benefits of market growth than
WOSs (compare Hennart,  1991). JVs usually require  less  time  than  WOSs
before they are in complete operation, because JVs may use existing facilities
of their partners. This reduction    in   time    is a comparative and competitive
advantage of JVs (Stalk, 1988). As a result, JVs enable firms to quickly gain
a good competitive position in rapidly growing industries.
Hypothesis 4 is also corroborated: firms with much international experience
indeed   have a higher inclination   to   set   up   WOSs   (B = -0.9975;    p < 0.1).
Experienced firms have become familiar with operating in a great many
different environments. In addition, from earlier foreign entries   they   know
what the potential pitfalls are of being a new player in an unknown market.
Apparently, these firms have learnt how to deal with new contexts and how
to adapt to the local contingencies. With an increase in cumulative internatio-
nal experience, the necessity of joining forces with a local partner decreases
and, eventually, disappears. This finding is comparable with findings of
previous studies (Agarwal, 1994; Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992a, 1992b;
Benito, 1994; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Madhok, 1994a).
Contrary to the expected effect (see Hypothesis 5), experience in the host
country significantly increases the probability of JVs as compared to WOSs
(B-0.6044; p<0.1) Moreover, it is also in contrast with the effect of
international experience. Apparently, international experience and host
country experience are two really distinct, firm-specific resources. Different
things are learnt from international expansions in general than from the
experience a firm builds up in one host country.39 On the one hand, firms
with many foreign ventures have experience in dealing with foreign contexts
and foreign firms. They have learnt which trajectory to follow when a new
market is entered. On the other hand, firms with much experience in one
host country are expected to have learnt how to deal with a host country's
19 Compare Barkema,   Bell, and Pennings   ( 1996), who found that experience gained in cultural
settings that are identical with or comparable to the host country's culture has a significant impact
on the longevity of foreign majority  JVs and foreign acquisitions.  No such effect was identified  for
general international experience.
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unique characteristics. This study's results, however, suggest that in spite of
the increased host country experience, firms prefer a JV over a WOS. Appar-
ently, firms are not afraid of establishing JVs with local firms when they see
new   opportunities    in    the host country. It seems that firms learn    how    to
cooperate with firms in the host country, which may increase their likelihood
of engaging in new JVs with local firms. This finding is in contrast with the
results of previous studies (Gomes-Casseres, 1989, 1990; Hennart, 1991;
Padmanabhan and Cho, 1994). Firms having no or only some host country
experience turn out to prefer a WOS as the mode of entry. This initial
preference may be due to the fact that inexperienced firms are unwilling to
share control in an unknown and uncertain environment (see Davidson and
McFetridge, 1985; Stopford and Wells, 1972). Another explanation may be
that firms overestimate their own capabilities in understanding the local
idiosyncrasies. or underestimate the difficulties of coping with them.
Hypothesis 7, which states that much product experience decreases the like-
lihood of JVs, is not confirmed. The effect of product experience on JVs
(B=0.0609) is insignificant. It seems that product experience  or the direction
of expansion has no impact on the choice between a JV and a WOS. To test
whether there are differences between industries with regard to product
experience, additional logit models were estimated with the interaction
between product experience and the type of industry: advertising, know-how,
and resource intensive (compare Gomes-Casseres, 1989). The results of these
analyses indicate  that  a  JV  is more likely  than  a  WOS  (p < 0.05)  when  the
industry entered fits within the core business of the firm, and is advertising
intensive. No significant effects were found for the other types of industry.
Other studies also failed to find a significant effect for product experience
(see, e.g., Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Larimo, 1993; Padmanabhan   and   Cho,
1994). However, some studies indeed confirmed that a JV is favoured over a
WOS when the firm expands in a direction outside its core activities (Hen-
nart, 1991; Hennart and Reddy, 1992; Stopford and Wells, 1972).
Unexpectedly, the relative size of the investment (Hypothesis 8) has a
negative effect (-0.3539) on the probability that a JV is chosen, which is
significant at the 0.05 level. A possible explanation for the preference of a
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WOS in the case of relatively large investments is to prevent a situation of
unilateral dependence. Large subsidiaries will have a substantial impact on
the MNE's performance. Then, full control may be preferred to secure that
the subsidiary receives the attention and commitment it needs, and to prevent
suboptimization and a deviation from the firm's interests. As a consequence,
MNEs will select a WOS for such important affiliates to avoid becoming
dependent on the unpredictable, and perhaps opportunistic, behaviour of a
partner firm (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Williamson, 1979, 1985). A neces-
sary condition for using a WOS in such situations is that the MNE has
enough resources (e.g., financial   and   managerial)   to   establish the foreign
affiliate on its own.
This finding is in contrast with the outcomes of Kogut and Singh's study
(1988b), which confirms that firms have a higher tendency to set up JVs
when the foreign investment is large compared to the firms' size. So far, this
latter study is the only study that found a significant effect of relative size on
foreign entry mode choice.
The hypothesis that the specificity of the assets decreases the probability of
JVs is supported  (B = -0.8194;  p < 0.05). This indicates  that  WOSs are better
mechanisms than JVs to prevent the appropriation of specific know-how.
This finding is in line with some other studies (Anderson and Gatignon,
1988; Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1994). However,
several empirical studies yielded an insignificant effect for asset specificity
(see, e.g., Agarwal, 1994; Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992b; Davidson  and
McFetridge, 1985; Fagre and Wells, 1972; Hennart, 1991).
As expected in Hypothesis 10, the firm's reputation has a significant,
negative effect  (B = -0.2704;  p < 0.1)  on the incidence  of JVs. Firms  that  have
a good image and reputation attempt to protect themselves from opportunistic
behaviour of partner firms. This free-riding behaviour may deteriorate their
reputation and even make all years of reputation building worthless. To
prevent these negative externalities of cooperation, firms which have invested
substantially in their reputation prefer to have full control over their expan-
sions (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Brickley and Dark, 1987; Caves, 1982;
Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Stopford and Wells, 1972).
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Hypothesis   11   states  that  both a small  and a large cultural distance between
the home country  and  the host country increases the propensity  to  set  up  JVs.
The results of Table 5.3 show that this expected relation is corroborated:
smaller differences and greater differences significantly   (p < 0.01) increase
the   likelihood   of   JVs (see Figure    5.9). This U-shaped relationship    was
acquired by incorporating   both   the main effect (0= -3.0452)   and its square
(#=0.6655)   in the logit model. This study  is the first study that demonstrates
that the relationship between cultural distance is more complex than is
usually assumed. Dutch MNEs not only want to share equity in strange
cultural settings, but also in cultures that resemble their home country's
culture. Especially this second finding constitutes an interesting contribution
to the foreign entry mode literature. It suggests that JVs are used for a
diversity of purposes. In cultures dissimilar to the home country's culture,
JVs are used as a means to get acquainted with the foreign culture, while in
more similar cultures  JVs are formed with firms for other reasons (e.g., joint
research or cost reductions) than acculturation. Thus, firms are willing to
cooperate with firms that have a comparable national culture, and also with
firms that have a really different or complementary cultural background.
E
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Cultural differences
Figure 5.9: Effect of cultural differences on the likelihood of JVs
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Most previous studies on US MNEs found that JVs are only preferred over
WOSs when countries are entered which have a cultural background that
differs substantially   from   the home country's culture   (see, e.g., Agarwal,
1994; Davidson, 1982; Erramilli, 1991; Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Gatignon
and Anderson, 1988; Kogut and Singh, 1988a). However, Japanese MNEs
(Padmanabhan and Cho, 1994) prefer WOSs in the case of a greater cultural
distance, and JVs in the case of a smaller cultural distance. Apparently,
Dutch MNEs have something in common with American and Japanese
MNEs, since they favour JVs if the cultural distance is either small or great.
According to Hypothesis 12, firms are expected to establish JVs in risky host
countries. The binomial logit model confirms that such countries are entered
with JVs (B-0.1941; p<0.05), presumably mainly to remain flexible in
unstable and unpredictable conditions. This risk-averse behaviour of Dutch
MNEs is consistent with that of American MNEs (Gatignon and Anderson,
1988; Kim and Hwang, 1992) and Norwegian MNEs (Benito, 1994). JVs are
particularly appropriate to reduce potential losses when the firm's opportun-
ities in a host country have vanished completely because of, for instance, a
major shift in the political or economic situation. Compared with a WOS, the
losses in a JV are divided between at least two firms.
A restrictive host government was believed to increase the likelihood of JVs
(see Hypothesis 13). However, the analysis reveals that host government
policy has no significant impact on the entry mode choice. This finding
Suggests that for Dutch firms in the late 1980s and early 199Os, the policy of
host country governments is no longer a decisive factor for the formation of
JVs.   This is completely   in  line  with the increasing relaxation of restrictive
policies that can be observed since the mid-1980s (Contractor, 1990b).
Previous studies which found that restrictions significantly affect the likeli-
hood of JVs have different time frames than the present study. This study
focuses on foreign entries that had recently been established at the time of
data collection (1993). Gatignon and Anderson (1988) and Gomes-Casseres
(1989, 1990) used data on foreign entries before 1975, while Shane (1983)
investigated entries that existed in 1977 and 1982. They all found that the
restrictiveness of host governments had a significant influence on the likeli-
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hood of JVs. Padmanabhan and Cho (1994) used a database that contains
data on Japanese entries between 1969 and 1991. They tested their model on
two subsamples: entries before 1986 and from 1986 onwards. Their results
showed that a restrictive government policy increases the chance of JVs
significantly in both periods. However, the effect is much greater in the first
period than in the second period (2.255 and 0.741, respectively).
The direction of the effect of the level of welfare in the host country on the
foreign entry mode choice was not specified (see section 3.3). The likelihood
of both JVs and WOSs was believed to be affected by the level of welfare.
Table 5.3 shows that the level of welfare turns out to have a very significant
(p<0.01), positive impact on the propensity to set up JVs (B-0.5781). It
seems that, for Dutch firms, developed countries are more attractive to enter
with JVs than developing countries. Local firms in developed countries can
offer foreign MNEs more than local firms in developing countries can do. In
this respect, two advantages are especially valuable: the commercial experi-
ence of local firms40 (Gomes-Casseres, 1989) and the well-educated indigen-
ous population. The positive effect of the level of welfare on the incidence of
JVs is in line with the results of earlier studies (see Gomes-Casseres, 1989,
1990; Kobrin, 1987; Larimo, 1993; Shane, 1993).
The logit model, which converged after six iterations, appears to be a very
good model, as it classifies 76.79 per cent of the observations correctly (see
Table 5.4). This is significantly better than a random model would have
achieved. A random model's classification rate is otz + (1-ot)2, with a being
the  number  of JVs divided  by the total number of observations (i.e., 73/168
= 0.4345). In this study, a random model has an overall classification rate of
50.86 per cent. The relative classification improvement of the estimated
model as opposed to a random model is: (76.79 - 50.86) : 50.86 = 50.98
per cent. This relative information gain is significantly higher than the
minimal improvement  of  25  per  cent  that is proposed  by  Hair  et  al.   (1979).
The sensitivity rate of the model, which indicates the ability of the model to
correctly classify JVs, is quite high (70.67 per cent). The model classifies
WOSs  better  than  JVs (the specificity  rate  is  81.72  per cent). Models  with  a
40  In developed countries, local firms are often MNEs themselves.
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logistic distribution always tend to overclassify the category with the largest
number of observations (Amemiya, 1981).41
Table 5.4: Classification table of the binomial logit analysis
Predicted
WOS                    JV Percentagecorrect
WOS 81.72%76             17
Observed
JV      22 53 70.67%
Overall 76.79%
The -2LL and the model-X2 also show that the model has a very high overall
explanatory power (see Table 5.3). The null hypothesis that the model fits
the perfect model cannot be rejected (-2LL is 159.899; p=0.1583). The
model-X2 is 71.066 and highly significant (p=0.0000), which indicates a very
good fit of the model. The p2 is 0.31, which is also very acceptable.
The conclusion of the logit analysis on the eclectic model (see Table 5.3) is
that the eclectic model can predict the choice of the foreign entry mode fairly
well: the percentage of correct classifications is high and the model-X  is
highly significant.
In the remainder of this section, the eclectic model developed in this study
will be compared with the four separate theories that together constitute the
cornerstones    of the eclectic model. First, the parameter estimates    of   the
individual theories will be presented (Table 5.5), afterwards all possible
combinations of the four theoretical approaches are evaluated on their
predictive quality (see Table 5.6).
41 The  overclassification  of  WOSs   is  much  less   than in previous studies (compare Hennart,   1991;
Larimo, 1993)
Table 5.5: Binomial logit estimations of the separate theories: JVs vs.
Wossl
independent variables Strategic Ownership-specific Transactional Locational
Intercept 2.1730 1.8429 0.8603 1.0057
(0.9867) (1 3118) (0.6813) (1.2123)
Global strategy -0.5543 -
(0.2963)






liost country experience 0.4564'
(0.3036)












Host country risk 0.2180-''
(0.0892)
Host government policy -0.0302
(0.1134)
Level of welfare 0.3722-
(0.1908)
Firm size 0.0567 0.0069 0.0551 0.0524
(0.0591) (0.0634) (0.0581) (0.0645)
Advertising-intensive industry 0.3702 0.3852 0.1655 0.3993
(0.4547) (0.4655) (0.4398) (0.4709)
Know-how-intensive industry 0.1122 0.0119 0.0426 0.1427
(0.4081) (0.4208) (0.4079) (0.4248)
Resource-intensive industry -0.8521' -0.7877' -0.8909" -0.7328
(0 5428) (0 5508) (0.5398) (0.5451)
Type of activity (1) 0 3856 0.5302 0.5632 -0.3489
(1.7169) (1.5530) (1.5533) (1.6070)
Type of activity (2) 0.4979 0.0124 0.2901 0.3550
(0.6332) (0,6657) (0.6295) (0.6476)
Type of activity (3) -1.0950' -1.6866'-' -1.1649 -1.4274-
(0.5516) (0.5877) (0.5446) (0.5488)
Type of activity (4) 0.1750 -1.7333 -0.2837 -1.8200'
0.1600) (1.2786) (1.1263) (1.3763)
Type of activity (5) -7 0896 -8.9809 -7.7770 -7.4147
(20.8764) (18.4041) (20 8221) (21.0636)
Type of activity (6) 0.0057 -02333 -0.0401 -0.1043
(0.5769) (0.5955) (0.5725) (0.5966)
Model-x' 31.848 39 624 31750 44315
Significance 0.0025 0.0003 0.0015 0.0001
Degrees of freedom                        13                                      14                                     12                                      15
'p <0.1:  ' -p <0.05.     -    p< 0.01 (one-tailed). Values in parentheses are standard errors.
' A positive coefficient means an increased likelihood  of JVs.
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Table 5.5 contains the estimates of the coefficients for each of the four
theories  with  the same control variables  as  in  the full model.   The four partial
models have a significant model-Xl, which indicates that not all #'s are zero.
In itself, the separate models are rather good models, but not so well as the
complete eclectic model. The results of these partial models   are   to a large
extent analogous  to the results  of  the full model.   Only one variable (industry
growth), which was significant in the full model, is no longer significant,
whereas one variable (global strategy), which was insignificant in the
complete model, turned   out  to   have a significant effect   in  the   partial   model
including the strategic variables. All variables remained positive or negative,
as  they were before. This substantial overlap demonstrates  that the variables
which are significant in partial models are hardly influenced by other vari-
ables in the whole model. Hence, multicollinearity appears to be absent in the
eclectic model.   This also suggests that partial models result   in   relatively
unbiased estimates of the effects.
In Table 5.6, the model-X2's of the separate theories and all possible combi-
nations of these theories are compared with the model-)(2 of the full eclectic
model. Also, the percentages of correct classification of the entry modes of
all models are presented. This table shows that the full eclectic model is
superior to each of the individual theories in predicting the selected mode of
foreign entry. The improvement in the model-XZ is highly significant. Thus,
it is proved that the eclectic model, which was built in Chapter 3, is not only
conceptually, but also statistically superior to one-sided approaches. Further-
more, it is evident from Table 5.6 that the combination of all four theoretical
approaches leads to significantly better predictions than any combination of
two or three of these approaches. Hence, the eclectic model proposed in the
present study turns  out  to  be  a  very good model.
So far, the results of the binomial logit analyses have been discussed. As
argued before, in addition to a dichotomous dependent variable, it is also
possible to distinguish four categories within the dependent variable: minority
JV, 50/50 JV, majority JV, and WOS. In the next section, the results of the
log it analyses with the categorized dependent variable will be discussed.
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Table 5.6: Model-x23, degrees of freedom, classification rates for all
possible models, and a comparison with this study's eclectic
model
Models Degrees of % of Correct Improvement Degrees of
(s -1  to 14) Model-x< freedom classification <XZF.11 - X25 freedom'
Full model 71.066  ' -            24              76.79                   --
1. Strategic 31.848'          13 64.29 39.218"'        11
2.   Ownership-specific    39.624' ' '            14 69.64 31.442' -        10
3. Transactional 31.750'                12 66.67 39.316"'        12
4. Locational 44.315 ==        15 73.81 26.751-"       9
5.1+2 47.687"'       17 72.62 23.379' -         7
6.1+3 41.172' -        15 72.02 29.894='-         9
7.1+4 55.859"'        18 76.19 15.207='          6
8.2+3 50.350  -       16 74.40 20.716"'              8
9.2+4 53.788'-'       19 72.62 17.278' -         5
10.3 +4 50.053' '        17 71.43 20.013  -         7
1 1.1+2+3 57.235 -'        19 76.79 13.831"          5
12. 1+2+4 64.428-'        22 77.38 6.638'                2
13.1 +3+4 61.431'-'        20 77.38 9.635-          4
14.2 +3+4 62.049'-        21 73.81 9.017=          3
'p<0.1,"p<0.05,"'p<0.01
' This column contains the difference between the degrees of freedom of the full model and of
each separate model
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5.5 Multinomial logit analysis
Following Gatignon and Anderson (1988), a more refined logit model was
developed with a more specific breakdown in different types of JVs. It was
expected that the effects of the explanatory variables are not equal for the
distinct types  of  JV. A multinomial logit model enables a detailed investi-
gation of whether  and how effects differ  for  each  type  of  JV.   In this section,
it  is  assumed  that the dependent variable  is an unordered categorical variable.
Multinomial logit analysis was carried out for two different methods of
categorizing the dependent variable. First, the division of equity was taken  as
a criterion for dividing the JVs into the categories minority, 50/50, and
majority. Second, the level of actual control was used for the allotment. See
Table  5.7  for the number of observations that resulted  in  the two cases.  Both
models will be discussed below.
Table 5.7: The number of minority, 50/50, and majority JVs based on
the division of equity and the division of control
Based on control
majority 50/50 minority
majority 17 1 4 22
Based on equity 50/50         8                23               4           35
minority         2                4                12          18
27          28           20
The distribution of the ventures in Table 5.7 demonstrates clearly that an
equal division of the equity of a JV does not necessarily imply that both
partners exert the same influence within the JV (compare Geringer and
Hebert, 1989; Killing, 1983).
Table 5.8: Multinomial logit model with JVs grouped according to the level of equityl
Entry mode Intercept Global Level of Industry Internat Host Product Relative Asset Reputa- Cult. (Cult. Host
strategy compet. growth exper. exper. exper. size spec. tion diff. diff.)2 risk
Minority JV 7.2172 - 0.0023 -0.4967 0.1422 0.0798 0.3817 -0.2009 -1.6662--- -0.5702 -0.1442 -4.5536
-
0.8934  - 0.0696
(3.6784) (0.6633) (0.2968) (0.3379) (1.2369) (0.6288) (0.2165) (0.5981) (0.8330) (0.2786) (1.6441) (0.3390) (0.1610)
50/50 JV 4.1162 -0.4788 -0.6688' - 0.5064' - -0.9516 0.9014= 0.1437 -0.2200 -0.6885 -0.3938 -2.9147' 0.6750- 0.2687
(3.2897) (0.4755) (0.2651) (0.2735) (0.8860) (0.5211) (0.1831) (0.2165) (0.6017) (0.2358) (1.5703) (0.3266) (0.1350)
Majority JV 4.5523 0.9463 0.1797 0.4667 -2.5144-
-
0.8784 0.1088 -0.1016 -1.0344 -0.4813-   -4.7901 -   1.0700 -   0.3178 -
(3.7587) (0.6022) (0.2942) (0.3071) (1.0321) (0.6921) (0.2273) (0.2730) (0.8474) (0.2985) (1.6390) (0.3427) (0.1529)
WOS                   0            0             0             0             0            0             0             0             0             0             0             0             0
Entry mode Host Level of Firm Adp en. Knowl. Resource Activity Activity Activity Activity Activity Activity
policy welfare size industry industry industry  1   2   3   4   5   6
Minority JV 0.3328 0.4144 0.2252 -0.6266 -1.2359
'
-0.4267 3.1078 0.3971 -1.6604' -2.4191 -9.8263' 0.8831
(0.2847) (0.3370) (0.2909) (1.1093) (0.8828) (1.0636) (2.6167) (1.3053) (1.2264) (2.4821) (.) (1.2683)
50/50 JV -0.2826- -   0.8679 0.0093 0.6614 0.1896 -1.1585 -8.4862' 0.3213 -1.8978"-10.9077' -7.9618' 0.0087
(0.1493) (0.3054) (0.2447) (0.7367) (0.5829) (0.8533) (.) (0.9007) (0.8122) (.) (.)            (0.8053)
Majority JV -0.0133 0.6896'-  -0.6435'=   1.7526" 0.1724 -0.3161 -5.6948" 1.1869 -1.0354 -2.7241 -8.2591' 1.2827
(0.2541) (0.3312) (0.2586) (0.8313) (0.7279) (0.9263) (.) (1.2940) (1.0944) (2.1772) (.) (1.1316)
WOS                     0              0               0               0               0              0               0               0               0               0               0               0
'p<0.1,  = 'p< 0.05.    - 'p< 0.01 (one-tailed) ' infinite parameters,  due  to a  lack  of JVs involved in these activities. Values in parentheses are standard errors.
' A  positive  coe fficient means an increased likelihood  of the specific  type  of JV relative  to  a  WOS.
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Table 5.8 contains the results  of the multinomial logit analysis  with  the   level
of equity as the determinant of the categorization. Analogous to the binomial
logit model, the WOS option is taken as the reference category. This means
that the effects of the independent variables on the three types of JV should
be interpreted as the effect relative to WOSs. 42
The results of the multinomial logit analysis show that a global strategy has a
significant effect (B-0.9463; p<0.1) on the propensity to choose a majority-
owned JV over a WOS. This suggests that with a majority stake, the control
required for a global strategy can be better ensured than with full ownership.
A high level of competition significantly increases the likelihood of WOSs as
opposed  to  50/50  JVs (B= -0.6688;   p < 0.01) and minority JVs (0=-0.4967;
p < 0.05). Apparently, Dutch MNEs prefer to fully control entries in highly
competitive markets. As such, they want to prevent that their firm-specific
advantages are going to be acquired by other firms (see section 5.4). Table
5.8  reveals  that  especially  50/50  JVs  (B=O.5064;  p< 0.05) and majority  JVs
(B-0.4667;   p < 0.1)  are  used to enter rapidly growing industries.  This  sug-
gests that the bargaining position of the partner which is already present in
the industry is so weak that no majority share can be obtained.
Firms    with much international experience    have a significant    (p < 0.01)
preference for WOSs over majority JVs. Both other JV types have no
significant effects. These results indicate that internationally experienced
firms rather have full control over their new entries than share the control
with another firm. Even a small share in the hands of a partner may lead to
coordination problems, and may cause delays in the decision-making pro-
cesses. In contrast,  50/50  JVs (B =0.9014;  p < 0.05) are favoured  over  WOSs
when firms are highly experienced in the host country. As suggested in
section 5.4, full comprehension of the specific local circumstances cannot be
achieved on one's own. The input of a local partner remains a prerequisite,
42 Using the WOS as the base category implies that this study acknowledges that firms see the
different JV types as real alternatives for WOSs. In other words, when entering a foreign market.
fi rms are expected  to  make  only one decision  on the entry  mode  that  will be selected.   This  is  in
contrast to a so-called two-stage approach according to which firms first decide whether they want
to enter by means of a JV or not, and in the second stage select the precise form of cooperation
(Gatignon and Anderson, 1988)
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even for experienced MNEs. No significant effects are found for the variable
product experience. With regard to the relative size of the investments, it
turns   out   that   WOSs are significantly appreciated over minority   JVs   (B =
-1.6662;  p <0.01) when relatively large investments are needed. This implies
that a minority share will be avoided for such important subsidiaries.
The specificity of the assets transferred to the foreign affiliate has no signifi-
cant effect on the different types of JV. This is strange, since the binomial
logit model showed that asset specificity has a significant effect on the likeli-
hood of WOSs. A firm's reputation is based on many years of image build-
ing, which usually involves the investment of a great deal of money. Firms
with a good reputation prefer WOSs over all types of JVs when entering a
foreign country. Especially 50/50 JVs and majority JVs (significant at the
0.05  level  and  the  0.1 level, respectively)  are less likely  than WOSs, because
in these governance structures partner firms can heavily abuse the MNE's
reputation while only a relatively low investment is required.
The curvilinear effect of cultural differences on the likelihood of JVs holds
for all three types of JVs. Thus, when compared to WOSs all three types of
JVs are more likely as modes of entry in both culturally similar and cultural-
ly dissimilar countries. However, the effect of minority and majority JVs
differs from the effect of 50/50 JVs (compare the B's of the variables cultural
difl'erences and (cultural differences)2 for all three   types   of  JVs).   When   the
host country is very risky, 50/50 JVs and majority JVs are favoured over
WOSS  (13=0.2687  and  B - 0.3178, respectively;  p < 0.05). The insignificant
effect of country risk on minority JVs is somewhat unexpected. Particularly
in risky environments, firms are assumed to minimize their commitment in a
way that the maximum loss is limited. Minority JVs are appropriate govern-
ance structures to achieve this aim. Perhaps risky host countries do not have
a strong collection of indigenous firms which possess enough resources and
capabilities to become a majority shareholder of a JV with a foreign firm.
The restrictive policies   of   a host government    lead   to a significant    (B=
-0.2826;   p < 0.05) preference  of  WOSs  over  50/50  JVs. This suggests  that
MNEs  rather  set  up  a  WOS  than an imposed  50/50 JV. Finally, particularly
50/50 JVs (13=0.8679; p<0.01) and majority JVs (B=0.6896; p<0.05) are
selected when developed countries are entered. This finding supports the
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argumentation put forward in section 5.4, that firms in developed countries
can offer foreign firms more than firms in developing countries.
The  model   as a whole turns  out  to  be  a good model   (-2LL is 263.66,   with
p= 1.0000),     with a model-X2 of 126.00 which is highly significant
(p< 0.001).  and  pz =0.43. The results  of the multinomial logit analysis based
on the division of equity resemble those of the binomial logit analysis. All
variables that were significant in the binomial logit analysis are also signifi-
cant (with the same sign) for at least one type of JV in the multinomial logit
model, with one exception: asset spec(ficity. In the binomial logit model, this
variable turned out to have a significant effect on the incidence of WOSs, but
in the multinomial logit model no significant influence was found. Further-
more, the insignificant variables of the binomial model are again insignifi-
cant, except for the variable host   government policy, which turns out to be
significant    in the multinomial model. The multinomial model provides
detailed information on the types of JV that are significantly affected by the
explanatory variables. Table 5.8 clearly demonstrates  that JVs should  not  be
considered as one group of organizational forms. On the contrary! There are
substantial differences among the various types of JVs (compare Bell and
Jagersma, 1996; Killing, 1983).
In addition to this multinomial logit analysis based on the division of equity,
a comparable analysis was carried out based on the division of control. Table
5.9 contains the results of this multinomial logit analysis that are largely
similar to the model based on equity division. Here, only the differences
between the two models with regard to significant effects will be discussed.
The second multinomial model shows no significant effect for the global
strategy of firms on the entry mode choice, whereas majority-owned JVs
were significantly preferred  to  WOSs  in the first model. This suggests  that  a
majority stake in the equity of the JV gives the firm full control over the
venture which is needed when the firm has a global strategy.
In the second multinomial model, WOSs are not only more likely than
majority JVs, which is the same outcome as in the first model, but also more
likely than 50/50 JVs when the firm has much international experience.
Table 5.9: Multinomial logit model with JVs grouped according to the level of control 1
Entry mode Intercept Global Level of Industry Internat Host Product Relative Asset Reputa- Cult. (Cult. Host
strategy compet. growth exper. exper. exper. size spec. tion diff. diff.)2 risk
Minority JV 4.3851 -0.1231 -0.4281 -0.1025 -0.4743 1.0392 0.1669 -1.1184''- 0.0145 -0.3119 -4.3293- 0.8508" 0.1149
(3.6568) (0.6437) (0.3048) (0.3196) (1.0595) (0.7328) (0.2469) (0.4577) (0.8380) (0.2954) (1.5994) (0.3350) (0.1556)
50/50 JV 2.2231 -0.5169= -0.5019' 0.4559- -1.2888 0.5783 0.2025 -0.2062 -1.0797 -0.1999 -1.9285 0.5132- 0.2246'
(3.5659) (0.4638) (0.2566) (0.3007) (0.8884) (0.5022) (0.2108) (0.2254) (0.6987) (0.2351) (1.6157) (0.3325) (0.1423)
Majority JV 9.5882 - 0.5132 -0.2218 0.7130"  -1.6814' 0.5683 -0.0712 -0.3388' -1.0268' -0.4923" -4.1495 - 0.9180''- 0.1871'
(3.3608) (0.5127) (0.2513) (0.2858) (0.9412) (0.5320) (0.1735) (0.2334) (0.6880) (0.2619) (1.4732) (0.3144) (0.1411)
WOS                     0              0               0               0               0              0               0               0               0               0               0               0               0
Entry mode Host Level of Firm Adveri. Knowl. Resource Activity Activity Activity Activity Activity Activity
Policy welfare size industry industry industry  1   2   3   4   5   6
Minority JV 0.2981 0.1328 0.1810 0.6041 -0.5917 -0.9952 -5.9435' 1.1528 -2.3743"     -3.4958 -8.4852' 0.2147
(0.2891) (0.3469) (0.2813) (0.9755) (0.8374) (1.0788) (.) (1.2244) (1.2460) (2.6330) (.) (1.2452)
50/50 JV -0.0965 0.8805 -- -0.0426 0.5016 0.4324 -0.7209 0.0778 -0.2986 -1.7126 -10.9633' -8.3647' -0.3777
(0.1550) (0.3139) (0.2514) (0.7500) (0.6053) (0.8434) (1.8652) (0.9457) (0.8221) (.) (.)        (0.8353)
Majority JV -0.2880 - 0.5074 -0.5443 1.4155' -0.1987 -0.9621 -6.1564' 0.0473 -1.6211 -2.2687 -8.5942' 0.6221
(0.1466) (0.2925) (0.2408) (0.7549) (0.6360) (0.8314) (.) (1.0523) (0.8828) (2.0583) (.) (0.8977)
WOS                      0              0               0               0               0              0               0               0               0               0               0               0
'p<0.1, "  p< 0.05,"    p< 0.01 (one-tailed) ' infinite parameters,  due  to a  lack  of JVs involved in these activities. Values in parentheses are standard errors.
 A positive coefficient means an increased likelihood of the specific type of JV relative to a WOS.
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Obviously, these internationally experienced firms    do    not    want to share
control over their foreign ventures. According to Table 5.9, 50/50 JVs are
preferred to WOSs when they have experience with the country to be
entered. However, when the level of control is used to classify JVs, it
appears that most of the control is in the hands of the local partner. Presum-
ably, the local partner needs a high level of control over the venture to be
able to adapt to the local idiosyncrasies. Equal division of the equity may
serve as a sign of good intentions. When the investment is relatively large,
firms turn out to have a significant preference for WOSs over both minority-
and majority-controlled JVs. The first model indicates that WOSs are only
preferred to minority-owned JVs.
In the multinomial logit model based on the division of equity, the specificity
of the assets transferred in the relationship has no significant effect on any of
the JV types. However, a high asset specificity turns out to influence signifi-
cantly the propensity to engage in WOSs relative to 50/50- and majority-
controlled JVs. Even the ability to control the JV to a large extent is not
enough to prevent opportunistic behaviour. The significant negative effect of
the firm's reputation on 50/50 JVs is no longer significant in the second
multinomial logit model. This implies    that    WOSs    are only preferred    to
majority JVs by firms which have heavily invested in their brandname
capital.  Apparently,  a  50  per cent equity stake  was not enough  to  keep  the
partner from behaving in an opportunistic way, whereas truly equally shared
control is believed to do so.
The U-shaped relationship between cultural differences and 50/50 JVs is not
significant any more when the level of control is used instead of the level of
equity. The signs are still as expected. This finding suggests that sharing the
equity equally is necessary when the culture is quite similar (as an expression
of mutual trust) or rather dissimilar (as a sign of good intentions). The con-
trol, however, is not really shared equally between partners in the case of
either a small or a great cultural distance. In such situations, it seems import-
ant to have one firm that largely controls the JV. The last differences involve
the effects Of the host government's policy on the preference for WOSs.
WOSs  are more likely than majority-controlled  JVs  (p < 0.05)  when  the  local
government puts restrictions on foreign ownership. The significant effect of
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the likelihood of WOSs as opposed to 50/50 JVs (see Table 5.8) is no longer
significant in the second model. Apparently, sharing control equally with a
local partner in a restrictive country is not a realistic option for Dutch
MNEs, because of all potential problems related to the coordination and com-
munication required. The results  of the second multinomial logit model   indi-
cate that if firms are in a position to acquire most of the control of a JV that
is established to meet local restrictive policies, they prefer to set up a WOS.
In that case, they do not have any coordination problems with an imposed
partner.
Again, the null hypothesis that the model is not significantly different from
the perfect model cannot be rejected    (-2LL is 277.53;    p = 1.0000).    The
model-X2 is 116.65 with p<0.0001, and p2=0.40.
The overall results of the multinomial logit models are comparable to the
results of the binomial logit model. The multinomial logit analyses added
insight  into the differences among the three types  of  JVs.   It has clearly  been
demonstrated that JVs should not be considered as one group, since there are
many differences among minority JVs, 50/50 JVs, and majority JVs. Further-
more, the multinomial logit analyses revealed that differences exist between
the classification of JVs on equity and control. For example, majority-owned
JVs are not always identical to majority-controlled JVs. Both models are
good models: the -2LL's are insignificant, the model-X2's are highly signifi-
cant, whereas the measures of overall fit 02) are 0.43 and 0.40, respectively.
In the next section, the results of the multinomial logit models will be
contrasted with those of the ordered logit models to find out which of these
models fits the data best.
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5.6 Ordered logit analysis
Two ordered logit analyses were carried out: one with the division of equity
as the criterion to classify JVs, and another with the division of control. The
results  of both models are presented in Table 5.10. Below, the results  will  be
discussed.
Table 5.10 shows  that a higher level of ownership is significantly more likely
when the assets transferred to the new foreign subsidiary are highly specific
(p < 0.05), the level of competition  is  high  (p < 0.01), the foreign affiliate  is
relatively large   (p < 0.01),   and the investing   firm   has   a good reputation
(p < 0.1). When entry into developed countries is contemplated, lower  levels
of ownership are preferred  (p < 0.1). Furthermore, the U-shaped relationship
between a lower level of ownership and cultural differences remains signifi-
cant  (p < 0.05). All other variables  turn  out  to  have no significant impact  on
the level of ownership. Compared to the binomial and multinomial logit
analyses, this ordered logit model reveals an insignificant effect of the
riskiness of the host country, the firm's international and host country
experience, and the growth of the industry entered. Apparently, no ordering
exists among the four entry modes for these variables.
A remarkable difference between the results of the ordered logit model and
the multinomial logit model concerns the outcome of the variable asset
specificity. In the multinomial model, no significant effect was found for this
variable on the likelihood of any of the three different types of JV, whereas
the effect became significant at the 0.05 level in the ordered model. A closer
look at Table 5.8 reveals that the estimated coefficients of the three types of
JV (minority, 50/50, and majority) are ordered: -0.5702, -0.6885, and
-1.0344, respectively. Hence, the multinomial logit model already contained
indications of a possible significant effect of asset specificity on the ordering
of the four entry modes.
Table 5.10: Ordered logit estimations with JVs grouped on the level of
equity and on the level of controll
Independent variables Equity JV Control JV
Intercept 1.40772.7112
(1.9165) (1.9154)
Global strategy -0.3621 -0.3489
(0.3066) (0.3038)
Level of competition -0.4419 -0.3498'-
(0.1536) (0.1524)
Industry growth 0. 1906 0.0939
(0.1671) (0.1656)
International expenence -0.4500 -0.7762'
(0.5551) (0.5532)
Host country experience 0.2670 0.5140'
(0.3146) (0.3224)
Product experience 0.0520 0.1298
(0.1187) (0.1236)








Cultural difference -1.4926" -1.7569' -
(0.7232) (0.7283)
(Cultural difference)2 0.3070" 0.3450' '-
(0.1448) (0.1458)
Host country risk 0.0943 0.1496"
(0.0816) (0.0816)
Host government policy -0.0893 -0.0357
(0.0990) (0.1003)
Level of welfare 0.2422' 0.3034"
(0.1650) (0.1661)
Firm size 0.0026 0.0249
(0.1392) (0.1381)
Advertising-intensive industry 0.3806 0.4155
(0.4674) (0.4651)
Know-how-intensive industry -0.2773 -0.1424
(0.4009) (0.4038)
Resource-intensive industry -0 6565 -0 6573
(0.5316) (0.5372)
Type of activity (1) 0.6923 0.0410
(1.4873) (1.5005)
Type of activity (2) 0.1472 0.3870
(0.6063) (0.6047)
Type of activity (3) -1.4295' '' 1.4531' -
(0.5630) (0.5615)
Type of activity (4) -2.0061' -2.5105''
(13388) (1.3384)
Type of activity (5) -101.5000 -101.6000
(2.98E21) (2.9OE21)




Degrees of freedom                                     24                                          24
' p<0.1,    ' p<0.05; ' - ' p<0.01 (one-tailed) Values in parentheses are standard errors.
' A positive coefficient means an increased likelihood of JVs.
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When the level of control is taken as the criterion to categorize JVs, different
results are obtained than in the case of the level of ownership. A higher level
of control is preferred when competition in the industry entered is high
(p < 0.05), the investing  firm  has much international  experience  (p < 0.1),  and
the  relative  size  of the foreign investment is large  (p < 0.05). Lower control
is preferred when the investing firm has much host country experience
(p < 0.1),     and when risky countries    (p < 0.05) and developed countries
(p < 0.05) are entered (see Table   5.10). In addition, the U-shaped effect   of
cultural distance on the preference for a lower level of control is significant
(p< 0.01).
A comparison of the two ordered logit analyses shows that three variables
which had an insignificant coefficient in the model based on the division of
equity are significant   in the second model based on control. These variables
are   international    experience,   host    country    experience,    and   host    country   risk.
Moreover, the two transactional variables (asset speclicity and repumtion),
which significantly affect the preference of a high level of ownership, turn
out to have no significant effect on the level of control. Apparently, only an
increase in the level of ownership, and not in the level of control, can reduce
the negative effects of opportunistic behaviour. This finding is in sharp
contrast to the prediction of a number of authors using transaction cost
economics, who argue that opportunistic behaviour    (in    the    case of asset
specificity or a good reputation) can best be prevented with a high control
governance structure   (see, e.g., Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Hennart,
1988; Teece, 1986).
The criteria for the assessment of the overall fit of the two models indicate
that both are good models: the -2LL's are 331.853 and 330.933, respective-
ly, which are both insignificant. The model-X2's are 57.802 and 63.247,
respectively, and highly significant  (p < 0.001).  The  p2  of the  two  models  is
identical: 0.34. However, both models   do not satisfy the requirement   that
they be invariant to the cutpoints. The two models are highly significant on
the    proportional odds assumption   test:    X2 = 134.5142   with   p < 0.001,    and
  = 100.6691  with  p < 0.001, respectively. This means  that the coefficients  of
the explanatory variables are not independent of the mode of entry which is
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taken as the cutpoint (Menard, 1995). Thus, the coefficients shown in Table
5.10  will be different  when  50/50 or majority JVs instead of minority  JVs
are taken as the cutpoint. This suggests that the four categories of the
dependent variable (minority JV, 50/50 JV, majority JV, and WOS) really
differ from one another, which is completely in line with the conclusion of
the multinomial logit analyses (see section  5.5). The results (see Table  5.10),
however, indicate that for some of the variables an ordering exists for the
four  types of entry  mode.
The lack of invariance to the cutpoint implies that the results of the ordered
logit analyses presented in Table 5.10 should be interpreted  with  care.   The
values of the coefficients of the independent variables should not be taken too
literally, but more important is the level of significance and whether the
effects are positive or negative.
5.7 Conclusions
At the end of this chapter, the three different types of logit models (binomial,
multinomial, and ordered) are compared. In Table  5.11, the logit  models  are
evaluated and compared following several criteria. The conclusion is that,
based on the -2LL and the model-X: all models are good models. However,
these two criteria cannot be used to compare models with different assump-
tions, such as multinomial logit and ordered logit. Consequently, other
criteria  are  used to compare the logit models.
Using the p2 as the criterion for evaluation, it turns out that the two multino-
mial logit models are better than the other models. This is in line with the
results of the different models, which provided clear evidence of the differ-
ences between   the four entry modes. The conceptually plausible ordering   of
the four modes of entry (minority JV, 50/50 JV, majority JV, and WOS) is
not corroborated by the data on Dutch foreign entries. Each mode turns out
to have unique characteristics and, as a result, each type has its own circum-
stances in which it is the most appropriate mode of foreign entry. Therefore,
there appears to be no real ordering between them, at least not for all
variables. For a number of variables (six in the case of the division based on
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equity, and seven in the control-based division), the ordered logit analyses
confirmed that an ordering exists among the four entry modes (minority JV,
50/50 JV, majority JV, and WOS).
The lack of ordering for all variables in combination with the larger number
of variables with a significant effect on the entry mode choice (see Table
5.11)  indicates  that the multinomial logit models  of this study better explain
the foreign entry mode choice than the ordered logit models. This conclusion
is in contradiction with the findings of Chu and Anderson (1992). They
concluded that ordered logit models are more appropriate for foreign entry
mode choices than unordered (i.e., multinomial) logit models.
The next chapter contains the conclusions and implications of this study.
Table 5.11: Comparison of the logit models: binomial, multinomial, and
ordered
Binomial Multinomial logit Ordered logit
Evaluation criteria logit equity control equity control
-2LL 159.965 263.655 277.523 331.853 330.933
Model-x' 71.066' 126.00Ot 116.654' 57.802t 63.247+
Degrees of freedom             24               69                   69               24                    24
p2 0.31 0.43 0.40 0.35 0.34
Number  of sign, indep.  var.     10                             11                                     1 1                            6                                        7




In this last chapter, the conclusions of this study will be presented (section
6.2). These conclusions form the basis for the managerial implications, which
are the subject of section 6.3. Finally, section 6.4 contains some suggestions
for further research.
6.2 Conclusions
This study investigated the foreign entry mode choice. More precisely, it
focused  on what factors affect the choice between two specific entry modes:
the JV and the WOS. The selection of the mode used to enter a foreign
country is an important, though complex, strategic decision. Many factors
influence this selection process. Therefore, it can be expected that many
firms will have problems in determining the optimal mode of entry. Particu-
larly, those firms that enter into cross-border activities for the first time will
probably encounter many problems.
The research question of this study was:
What factors influence the choice between a JV and a WOS as the mode
of foreign entry?
To gain insight into the possible impact of the factors that may be relevant
for foreign entry mode choices, two trajectories were followed. First, the
literature, both theoretical and empirical, was reviewed. Second, an empirical
study was conducted to test the hypotheses that were formulated based on the
literature review.
Seven theoretical approaches in the field of international business and stra-
tegic management were evaluated on their applicability to foreign entry mode
choices: Hymer's market imperfections theory, transaction cost economics,
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internalization theory, Dunning's eclectic paradigm, the strategic behaviour
approach, the resource-based approach, and the eclectic theory of the choice
of the international entry mode by Hill, Hwang, and Kim (1990). All these
theories turned out to be useful in explaining foreign entry mode choices.
However, the focus in this study On the entry mode choice by individual
firms necessitated that Hymer's market imperfections theory and Dunning's
eclectic paradigm were omitted     from the further analysis.     Four    of    the
remaining theories offer only partial explanations. Only Hill, Hwang, and
Kim's eclectic theory was able to provide a more comprehensive framework
for analysing foreign entry mode choices. This framework reflects   the   com-
plexity and diversity of a firm's business environment much better than
partial frameworks.
Hill, Hwang, and Kim's eclectic theory was taken as the starting point of the
present study, as it combines elements of three relevant, complementary
theoretical approaches: transaction cost economics, internalization theory,   and
the strategic behaviour approach. Various empirical studies found that
elements of these theories significantly affect the choice between a JV and a
WOS. In spite of its attractiveness, this eclectic theory was criticized in the
present study. The main criticism concerns the neglect of the resource-based
theory, which is one of the theories that provides a partial explanation of the
foreign entry mode choice. This theory is oriented towards a firm's resources
and capabilities. Given its focus  and its level of analysis  (i.e., the organiz-
ational unit), this approach is complementary to the strategic behaviour
approach, internalization theory, and transaction cost economics. Further-
more, the relevance of this theory was empirically confirmed.
In the present study, Hill, Hwang, and Kim's eclectic framework was
adjusted and extended, which resulted in a new eclectic framework. A major
extension is that the resource-based theory is added to the framework. Hence,
the present study's eclectic framework consists of elements of four theories:
the strategic behaviour approach, the resource-based theory, transaction cost
economics,    and the internalization theory. This framework    was    used    to
formulate a number of hypotheses regarding the influence of strategic
variables, ownership-specific variables. transactional variables, and locational
variables  on the choice between  a  JV  and  a  WOS  as  the  mode of entry.
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A survey was held among Dutch MNEs which were expected to have set up
one or more foreign JVs or foreign WOSs. The response to this survey
resulted in a total number of 168 observations (73 JVs and 95 WOSs). Most
explanatory variables were operationalized by several indicators to capture
the  complexity of these variables. In contrast to other studies, perceptual  data
were combined with archival data, since it was expected that both capture a
different part of the variables. The data collected were firm-level data and
venture-level data.
A two-step approach was followed to test the hypotheses. The first step
consisted in estimating the measurement model using confirmatory factor
analysis in LISREL. This means that it was investigated whether the indica-
tors, which were expected to measure the explanatory variables, indeed
measured these variables.    All    but two indicators turned    out    to    be    good
measures of the latent variables. These two indicators were omitted from all
further analyses. The output of this first step was used as the input for the
second step: the testing of the hypotheses.
The hypotheses were tested using three different types of logit models:
binomial logit, multinomial logit, and ordered logit. In the binomial logit
model, the dependent variable was either a JV or a WOS. The results of this
logit analysis clearly showed that the eclectic framework that was developed
in this study is not only conceptually, but also empirically superior to partial
and less comprehensive models. Nevertheless, the partial models (i.e., based
on only one theory) and the less comprehensive models (i.e., based on two
or three of the relevant theories) in themselves also were good models.
According to the binomial logit analysis, JVs are more likely to be estab-
lished when a high-growth industry is entered, the investing firm has much
host country experience, the cultural differences between the home and the
host country are either very small or very large, a risky host country is
entered, and the host country has a high level of welfare. JVs are less likely,
or, put differently, WOSs are more likely, to be established when the level of
competition in the industry entered is high, the investing firm has much
international experience, the size of the foreign subsidiary is relatively large,
the assets transferred to the foreign affiliate are highly specific, and the
142 Chapter 6: Conclusions
investing firm has a good reputation. Three variables (the investing firm's
strategy, its experience with the products, and the policy of the host govern-
ment) appeared to have no significant effect on the choice between a JV and
a WOS.
These results concerning individual effects are to a large extent comparable
to the findings of previous studies (see Table  2.1). Five variables turned  out
to have effects which deviated from earlier findings:
1. The level of competition has a negative effect on JVs, whereas previous
studies found a positive effect (Gomes-Casseres, 1990) or no effect at all
(Hennart, 1991; Kogut and Singh, 1988b; Larimo, 1993).
2. The experience with the host country has a positive effect on JVs, where-
as earlier research (Gomes-Casseres, 1989, 1990; Hennart, 1991; Pad-
manabhan and Cho, 1994) found the opposite.
3.   The   relative   size   of the foreign subsidiary turned   out   to   have a negative
effect on the likelihood of JVs, whereas former studies showed a positive
effect (Kogut and Singh, 1988b) or an insignificant effect (Hennart, 1991;
Larimo, 1993).
4. A U-shaped relationship between cultural differences and JVs was con-
firmed. So far, only linear positive (Agarwal, 1994; Agarwal and Ramas-
wami, 1992b; Benito, 1994; Erramilli, 1991; Erramilli and Rao, 1993;
Gatignon and Anderson, 1988) and linear negative (Madhok, 19943;
Padmanabhan and Cho, 1994) effects or insignificant effects (Larimo,
1993) were found.
5. In the present study, host government policy did not affect the choice
between  a  JV   and   a WOS. Studies that investigated less recently estab-
lished foreign entries provided significant support for an increased likeli-
hood of JVs (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1989,
1990;  Padmanabhan  and  Cho, 1994; Shane,   1993).
Nevertheless, most variables appear to affect the entry mode choice in the
same way as in previous studies. This comparison with previous studies
indicates that the different way of measuring the variables that is employed in
this  study (viz., multiple indicators, subjective  data and archival  data,  firm-
level and venture-level data, Dutch foreign entries) does not lead to very
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different results. For most variables, the effect seems robust for the precise
way in which it is measured.
Two different multinomial logit models were estimated. The first was based
on the division of equity as the criterion for classifying JVs into minority-,
50/50-, and majority-owned JVs. In the second model, the division of control
was used as the criterion. The results of both models, which are largely com-
parable to the results of the binomial logit model, showed manifestly that JVs
should   not be regarded   as one group of organizational forms. In contrast,
there are many differences among minority JVs, 50/50 JVs, and majority
JVs! ! !   Furthermore, the multinomial logit analyses revealed that differences
exist between the classification of JVs on equity and control. Minority-owned
JVs, for example, turn out to be not always identical to minority-controlled
JVs.
The    last   type of logit analysis concerns the ordered logit    model.    In    this
model, it is assumed that the categories of the dependent variable are ordinal.
Analogous to the multinomial logit model, two different orders are distin-
guished: one based on the level of equity and one based on the level of
control. The results   of   the two models indicate    that the models    are    not
invariant to the cutpoints, which implies that the coefficients of the explana-
tory variables are not independent from the mode of entry which is taken as
the cutpoint. This suggests that the four categories of the dependent variable
(minority JV, 50/50 JV, majority JV, and WOS) really differ from one
another, which is completely in line with the conclusion of the multinomial
logit analyses. The results, however, indicate that for some of the variables
an ordering exists  for  the four types of entry  mode (see Table  5.10).
In sum, the eclectic framework that was developed in this study turned out to
be not only conceptually, but also empirically superior to partial and less
comprehensive models. The methodology used proved    to be fruitful    for
capturing the complexities that are predominantly present in foreign entry
mode choices. A final conclusion is that minority JVs, 50/50 JVs, and
majority JVs should not be regarded as one group of JVs: they are genuinely
different forms of organization.
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6.3    Implications of the results
This section contains some 'translations' of the results to the practice of
decision makers. An attempt will be made to indicate what the implications
of both the framework and the results are for decision makers who are
responsible for selecting the appropriate mode of foreign entry.
Apart from choosing the country in which to enter, a firm has to choose the
mode of entry. The choice of the entry mode is a crucial decision, which
may   determine the success or failure   of the entry.    In some situations,    the
wrong choice may even threaten the survival of the firm. Therefore, it is of
the utmost importance to invest time and money in investigating and evaluat-
ing as many relevant variables as possible before the choice of entry mode is
made. The eclectic framework developed in this study is a useful instrument
for selecting the right mode of entry.
Every situation is unique. Therefore, the framework cannot be used without
making the necessary adjustments for the particular situation. Firms should
try to concentrate most of their attention on the variables that are most
relevant for their situation, and divide the remaining time over the less re-
levant ones. A further aspect that should not be disregarded is that some of
the variables which were not supported by the empirical data may turn out to
be relevant in individual settings. For example, when a firm actually pursues
a global strategy,  it is critical  that all, or almost all, activities are coordinated
centrally. In such a case, the need for full control may be more pressing than
in other circumstances.
The variables incorporated in the eclectic framework should not be con-
sidered on their own; their impact should be evaluated in conjunction with
the other variables. Depending on its specific situation, a firm may opt for a
WOS as the mode of entry in a culturally distant country, because it has
much international experience. This example illustrates that all relevant vari-
ables should be considered jointly, whereby possible JV-encouraging aspects
may be neutralized by WOS-encouraging aspects.
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When using the outcomes of this study, firms should always keep in mind
their limitations and the constraints imposed by stakeholders. For example, a
firm that wishes to set up a relatively large WOS but does not possess
sufficient financial resources to establish the subsidiary on its own, is forced
to  select a different   mode of entry, or withdraw   its  plan to invest.
A final important issue is that the intuition of decision makers is vital in
choosing the right entry mode. This holds particularly for situations in which
it is not possible to consider and evaluate all relevant variables. However,
intuition should not be the only basis for the selection of an entry mode.
Attempts to systematically detect the most decisive aspects in the firm's
environment remain important. This not only forces decision makers to
rethink their process of decision making critically,   but  also  facilitates  the
evaluation  of the choice  made.   Only then, firms can learn from their previous
decisions and choices.
6.4   Suggestions for further research
Like all studies, the present study has a limited scope. One can think of
many issues that are also interesting to investigate, but that are beyond the
scope of this study. As such, they can be labelled the limitations of the study.
In this final section, these issues are presented as suggestions for further
research. Five paths for additional research are proposed.
First, the present study used a static approach, which, by definition, only
gives insight into the situation at one moment in time. Of course, the firm's
environment is a dynamic setting characterized by many changes and devel-
opments. For instance, risky countries can become less risky  over  time,   and
vice versa. In addition, firms may also learn from their experiences, which
may affect their way of perceiving the (developments in the) environment.
These dynamic aspects are largely ignored when taking a static approach.
To incorporate more dynamism into a study on foreign entry mode choices,
more elements should be borrowed from dynamic approaches such as the
internationalization process model or Uppsala model  (see, e.g., Johanson  and
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Vahlne, 1977, 1990; Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975), the innovation-
adoption-inspired internationalization models (Andersen, 1993; Bilkey and
Tesar, 1977; Cavusgil, 1980), and the product cycle model (Melin, 1992;
Vernon, 1966, 1979). Particularly the internationalization process model,
which considers the internationalization of a firm to be an incremental
learning process, has been frequently corroborated in empirical studies (see,
e.g., Bilkey, 1978; Bilkey and Tesar, 1977; Cavusgil, 1980, 1982; Czinkota,
1982; Davidson, 1980, 1983; Denis and Depelteau, 1985; Ford et al., 1987;
Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Luostarinen, 1980; Newbould,
Buckley, and Thurwell, 1978; Tschoegl, 1982). However, in more recent
empirical studies, the Uppsala model   was not supported  (see, e.g., Benito
and Gripsrud, 1992; Engwall and Wallensthl, 1988; Hedlund and Kverne-
land, 1985, 1986; Johanson and Sharma, 1987; Nordstrom, 1991; Sullivan
and Bauerschmidt, 1990; Turnbull, 1987). This suggests that this dynamic
model is especially germane in the early stages of internationalization
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1990; Melin, 1992). Irrespective of the mixed support
for the dynamic internationalization process approach, it remains interesting
to incorporate more dynamic elements in a study on foreign entry mode
choices. Longitudinal studies rather than cross-sectional studies are required
to capture the dynamism.
A second suggestion for further research is to attempt to examine the role
and influence of intuition. In general, static approaches implicitly assume that
decision makers are able to evaluate the effects of all possibly relevant vari-
ables rationally. Such an evaluation is very complex, since hardly
quantifiable, hardly predictable, and sometimes even contradictory effects
have to be included. In practice, however, most decision makers are not
hyperrational. Hence, they partially base their decisions on their intuitions.
So far, the influence of intuition has received too little attention in the
literature on foreign entry mode choices. In-depth interviews with decision
makers and in-depth case studies may provide more insight into the balance
between ratio and intuition in foreign entry mode choices.
Third, the present study only focused on the incidence of JVs and WOSs.
Therefore, nothing can be said about the best mode of entry in terms of SUC-
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cess. One might say that the most successful mode of entry will most likely
be chosen by decision makers. However, this statement supposes that deci-
sion  makers are hyperrational. The questionnaire  used  in this study contained
one question on the success of the foreign venture. Most of the respondents
(61.9 per cent) indicated that they were satisfied with the performance of the
foreign subsidiary, whereas   only   7.1    per   cent was dissatisfied.43   For   the
remaining foreign entries no opinion could be given yet, since they were still
in the initial phase. The low percentage of failure and the high percentage of
'unknowns' makes that no conclusions can be drawn about the success and
failure of the foreign ventures. Therefore, in line with recent research (see
Barkema, Bell, and Pennings, 1996; Blodgett, 1992; Li, 1995; Woodcock,
Beamish, and Makino, 1994), more research needs to be done to gain insight
into the precise impact of variables on the success and failure of foreign
entries.
As described in Chapter 2, many different modes of entry can be distin-
guished. The fourth suggestion involves  the  use  of the eclectic framework
developed for analysing and testing the choice of entry modes other than JV
or WOS. Possibly, the framework needs to be adapted because of the specific
characteristics of the various entry modes.
Finally, it may be worthwhile to employ and test the eclectic framework of
this study in different settings, such as product-market entries and regional-
market entries. Furthermore, the foreign entry mode choice of firms from
one or more different home countries may be examined using this eclectic
framework. Then, possible country-of-origin effects can be filtered out.





The aim of this questionnaire is to gain insight into the choice of foreign
entry mode. In the present study, two possible entry modes are distinguished:
joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries. For both modes comparable
questions are included.
The questionnaire consists of three separate parts:
I        Introduction and definitions
II General questions
III Specific questions
The first part explains the way in which to fill in the questionnaire, and
provides definitions of important terms. Next, some general questions on
your firm will be posed. The third part contains a number of questions
related  to  the two modes of foreign entry.
I     Introduction and definition
Please read this introduction carefully before filling in the
questionnairel 1 1
The general questions concern the firm, division, or business unit where you
are currently working. Depending on your position, references to the term
'firm'   should be replaced by either 'division' or 'business unit'. Please
answer the questions from the perspective of the entity where you hold your
position.
The specific questions involve a foreign entry with a joint venture and a
wholly owned subsidiary. Please take notice of the following directions when
answering the questions:
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1. Think of a recent foreign joint venture the establishment of which you
were personally involved in.
2. Subsequently, answer the specific questions on joint ventures.
3. Do the same for a recently established wholly owned subsidiary.
Please fill in the questionnaire for both modes of entry. If it is impossible for
you to do so, please answer the questions for the mode of entry in which you
and your firm were involved. The questionnaire contains questions with a
7-point scale. Please circle the number that is most in line with reality.
Example: Suppose that the following question is asked: 'How was the
economic situation  in  the host country  when your firm entered that country?'.
The answer categories possible range  from  'very  good'  to  'very  bad'.
very good     7    6    5    4    3 2 1      very bad
If the host country's economic situation was very good, number '7' should be
circled. Analogously, number '1' should be circled if the situation was very
bad. If the economic situation can be characterized as somewhere between
very good and very bad, the number which best represents the economic
situation should be chosen. In case questions are not relevant to your
firm/division/business unit, write dow 'irrelevant'.
For the sake of clarity, the two modes of entry are defined as follows:
Joint venture: A form of partial cooperation between two or more firms,
whereby the partners have a stake in the newly established
entity and, in theory, are able to influence the decisions of this
new entity. Cooperation   is only partial because   not   all   the
activities of the partners are involved in the cooperation.
Wholly owned subsidiary: A (daughter) firm set up by one firm, the latter
being the only firm that is in the position to influ-
ence the decisions of the former.
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II General questions
The general questions involve your firm/division/business unit, dependent on




Sales  in   1992:
Ratio equity/total assets:
1.      How   much   experience   does   your  firm   have   with   international   oper-
ations ?
very much 765432 1     none
2.     How  many foreign joint ventures and/or wholly owned subsidiaries does
your jirm  have ?
ID       0 (You may stop here!)
0      1-10
E       11-25
El       26-50
ID       more than 50
3.       When   did   your   firm   set   up    its   first   foreign   joint   venture   or   foreign
wholly owned subsidiary?
0                 before   1920
[3       1920 - 1945
[3              1946  -  1980
E]     after 1980
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4.        What  appreciation  do  your  clients   have  for  your  firm  as   compared   to   its
competitors ?
very high 76543 2    1     very low
5.       Does   your   firm   invest    much   money   in   its   image    (e.g.,    brand   name,
quality image) as compared to competing firms?
very much 76543 2 1 nothing




b.    If   so,   please    indicate    the   sequence    of   preferences.    (Please   write
down 1 to the entry mode which is preferred most, a 2 to the mode
which is subsequently preferred, and so on.)
ID joint venture
[3 wholly owned subsidiary
ID  another mode,  viz.:
c.    Please  explain  this  sequence  of  preferences.
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III Specific questions
The following questions deal with the entry modes:
A joint venture (questions 7-36);
B wholly owned subsidiary (questions 37-63).
A: JOINT VENTURE
When answering the questions, please think of a foreign joint venture
which was recently established by your firm/division/business unit to
enter a foreign market.
1.       Name  of joint  venture   (A):
8.   Host country (X).
9.       a.    Year  of actual  establishment:            ....
b.  Year of dissolution:
E 19.
E] still in operation
Core activities:
10.     What   is   the   core   activity   of joint   venture   (A) ?
11.    To  what  extent  does  the  core  activity  of joint  venture   (A)  differ  from  the
core activities of your firm?
very much 765432 1     not
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12.    What   type   of  activities   are   carried   out   within  joint   venture   (A) ? (More
answers are possible!)
0 research and development
El production
El marketing and sales
0 other, viz.
Each  product  has a so-called life-cycle. This life-cycle  can be divided  into
four separate stages: introduction, expansion, maturity, and decline. The
introduction stage concerns the period in which a product is introduced to the
market. In the expansion stage, the sales of the product increase substan-
tially. Then, the speed of the increase decreases because of saturation of the
market (maturity stage). Finally, the demand for the product will become
negative   (i.e., the decline stage). Two different life-cycles   can be distin-
guished: (1) a life-cycle which focuses on the sales in the Netherlands; and
(2) a life-cycle based on foreign demand. In question 13, these life-cycles are
called the 'domestic' and the 'foreign' life-cycle, respectively.
13.    a.    Into  what  stage  of  the   'domestic'   life-cycle   could  the   core  activity   of






b. Into what stage of the 'foreign' life-cycle could the core activity of
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Relationship:




[3 more than 3
15.    What   is  the  equity  division  of joint  venture   (A)?
your firm: .... %
partner 1: .... %
partner 2: .... %
other partners: .... %
16.     How  much  actual  control  does  your  firm  have  over joint  venture   (A) ?
El majority
[3 as much as the partner (only in the case of one partner)
0 minority
Experience:
17.   a.   Did your firm  engage  in  one  or  more  foreign joint ventures before
joint venture (A) was set up?
0 yes
[3    no (please continue with question   18)
b.    What  was,   in  general,  your  experience  with  these  joint  ventures?
very good 76543 2    1     very bad
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c.  Please explain.
18.    How familiar  was  your firm with  the  characteristics  of country   (X)   (e.g.,
customer needs, inarket structure, culture, the division of power, the
attitude   towards  foreign  firms),   before  joint  venture   (A)  was   set  up?
very 765432 1      not
19.   a.   How much experience did your firm have in operating in country  (X)
before joint venture (A) was set up?
very much 765432 1     none
b.  What was your jirm's  reputation in country (X) before joint venture
(A) was set up?
very good 765432 1      very bad
c.  What was your firm's  reputation in the industry entered before joint
venture (A) was set up?
very good 765432 1      very bad
Input:
10.  a.  How much technological know how that on[v your firm possesses did
your firm contribute  to joint venture  (A)?
very much 765432 1      nothing
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b.    How   great   was   the   risk   that   other   firms   would   profit   from.    or   even
abuse, this unique know-how?
very great 765432 1 very small
21.    a.    How  many   skills   (such  as   management   techniques,   process   control,
quality control, marketing know-how) that onlv vour firm possesses
did  your firm  contribute  to  joint  venture   (A) ?
very many 765432 1 nothing
b.  How great was the risk that other jirms would profit from, or even
abuse, these unique skills?
very great 765432 1      very small
21.  a. How many natural resources (such as oil, wood, ore, coal, rubber)
from country  (X) did joint venture  (A) use?
very many 765432 1 nothing
b. To what extent were the natural resources used by joint venture (A)
easily  available?
very easily 7     6    5     4     3     2     1 not easily
Financial aspects:
13.    Did  your  firm   have   many  financial  resources  at  the  time  of  establishing
joint  venture   (A) ?
very many 765432 1     none
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24.  What is the relative size  (measured in invested capital)  of joint venture
(A) compared to your firm?
very large 76543 2     1 very small




b. What part of the sales of joint venture (A) is sold to other divi-
Sions/business units of your ftrm?
ID nothing
0 a minor part (less than 10%)
I  a major part (10% or more)
16.  a.  What was the annual growth in sales of the industry entered at the





b.  What was the chance of continuation of this sales growth?
very large 76543 2     1      very small
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Characteristics of country (X):
21.   What was the political stability  of country  (X) at the time of establishing
joint  venture   (A) ?
very good 765432 1     very bad
28.     What   was   the   economic    situation   in   country    CO    at   the   time   of   estab-
lishing  joint  venture   (A)?
very good 765432 1      very bad
19.     How   large   were  the   remaining   risks   (such  as   the   likelihood  of  natural
disasters, crop failure, strikes, and so on) related to investing in coun-
try   (X)  at  the  time  of  establishing  joint  venture   (A) ?
very large 7     6    5    4    3    2     1 very small
30. To what extent were there cultural diJIerences (e.g., with regard to
norms, values, customs, relationships with people) between country (X)
and your firm at the time  of establishing joint venture  (A)?
very many 7654321 none
31.    How  many   restrictions   (e.g.,   limitation   of  the  percentage  of  ownership
your firm could have,  meeting local requirements) did the  government of
country  (X)  impose upon your firm?
very many 7654321none
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31.  a.  To what extent did the government of country (X) stimulate (e.g., by
means of tax holidays, market protection, subsidies, low-interest
loans) your firm to cooperate with a local firm?
very much 765432 1      not at all
b. To what extent did the Dutch government stimulate your firm to
choose  a joint  venture  as  the  mode  of  entry ?
very much 765432 1       not at all
33.    To  what  extent  were  local  firms  in  country   OX)  attractive  regarding  their
level of knowledge and education?
very much 765432 1      not at all
Competition:
34.  How many potential competitors were present in the industry entered at
the  time  of establishing  joint  venture   (A) ?
very many 765432 1     none
35.    a.    What   was   the   intensity   of  competition   in  the   industry   entered  at   the
time  of establishing joint  venture  (A)?
very high 765432 1      very low
b. To what extent did a previous entry of a competitor in country (X)
influence the entry of your jirm?
very much 765432 1      not at all
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c.    To   what   extent   did   a  previous   entry   of  a  competitor   in   country    00
influence the entry mode choice of your jirm?
very much 765432 1       not at all
Success/failure:
36.    a.    Are  you  satisfied  with  the  performance  of joint  venture   (A),   or,  stated
differently, do you consider joint venture (A) successful?
0 yes
El no
[3 cannot be assessed yet
0   other,  viz.:
b. Please explain.
Please write down below any remarks you may have about joint venture (A),
country  (X)  or the questionnaire:
162 Appendix A: Questionnaire
B: WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY
When answering the questions, please think of a foreign wholly owned
subsidiary which was recently established by your firm/division/business
unit to enter a foreign market.
37.   Name of wholly owned subsidiary (B)
38.  Host country (Y):
39.  a.  Year of actual establishment.
b.  Year of dissolution:
EJ 19..
1 still in operation
Core activities:
40.    What  is  the  core  activity   of wholly  owned  subsidiary   (B) ?
41.    To  what   extent  does   the   core   activity   of  wholly   owned  subsidiary   (B)
differ from the core activities of your firm?
very much 765432 1     not
42.  What type of activities are carried out within wholly owned subsidiary
(B) ?   (More  answers  are  possible!)
[ 3 research and development
0 production
El marketing and sales
0 other, viz.
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Each product has a so-called life-cycle. This life-cycle can be divided into
four separate stages: introduction, expansion, maturity, and decline.     The
introduction stage concerns the period in which a product is introduced to the
market. In the expansion stage, the sales of the product increase substan-
tially. Then, the speed of the increase decreases because of saturation of the
market (maturity stage). Finally, the demand   for the product will become
negative   (i.e., the decline stage). Two different life-cycles   can be distin-
guished: (1) a life-cycle which focuses on the sales in the Netherlands; and
(2) a life-cycle based on foreign demand. In question 43, these life-cycles are
called the 'domestic' and the 'foreign' life-cycle, respectively.
43.    a.    Into  what  stage  of  the  'domestic'  life-cycle  could  the  core  activity  of
wholly owned subsidiary (B) be classified at the time of establishing





b. Into what stage of the 'foreign' life-cycle could the core activity of
wholly owned subsidiary (B) be classified at the time of establishing






44.     a.    Did  your  firm  engage  in  one  or  more  foreign  wholly   owned  subsidi-
aries before wholly owned subsidiary (B) was set up?
n yes
0 no (please continue with question 45)
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b. What was, in general, your experience with these wholly owned
subsidiaries ?
very good 765432 1      very bad
c.  Please explain.
45.    How familiar  was  your firm  with  the  characteristics  of  country   (Y)   (e.g.,
customer needs, market structure, culture, the division of power, the
attitude towards foreign firms), before wholly owned subsidiary (B) was
S et    up ?
very 765432 1     not
46.   a.   How much experience  did your firm have in operating  in country  (Y)
before wholly owned subsidiary (B) was set up?
very much 765432 1     none
b.  What was your firm's reputation in country  (Y) before wholly owned
subsidiary (B) was set up?
very good 765432 1      very bad
c.    What    was    your   firm's    reputation    in    the    industry    entered    before
wholly owned subsidiary (B) was set up?
very good 765432 1      very bad
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Input:
41.   a.   How  much technological know  how that only your firm possesses did
your firm  contribute  to  wholly  owned  subsidiary   (B) ?
very much 765432 1      nothing
b.    How   great   was   the   risk   that   other  firms   would   profit  from,    or   even
abuse, this unique know-how?
very great 765432 1 very small
48. a. How many skills (such as management techniques, process control,
quality control, marketing know-how) that only your firm possesses
did  your  firm  contribute   to  wholly   owned  subsidiary   (B) ?
very many 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 nothing
b.     How   great   was   the   risk   that   other  firms   would  profit   from,   or   even
abuse, these unique skills?
very great 7     6    5    4    3    2     1 very small
49.    a.    How  many   natural  resources   (such  as  oil,   wood,   ore,   coal,   rubber)
from country (Y) did wholly owned subsidiary (B) use?
very many 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 nothing
b. To what extent were the natural resources used by wholly owned
subsidiary   (B)   easily  available?
very easily 765432 1       not easily
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Financial aspects:
50.   Did your firm have many financial  resources at the ti,ne of establishing
wholly  owned  subsidiary   (B) ?
very many 765432 1     none
51.   What  is  the  relative  size  (measured  in  invested  capital)  of wholly  owned
subsidiary  (B) co,npared to your firm?
verylarge 765432 1 very small
51. a. Is the output (the products) of wholly owned subsidiary (B) sold
solely in country (Y)?
El yes
El no
b. What part of the sales of wholly owned subsidiary (B) is sold to
other divisions/business  units of your firin?
El nothing
El a minor part (less than 10%)
0 a major part (10% or more)
53.    a.    What  was  the  annual  growth  in  sales  of  the  industry  entered  at  the
time  of  establishing  wholly  owned  subsidiary   (B)?
strongly strongly
positive 765432 1 negative
b.  What was the chance of continuation of this sales growth?
very large 765432 1 very small
Appendix A: Questionnaire 167
Characteristics of country (Y):
54.     What  was   the  political   stability   of  country   (Y)   at   the   time   of  establishing
wholly  owned  subsidiary   (B) ?
very good 765432 1     very bad
55.    What  was  the  economic  situation  in  country   (Y)  at  the  time  of  establish-
ing wholly owned subsidiary (B)?
very good 765432 1     very bad
56.     How   large   were   the   remaining   risks    (such   as   the   likelihood   of  natural
disasters, crop failure, strikes, and so on) related to investing in coun-
try (Y) at the time of establishing wholly owned subsidiary (B)?
very large 765432 1 very small
51.    To   what   extent   were   there   cultural   differences    (e.g.,    with   regard   to
norms, values, customs, relationships with people) between country (Y)
and  your firm  at   the  time  of  establishing  wholly   owned  subsidiary   (B) ?
very many 765432 1     none
58.  How many restrictions (e.g., limitation of the percentage of ownership
your firm could have.  meeting local requirements) did the government of
country  (Y) impose upon your firm?
very many 765432 1     none
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59.    a.    To  what  extent  did  the   government  of  country   (Y)  stimulate   (e. g.,by
means of tax holidays, market protection, subsidies, low-interest
loans) your firm to cooperate with a local firm?
very much 7654321 not at all
b. To what extent did tile Dutch government stimulate your firm to
choose  a  wholly  owned  subsidiary  as  the  mode  of  entry?
very much 7654321 not at all
60.  To what extent were local firms in country (Y) attractive regarding their
level of knowledge and education?
very much 7654321 not at all
Competition:
61.   How many potential  competitors  were present  in  the  industry  entered at
the  time  of establishing  wholly  owned  subsidiary   (B)?
very many 7654321 none
61.  a. What was the intensity of competition in the industry entered at the
time  of establishing  wholly  owned  subsidiary   (B) ?
very high 765432 1      very low
b. To what extent did a previous entry of a competitor in country (Y)
influence the entry of your firm?
very much 7654321 not at all
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c.    To   what   extent   did   a   previous   entry   of   a   competitor   in   country    (Y)
influence the entry mode choice of your firm?
very much 765432 1       not at all
Success/failure:
63.    a.    Are   you   satisfied   with   the   performance   of  wholly   owned   subsidiary




C] cannot be assessed yet
El  other, viz.
b. Please explain.
Please write down below any remarks you may have about wholly owned
subsidiary (B), country (Y) or the questionnaire:
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1 For eleven entries, the host country was unknown.
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Steeds meer ondernemingen begeven zich buiten hun landsgrenzen. Mogelij-
ke redenen zijn de toenemende globalisering, een verzadiging van de thuis-
markt, de opkomst van nieuwe markten en de verkorting van de (mentale)
afstand tussen het eigen  land  en het buitenland. De toetreding tot buitenlandse
markten kan met veel verschillende problemen gepaard gaan, zoals bijvoor-
beeld taalproblemen, culturele verschillen, discriminatie en het ontbreken van
voldoende kennis over de markt. Al deze problemen beYnvloeden het succes
van de buitenlandse toetreding. Een deel van de problemen kan echter
opgevangen worden door de keuze van de vorm van toetreding.
In deze studie is onderzocht welke factoren doorslaggevend zijn bij de keuze
van de vorm van toetreding. Gezien de enorme verscheidenheid aan vormen
van toetreding is besloten om het onderzoek te beperken tot twee vormen van
toetreding, namelijk joint ventures (JVs) en 100% eigen vestigingen (WOSs),
die gebruikt worden om nieuwe activiteiten in het buitenland op te zetten.
Deze vormen zijn vergelijkbaar omdat voor beide vormen geldt dat gepartici-
peerd wordt in het aandelenkapitaal van de nieuwe vestiging. Het belangrijk-
ste verschil is echter dat in geval van een JV tenminste twee ondernemingen
samenwerken om het gestelde doel te behalen, terwijl bij een WOS slechts
een onderneming betrokken   is. Deze inperking   van het aantal verschillende
vormen van toetreding heeft geleid tot de volgende probleemstelling:
Welke factoren zijn van invloed op de keuze tussen een joint venture
(JV) en een 100% eigen vestiging (WOS) bij toetreding tot een buiten-
landse markt?
Om deze probleemstelling te beantwoorden zijn twee verschillende routes
gevolgd. Als eerste werd de theoretische en de empirische literatuur grondig
bestudeerd, wat leidde tot een aantal hypothesen. Vervolgens werd een
empirisch onderzoek uitgevoerd onder Nederlandse bedrijven om deze
hypothesen te toetsen.
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Uit de beoordeling en vergelijking van zeven belangrijke theorieen op het
gebied van internationalisering en strategie, kwam naar voren dat diverse
elementen van deze theorieen relevant zijn voor de beantwoording van de
probleemstelling. Op grond hiervan is besloten een nieuw model te maken
dat elementen bevat van vier belangrijke, complementaire partiale theoriean:
transactiekostentheorie, internalisatietheorie, strategisch gedragbenadering  en
de resource-based theorie (zie Figuur   3.2). Dit nieuwe, eclectische model
vormde de basis   voor de hypothesen die geformuleerd   zijn (zie Tabel   3.1).
Uit eerdere onderzoeken bleek dat het merendeel van deze hypothesen
invloed heeft op de keuze van de vorm van buitenlandse toetreding.
Om de hypothesen te toetsen werd een enqutte gehouden onder Nederlandse
ondernemingen waarvan verwacht werd dat ze tenminste 66n buitenlandse JV
of WOS zouden hebben. Er werd een bestand gemaakt van 459 Nederlandse
ondernemingen, divisies en business units, die allemaal telefonisch benaderd
zijn om de bereidheid tot deelname aan de enqudte te polsen. De enquBte
leverde gegevens op over 73 JVs en 95 WOSs. De gegevens die verzameld
zijn middels de enqutte reflecteren voornamelijk de percepties van de
managers die beslissen over buitenlandse toetreding. Deze percepties zijn
gecombineerd met meer objectieve gegevens die uit allerlei bronnen verza-
meld zijn.
De verzamelde gegevens werden gebruikt om de hypothesen in twee opeen-
volgende stappen te toetsen. Als eerste werd het meetmodel van de verschil-
lende variabelen geschat met behulp van confirmatieve factor analyse in
LISREL. Dit was nodig omdat de meeste variabelen gemeten werden door
meerdere indicatoren. Uit deze analyse bleek dat, op twee na, alle indicato-
ren goede meetinstrumenten zijn voor de variabelen. De output van deze
eerste stap werd gebruikt als input voor de tweede stap: het toetsen van de
hypothesen.
De hypothesen werden getoetst middels drie verschillende logit modellen:
binomial logit, multinomial logit en ordered logit. De resultaten van de
binomial logit analyse laten duidelijk zien dat het eclectisch model dat
ontwikkeld  is  in dit onderzoek niet alleen conceptueel,  maar ook empirisch
superieur is ten opzichte van particle theoretische modellen.
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Uit de binomial logit analyse blijkt 4at JVs meer waarschijnlijk zijn dan
WOSs als de onderneming veel ervaring heeft met het betreffende gastland,
de toegetreden bedrijfstak sterk groeit, de culturele verschillen tussen het
gastland en het moederland heel groot 6f heel klein zijn, een riskant land
wordt betreden en als het gastland een hoog welvaartsniveau kent. WOSs zijn
meer waarschijnlijk als de onderneming veel internationale ervaring heeft, de
concurrentie in de toegetreden bedrijfstak fel is, de nieuwe buitenlandse
dochteronderneming relatief groot is, de activa die getransfereerd worden
naar de buitenlandse dochter zeer specifiek zijn en de onderneming een goede
reputatie heeft. Drie variabelen (de strategie van de onderneming, haar
ervaring met de produkten en het beleid van de overheid van het gastland)
hebben geen effect  op de keuze tussen  een  JV  en  een  WOS.
Deze resultaten komen grotendeels overeen met de bevindingen uit eerdere
onderzoeken (zie Tabel   2.1).   Voor vijf variabelen geldt echter   dat   in   het
onderliggende onderzoek een afwijkend resultaat is gevonden. Bijvoorbeeld,
er is een U-vormig effect gevonden tussen de culturele verschillen tussen het
gastland  en het moederland   en de keuze  voor  een  JV. Dit effect   is   nog  niet
eerder in andere onderzoeken aangetoond. Gezien de overeenkomst met de
resultaten van voorgaande studies, kan geconcludeerd worden dat de afwij-
kende meetmethode die in de huidige studie is gebruikt (meerdere indicato-
ren, percepties en meer objectieve data, data op het niveau van de onderne-
ming en de nieuwe buitenlandse vestiging, Nederlandse ondernemingen) geen
grote consequenties heeft gehad voor de resultaten. Het effect van de meeste
variabelen lijkt robuust te zijn voor de wijze waarop ze gemeten zijn.
Er zijn twee verschillende multinomial logit modellen geanalyseerd. Het
eerste model was gebaseerd op de verdeling van het aandelenkapitaal van de
nieuwe vestiging als het criterium om JVs in te delen in minderheids JVs,
50/50 JVs en meerderheids JVs. In de tweede analyse is de verdeling van de
zeggenschap gebruikt als criterium. De resultaten van beide modellen, die
grotendeels overeenkomen met die van het binomial logit model, geven
duidelijk aan dat er vele verschillen zijn tussen de drie typen JVs. JVs
kunnen dus niet als tan groep van organisatievormen gezien worden! Tevens
lieten de modellen zien dat er verschillen zijn tussen de beide indelingscri-
teria (participatie in het aandelenkapitaal en zeggenschap).
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Tot slot zijn er twee ordered logit modellen geanalyseerd; voor beide inde-
lingscriteria 66n. Deze modellen gaan ervan uit dat er een volgorde zit in de
drie typen JVs. De resultaten laten zien dat deze volgorde slechts in geval
van een beperkt aantal variabelen aanwezig is. Voor het overige geldt dat de
resultaten overeenkomen met die van de multinomial logit modellen, namelijk
dat de drie typen JVs echt verschillend zijn!
De belangrijkste conclusies van dit onderzoek zijn dat het ontwikkelde,
eclectische model niet alleen conceptueel, maar ook empirisch superieur is
ten opzichte van particle theorieen. De afwijkende methodologie waarbij in
twee stappen de hypothesen worden getoetst en waarbij de perceptie van
besluitvormers is gecombineerd met meer objectieve data blijkt zeer goed in
staat om de complexe werkelijkheid van de keuze van de vorm van buiten-
landse toetreding te vatten. De laatste conclusie is dat minderheids JVs,
50/50 JVs en meerderheids JVs niet op 66n hoop moeten worden gegooid:
het zijn echt verschillende typen JVs!
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